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Education is considered to be very important for economic growth.  But family 
investments in education are much lower in developing countries compared to 
developed countries. This leads to the question whether families in developing 
countries are less inclined to invest and whether the market rates of return are very 
low; or that there are actually constraints to investment. Potential constraints are 
basic facilities for schooling and low incomes. These constraints might not only 
affect whether or not investments are made, but might also affect the extent and 
quality of investments made. Spending a full day in school with limited basic 
facilities might be less productive than going to school part of the day and rushing 
home to help in the family enterprise and learn the trade. Families in developing 
countries tend to face such constraints or “stumbling blocks” due to a multitude of 
factors and unexpected events which might result in sub-optimal human capital 
investments. In this dissertation we study two main constraints faced in the 
Indonesian developing country context: resource constraints in basic facilities – we 
use the access to and use of electricity for learning; and monetary constraints as 
captured by family income. 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the effects of inadequate basic facilities 
on learning; and the effects of low income on educational investment. We consider 
how these resource and income constraints affect the different dimensions of school 
quality and educational outcomes. This investigation is carried out using data for 
Indonesia over the period 1997 – 2000. To carry out this empirical analysis, we 
adopt theoretical models of human capital from Becker (1964, 1993 updated), and 
Cunha and Heckman (2007) and apply them within the context of Indonesian 
children’s primary school and junior high education. The dataset that we use 
throughout this dissertation is the RAND Corporation Indonesian Family Life 
Surveys (IFLS) Wave 2 from 1997 and Wave 3 from 2000. Because of this dataset 
that captures family strategic behavior in education, we are able to determine a 
non-income resource constraint and income constraint for the following reasons. 
First, as Indonesia is a large country there is sufficient geographic variation in 
infrastructure to study the constraint of electricity access and use on schooling. 
Parental investments in education differ in Indonesia because of huge variations in 
regional development across the country with an estimated population of 237 
million, land mass of 1.3 million km2 and over 13,000 islands. The main Java and 
Bali islands have more advanced levels of economic development, more waged 
labor opportunities and more schooling choice1. This is as opposed to the Outer 
Islands that consist more of subsistence economies, agricultural economies and 
                                                 
1 Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California at Berkeley 1991 3 
 
have lower levels of economic development. In terms of electricity infrastructure, 
Java and Bali have 77% of total capacity and the Outer Islands have the remaining 
23%. Also because the Outer Islands are located further away from the central 
government in Java and more difficult to access geographically there are fewer 
quality schools available. Second, Indonesia faced the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 
in end 1997 that lowered family incomes exogenously which provides us with an 
instrument for income to study the effects of family income on child labor and 
educational investments. Over the period of 1998 and 1999, the reduction in 
household incomes produced a variety of observable behavioral responses towards 
investment in education which makes this period ripe for a natural experiment2. 
The differences observed in family strategic behavior provide us with the 
opportunity to investigate various behavioral dimensions towards education.  
 
In Indonesia investment in education is a goal shared by the family and the state. 
This is highlighted in the opening chapter of the 1945 Republic of Indonesia 
Constitution which explicitly states that one major goal of the state is to ensure the 
intellectual development of all citizens of the country. While there is no 
compulsory schooling age, the family and the state attempt to invest in at least 9 
years of basic education for children aged 6 - 15. However, families face direct costs 
and opportunity costs for schooling. Hence having 9 years of schooling is 
considered an educational achievement in the country where only in recent 
memory, achieving full adult literacy was still a long overdue goal. With economic 
growth in Indonesia, there has been the expansion of schooling attainment. In the 
country’s thirty year growth trajectory 1967 - 1997 universal primary education was 
on target to be achieved and to be followed by an increase in junior high. By 1997, a 
peak of 80% of all school children who enrolled in school had attained 9 years of 
education in primary school and junior high while the remaining 20% dropped out. 
But after 1997 coinciding with the crisis, the percentage of children who attained 9 
years of schooling fell to 75% and the trend has since deteriorated to 52.6% in 2001; 
and this negative trend continues to hold after 20013.  
 
                                                 
2 Why is the financial crisis as a natural experiment an opportunity? First and foremost this is an 
opportunity because it is not possible to create a randomized controlled trial using the whole Indonesian 
population as treatment and control subjects. Second and lyrically, we cite the econometrics forefather 
Trygve Haavelmo (1944) and his thoughts on natural experiments: “the stream of experiments that 
Nature is steadily turning out from her own enormous laboratory, and which we merely watch as 
passive observers. The aim of the theory (behind experimental designs) is to become master of the 
happenings of real life.” Also more recently, Jared Diamond and James A. Robinson (2010) write about 
“Natural Experiments of History” on the basis that some central questions in the natural and social 
sciences can’t be answered by controlled laboratory experiments. One has to then devise other methods 
of observing, devising and explaining the world. 
3 Indonesia Ministry of National Education (MONE) 4 
 
In the literature on education in developing countries, children tend not to receive a 
full basic education mainly because of credit constraints where there is limited 
scope for borrowing in order to invest in education (Galor and Moav, 1999; Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 2000; Glewwe and Jacoby, 2000, Glewwe and Kremer, 2005). Most 
of the financial investment in education therefore has to be funded by the family. In 
Indonesia, up to 60% of total financing for education is funded by the family 
(World Bank, 2007). Hence how the family makes it decisions for educational 
investment is a crucial issue. This is as argued by Rosen (1989) and Glewwe and 
Kremer (2005) where it is not just credit constraints but the nature of family 
decision making as well that will provide a better understanding of how much 
education children attain. The parental decision to finance more or fewer years of 
schooling is influenced by the private rate of return to additional years of schooling 
(Psacharopoulos, 1994 and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). Parental decision 
making is also influenced by the value added to cognitive skills from each 
additional year of schooling (Harbison and Hanushek, 1992; Hanushek and 
Wößmann, 2010). Also Harbison and Hanushek (1992) find that some parents in 
developing countries are predisposed to education for their children simply when a 
minimum standard of school resources are available i.e. the school has a permanent 
physical structure as opposed to temporary arrangements. Because of the various 
considerations that parents make when deciding to finance their children’s 
education, it is no longer simply a question of having the financing to attend or not 
to attend school. The calculus of decision making involves how much schooling to 
attain, whether the school has sufficient resources, the quality of knowledge and 
skills accumulated; and parents’ perceived private and social returns to education. 
 
While studying the empirics of family income and human capital is interesting in 
its own right, these dissertation findings provide new information for development 
policymaking. National development planners in Indonesia and foreign aid donors 
have put much focus on improving school resources for the formal education 
system in order to achieve the country’s educational goals. The government builds 
more schools for formal education, buys more computers, trains more teachers and 
tinkers more with the academic curriculum. To complement this would be more 
understanding of the nature of decision making by parents for their children’s 
future  – the environment in which they live and not just the school specific 
environment for education, what they do each day, what difficulties they face each 
day and the multitudes of decisions they take for investing in their children. The 
findings in this dissertation provide some policy implications concerning how 
these two constraints affect educational investment decision making from a 
monetary and non-monetary perspective. These findings may perhaps be of useful 
application to the geographically large and socio-economically diverse developing 
countries of Brazil, China and India that are faced with varying school quality. 
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1.2 Human Capital Accumulation, School Resources, 
Outputs & Outcomes 
To carry out our empirical investigation, we review human capital concepts and 
introduce the ways in which we measure them as educational inputs, outputs and 
outcomes. These concepts and measures are derived from Becker (1964, 1993 
updated), Hanushek (2006), Hanushek and Wößmann (2008), Cunha, Heckman, 
Lochner and Masterov (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007). 
 
1.2.1 Human Capital Accumulation 
Following Becker, we view human capital as a stock of knowledge or skills that are 
directly useful in the production process. Becker also recognizes that knowledge 
and skills can be gained not just from school but from various sources and these 
sources are elaborated upon by the Coleman Report (1966). To capture the 
knowledge and skills from each additional year of schooling as a part of a total 
stock, we mainly use the Indonesian national standardized achievement test scores 
EBTANAS at the end of a given school level. Together with the initial endowments 
when the child is born which are unobserved, additional knowledge and skills 
increase the size of this stock. But the marginal benefits decline as additional capital 
is accumulated. This can be due to memory capacity, a requisite skill or ability that 
is not present to build new skills, etc. The implication is that eventually over the 
child’s life cycle, diminishing returns set in from producing additional capital (Ben-
Porath, 1967). It becomes more costly to accumulate more human capital when the 
child is older; and at a later school level compared to an earlier school level. To 
then maximize the returns to human capital, parents should increase the 
productivity of early knowledge and skills accumulated by making further 
investments when the child is older. This can be related to complementary 
investments in human capital (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov, 2006).  
 
1.2.2 School Resources 
To build a stock of knowledge and skills requires school resources or educational 
inputs for use in the educational production process. Using the structure of the 
Indonesia national education system and educational policy, we determine the 
characteristics of these school resources. Also we study how these school resources 
relate to school quality and the implications for how much or how little family 
income can do to acquire school quality (Glewwe, 2002 and Hanushek, 2009). Even 
if a family in a developing country has high income, they may reside in an area 
geographically that has limited schooling choice. This family for unobserved 
reasons may also have low mobility i.e. there might be a low inclination to migrate 6 
 
for education. As such they may be able to do very little using income to improve 
the quality of schooling inputs available in their residential area. 
 
The school resources that we investigate in Indonesia are school facilities 
particularly electricity, teacher qualifications, the curriculum taught, the 
availability of textbooks and the mode of learning. Closely related to school quality, 
we study how these schooling inputs differ for children in the high quality formal 
education system and children in low quality alternative education (non-formal 
and informal schools). 
 
1.2.3 Outputs 
As the Indonesian national educational system recognizes but differentiates 
between formal education and alternative education (non-formal and informal 
schools), we use different measures of school attendance for formal education and 
alternative education as educational outputs. For the formal education system, we 
use each year of school enrollment as an output measure. For alternative education, 
we use registration in a non-formal or informal school as a mode of learning as an 
output measure. For both formal education and alternative education, available 
data enables us to include as an output measure, time allocated to the learning 
process over the period of a day and a week. This output measure of time 
allocation includes the dimensions of time for classroom instruction and studying 
in the evening after school. Time allocation for schooling also enables us to analyze 
the relative value of a child’s time between schooling and work. 
 
1.2.4 Outcomes 
While many empirical studies define educational outcomes in terms of the number 
of years of schooling enrollment, we take a different approach by using the 
measure for transition between school levels as represented by the EBTANAS 
standardized achievement tests. The full set of tests for EBTANAS consists of the 
national language Bahasa Indonesia, Mathematics, Science, Social Studies and 
Religious Studies. By passing EBTANAS at the end of the primary school level, the 
child is qualified to transition to the junior high level.  
 
Only children in the mainstream, formal education system are entitled to directly 
sit for EBTANAS at the end of a school level. Children who are in alternative 
schools such as non-formal school for child workers and informal school for 
children who are home schooled or are child apprentices are entitled to sit for these 




Transition from one school level to the next is both an output and outcome of the 
educational process because it measures the number of schooling years attained 
and the level of knowledge and skills attained. This measurement indicator is 
important from both a technical and policy perspective. From a technical 
perspective, a child’s labor market outcomes in adulthood can be traced back to the 
number of schooling levels completed and qualifications attained for each level. In 
Indonesia’s structured and hierarchical education system, the first transition is 
from primary school to junior high. The second transition is from junior high to 
senior high. The third transition is from senior high to tertiary education. Each 
additional schooling year completed does not matter but each additional schooling 
level completed matters because of the qualification received at the end of a level. 
From a policy perspective, transition rates matter for the achievement of national 
educational policy and the Indonesia UN Millennium Development Goal #2 of 9 
years of universal basic education. 
 
We do not use enrollment as an outcome measure in any of the chapters for various 
reasons. Based on UNESCO technical guidelines, enrollment is recorded as 
registration on the first day of the school year. Or it is recorded during a census. As 
such this measurement indicator does not accurately capture school attendance 
flows throughout the school year. As pointed out by Krueger and Lindahl (2001), 
enrollment rates are then a flawed measure for human capital. Most importantly, 
Hanushek and Wößmann (2008) argue that using years of schooling enrollment as 
an education measure implicitly assumes that a year of schooling delivers the same 
increase in knowledge and skills regardless of the education system i.e. the 
difference between formal education and alternative education in Indonesia. The 
school enrollment measure also assumes that formal education is the primary 
source of education and variations in the quality of non-school factors affecting 
learning such as where children are raised and their daily learning environment i.e. 




This dissertation consists of five chapters4. Chapter 2 provides the departure point 
for the dissertation with a detailed description of the Indonesian national education 
system and an overview of the AFC context. This is then followed by a descriptive 
analysis of changes to Indonesian family educational investment behavior. The 
changes are documented by comparing families in 1997 and families in 2000 that 
                                                 
4 The five chapters have been revised from four individual papers. 8 
 
have similar characteristics. Also we justify using the crisis as a valid instrument 
for income. We show that the AFC is relevant because it is correlated with income 
and it is plausibly exogenous because it is not directly correlated with educational 
investments but through its correlation with income. As Chapter 2 maps out the 
role of the family in making educational investment decisions given available 
income and time, schooling prices and the institutional environment, we are able to 
then determine the two constraints for investment. We proceed to study the 
resource constraint in Chapter 3 and the income constraint in Chapters 4 and 5. For 
Chapters 4 and 5, we specifically use the AFC as an instrument for household 
income. From these chapters, we determine that there are two constraints to the 
amount and quality of educational investment: i) resources for basic facilities - 
electricity, ii) low family income. The resource constraint is a non-income constraint 
as it is not easily influenced by family income and together with the income 
constraint, affect the quality of schooling inputs used for education, the number of 
schooling years attained, the completion of school levels and educational 
achievement. Chapter 6 provides a summary of this dissertation and implications 
for policy. We will now elaborate on the structure of the chapters, methods used 
and the line of thought. 
 
1.3.1 Family Educational Spending when Income Falls 
In Chapter 2, we describe the national education system and the environment when 
the financial crisis occurred from end of 1997 - 2000. We then map out the role of 
the family in making educational investment decisions for children aged 6 – 15. 
This is given available income and time, real schooling prices and the institutional 
environment. We document changes to family decision making by comparing 
families in 1997 with families in 2000 that have similar characteristics. We carry out 
a review of the extensive literature that was written to document the volatile 
changes to prices and we isolate the price of schooling, incomes, consumption and 
schooling behavior. We show that parents respond to an income reduction by 
compromising on the quantity and quality of education that their children attain. 
We then report on the various strategies families in different geographical areas 
took for their children’s education. The documentation of these educational 
investment responses to the financial crisis then justifies the use of the crisis as a 
valid instrument for income. The crisis is used as an instrument in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
1.3.2 Electricity Access, Use and Children’s Educational 
Performance 
In Chapter 3, we study whether there is a correlation between the availability of 
electricity in schools and households and educational performance at age 12. The 9 
 
potential relationship between the two main variables of interest is via the use of 
electricity in school and at home. We use pooled data from 1997 and 2000 which 
consist of regional variation in electricity availability. We find that there exists a 
positive correlational relationship between access to electricity and educational 
performance. We find this result in both developed and underdeveloped, left 
behind regions of the country. However children in underdeveloped, below-the-
poverty-line areas have lower test score performance than children in developed 
areas. Using access to electricity, this chapter shows that the family can be 
confronted with overall resource constraints in basic facilities for schooling. When 
the educational performance of disadvantaged 12 year old children in 
underdeveloped areas is found to be lagging behind, resource constraints may 
prevent the children from progressing on to junior high. 
 
1.3.3 Family Income, Simultaneous Work-Schooling and 
Human Capital 
In Chapter 4, we investigate the relationship between family income and child 
labor in terms of the behavior of children who allocate time to work and attending 
school simultaneously. This chapter documents how child workers can choose to 
attend formal school, non-formal school or informal school. Using a natural 
experiment with IV estimation, we find that a fall in income results in a shift away 
from full time schooling to joint work-schooling. Within the joint work-schooling 
decision, an income decrease is also found to increase the propensity to shift more 
away from schooling and shift more towards work. Unexpectedly family income is 
not the main constraint that prevents full time schooling. What drives the joint 
work-schooling decision is the age of the child. After age 12, children are inclined 
to work more and attend school less which increases the risk of failing to complete 
a full course of 9 years of basic education.  
 
1.3.4 Dynamic Complementarity of Investment in Education 
In Chapter 5, we study the role of family income on financial and time investments 
in education. We apply the Cunha and Heckman (2007) theoretical formulation for 
the technology of skill formation. Using repeated cross sections from 1997 and 
2000, we find that about 80% of the cross-sectional link between income and 
educational expenditures is caused by differences in income. The remaining 20% is 
related to unobserved income related parental characteristics. But lower 
educational expenditures due to less income are highly compensated by time 
investments. This strongly implies that income related parental characteristics as 
well as unobserved child characteristics explain a substantial part of these 
compensating time investments. But this is only for higher ability children who 10 
 
have selected to complete primary school and transition to junior high. Also the 
reduction in educational expenditures is much lower for children who have already 
attained a few years of junior high education compared to children who have just 
begun junior high. This then suggests that optimal education investment does 
include accounting for the loss in returns from previous investments on the stock of 
human capital that has been accumulated. Put another way, parents do face a loss 
aversion where sunk costs do matter. Taken together these results reveal that 
income constraints do restrict parents in their educational expenditures, that they 
are concerned with future returns; and that especially parents with favorable 
characteristics compensate reductions in educational expenditures by letting their 
children spend more time in school. 
1.3.5 Main Findings and Implications 
The main findings of the dissertation are reviewed in Chapter 6 and we discuss the 
implications of the role of the family in increasing human capital in developing 
countries. By providing insight into the disadvantaged family and the resource 
constraints and income constraints they are confronted with, we will be able to 











In this chapter we describe educational spending in Indonesia and how it was 
affected by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The AFC reduced economic growth, 
increased unemployment, substantially increased inflation and severely reduced 
household purchasing power. Because of reduced income, households made 
adjustments to daily expenditures, savings and budget allocations for their 
children’s education.  
Our aims are to document how households spent on education before the crisis; 
how spending and schooling participation patterns changed in response to an 
income reduction; and how these patterns are influenced by where the household 
resides geographically in the Indonesian archipelago. Available data provides us 
with the opportunity to examine not just whether parents continued to spend on 
education and send their children to school when income fell but also the extent to 
which schooling quality changed, as well as how schooling participation was 
affected by the incidence of child labor.  
We trace the effects of extreme increases in the general prices of goods and services 
on household consumption and savings down to spending decisions for the child’s 
education. We document these responses for children in primary school and junior 
high. Regardless of extremely high levels of inflation and volatility in currency 
exchange rates, we find that the children still managed to receive an education. 
However the fall in household income reduced the quality of schooling purchased. 
We document an increase in the number of children in schools that have lower 
quality schooling inputs. We also find evidence that educational outcomes 
deteriorated. There is evidence too that a smaller proportion of children 
transitioned from the primary school level to the junior high level. 
Sparrow (2006) who studied Indonesia state intervention during the financial crisis 
found that targeted subsidies maintained enrollment flows; and it seemed to 
relieve pressure on household spending in education. We expand on Sparrow’s 
work on enrollment flows and study the quality of schooling inputs and outcomes 
at the time. We use measures that encompass different schooling inputs which 
includes school type (formal education and alternative education) and school 
provision type (publicly funded and managed and privately funded and managed). 
Our measures of educational outcomes are the EBTANAS national standardized 
achievement test scores and transition rates. The rest of the chapter is organized in 
the following way. Section 2.2 provides a general overview of the country. Section 13 
 
2.3 provides the context in terms of the AFC occurring at the time and a detailed 
description of the national educational system. In section 2.4 we describe the data 
and where we carry out a pair-wise matching of households and schools in the 
same community to enable comparison and use separate price deflators for 
education and non-education goods. In section 2.5 we map out the changes to the 
price of goods and services, household income and educational spending. Given 
these changes we analyze adjustments to the different parental spending strategies 
for their children. Section 2.6 covers the conclusions made from the documented 
changes and makes linkages to Chapter 3 which investigates how spending is 
influenced by where the household resides in the Indonesian archipelago. 
2.2 Indonesia Country Overview 
The Indonesian archipelago consists of over 13,000 islands spread across 1.3 million 
km2 with an estimated population of 237 million people speaking over 20 dialects 
and represented by highly diverse cultures. The unification language of the country 
is Bahasa Indonesia5. With population planning over 3 decades, the total fertility rate 
has fallen from 5.6 in 1971 to 2.8 in 19976. Map 2.1shows the main islands of the 
Indonesian archipelago – Java and Bali; the Outer Islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan 
(in Borneo), Sulawesi and the Eastern Nusa Tenggara cluster of small islands. 60% 
of the total population is in the main islands of Java and Bali which only make 7% 
of total land mass.  
                                                 
5 Unification of Indonesia is first set forth in the country’s 1945 Constitution Pancasila. 
6 Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics et al. (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) 1998 14 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of the Indonesian Archipelago 
 
2.3 Institutional Context – Asian Financial Crisis and 
National Educational System 
2.3.1 Asian Financial Crisis 
The AFC occurred at the end of 1997 with effects in the financial markets felt until 
the beginning of 2000. It had interrupted a thirty year period of rapid growth in 
East and South East Asia. In Indonesia, real per capita GDP rose four-fold between 
1965 and 1995 with an annual growth rate averaging 4.5% until the 1990s when it 
rose to almost 5.5% (World Bank, 1997). The poverty headcount rate declined from 
over 40% in 1976 to just under 18% by 1996. The country’s domestic savings level 
reached 30% prior to 1997. Primary school enrollment rates rose from 75% in 1970 
to universal enrollment by 1995 and secondary enrollment rates from 13% to 55% 
over the same period (World Bank, 1997).  
In April 1997, the financial crisis began to be felt in the Southeast Asian region, 
although the major impact did not hit Indonesia until December 1997 and January 
1998. With reference to the following Table 2.1, which consists of macroeconomic 
data, GDP growth fell from 4.70% in 1997 to -13.13% in 1998 and then rising to 
0.79% in 1999 before reaching pre-crisis growth rates in 2000. Annual inflation rates 
increased from 6.23% in 1997 to 58.39% in 1998 and then improving to 20.49% in 
1999 before resuming a considerably lower rate of 3.72% in 2000. The trend for 15 
 
gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP presented a pattern of offsetting the 
massive spike in inflation rates. While savings were at a high of 31.48% in 1997, 
there was a decreasing trend from 1998 to 2000.  
Table 2.1 Indonesia Macroeconomic Variables Time Series 1997 – 2000 
 
 
1997  1998  1999  2000 
 
GDP Growth (Annual %)  4.70  -13.13  0.79  4.92 
 
GDP Per Capita Growth  3.27  -14.30  -0.55  3.55 
          Inflation, Consumer Prices 
(Annual %)   6.23  58.39  20.49  3.72 
 
Real Interest Rates (%)  8.21  -24.60  11.83  8.05 
 
Gross Domestic Savings 
(% GDP)  31.48  26.53  19.45  25.56 
          Foreign Aid (% GNI)  0.39  1.41  1.64  1.19 
Sources: Development Research Institute, New York University; Global Development Finance, World 
Development Indicators 
For the household, much of the impact of the aggregate shock was felt in the 52.16 
percentage point or eightfold increase in inflation rates from 1997 to 1998. Inflation 
rates were then less substantial in 1999. The significant increases in inflation rates 
for the two years 1998 and 1999 compared to 1997 and 2000 would most likely have 
severely weakened household purchasing power of all goods including education.  
On this basis we focus on the relationship between price changes and household 
income and how this relationship affected educational spending and outcomes. 
2.3.2 National Educational System 
The following Figure 2.2 shows the organizational structure of the formal and 
mainstream school system in Indonesia. The formal school system is divided into 
two streams, namely the secular stream under the Ministry of National Education, 
MONE (public and private) and the Islamic stream under the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, MORA (public and private). There are also Christian and Buddhist schools. 
The extent to which the emphasis is on skills development in language and 
mathematics or religion depends on whether the education provider is publicly or 16 
 
privately funded and whether the education provider is regulated by MONE or 
MORA.   
Contrary to practices in many other countries, the public sector provides higher 
quality education than the private sector (Lanjouw, Pradhan, Saadah, Sayed and 
Sparrow, 2001; Newhouse and Beegle, 2005). The differences in quality between 
public and private schools are in terms of schooling inputs (Newhouse and Beegle, 
2005). Based on their studies of junior high schools, in public schools textbooks are 
more easily available and teachers have higher educational qualifications 
compared to private schools. 
Since the end of the Suharto regime and the introduction of regional autonomy 
laws, there is an increasing trend of schooling provision by religious associations 
and non-governmental organizations. These private providers of education retain 
the option to adjust the curriculum to a greater extent to meet local indigenous 
needs. These include a curriculum covering local agricultural farming methods, 
environmental education and local culture - traditional arts and languages / 
dialects. 17 
 




















Source: Ministry of National Education & Ministry of Religious Affairs (MONE & MORA) 
Notes: We study the 9 years of Basic Education of Indonesian children aged 6 – 15 which is defined as 
being their school age as opposed to birth age. While the starting school age for primary school is 7 
years old, there are some children who start at 6 years old. In 1997, 18% of children reported repeating 
one school grade once and in 2000, 15% of children reported repeating one school grade once in their 
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Figure 2.3 shows the expanded organizational structure of the education system 
that incorporates both formal schooling and alternative schooling. In this figure, 
formal schooling is represented by in-school education and non-formal and 
informal schooling are represented by out-of-school education. For disadvantaged 
children e.g. child workers who have fewer fulltime educational opportunities the 
education system provides two alternatives to the formal, mainstream system – the 
non-formal school and informal school / education by the family. 
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The non-formal school system consists of equivalency educational programs, 
Packet A (equivalent to primary school) and Packet B (equivalent to junior high); 
and vocational training programs provided by non-governmental organizations. 
Private religious schools funded from charitable contributions and not 
administered by MORA also provide non-formal education. Children who choose 
the equivalency educational programs have the flexibility of customizing time for 
learning around time for working. For example, if a child has to work on the farm 




In formal basic education, children are taught a compulsory curriculum of the 
national language Bahasa Indonesia and Mathematics. Other courses taught include 
Religion, Pancasila, Moral Education, Social Sciences, Natural Sciences, Sports and 
Health, Handicraft and Art, Regional Languages and courses termed as Local 
Indigenous Content. The ratio between the national and local curriculum content is 
80%-20%. Table 2.2 provides information concerning the national curriculum 
Table 2.2 Structure of Academic Hours per Week for the National Curriculum by 
the Primary School Level and Junior High Level 
 
    Primary School  Junior High 
  Subject  1  2  3  4  5  6  1  2  3 
1  Pancasila 
Education 
2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
2  Religion  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
3  Bahasa Indonesia  10  10  10  8  8  8  6  6  6 
4  Mathematics  10  10  10  8  8  8  6  6  6 
5  Natural Sciences  -  -  3  6  6  6  6  6  6 
6  Social Sciences  -  -  3  5  5  5  6  6  6 
7  Handicraft and Art  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
8  Health and Sport  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
9  English  -  -  -  -  -  -  4  4  4 
10  Local Indigenous 
Content 
2  2  4  5  7  7  6  6  6 
  Total  30  30  38  40  42  42  42  42  42 
Source: Ministry of National Education (MONE) 
Notes: Pancasila Education is concerned with studying the principles enshrined in Indonesia’s 
Constitution. 
At the end of each school level children sit for the compulsory EBTANAS national 
standardized achievement tests or also known as the national end-of-cycle tests. It 
is a requirement that children sit for this test to enable them to transition to the next 
level. EBTANAS is considered to be a proxy for child ability and it is a 
standardized test designed by the Ministry of National Education. Standardization 
of the achievement tests was carried out in 1994. These tests enable quality 
comparisons to be made across schools in the different main islands and provinces 
in the country.  20 
 
Table 2.3 provides national level time series data that shows the proportion of 
children who complete the full course of 6 years of primary school and 3 years of 
junior high. 
Table 2.3 Proportion of Grade 1 Cohorts Completing 9 Years of Education, Time 
Series 1997/98 – 2001/02 
 
1997/98  80.00% 
1998/99  75.00% 
1999/00  73.30% 
2000/01  52.40% 
2001/02                           52.60% 
Source: Ministry of National Education & Ministry of Religious Affairs (MONE & MORA) 
Notes: The Grade 1 cohort is defined as the group of children who start Grade 1 at the end of age 6 or 
beginning age 7 in the national education system in a given year. The proportion of a Grade 1 cohort 
completing 9 years of education is the number of children who complete each of the 6 full grades of 
primary school; qualifies and transitions to then complete each of the 3 full grades of junior high divided 
by the total number of children who start Grade 1. The numerator is smaller than the denominator when 
children drop out or repeat a grade. To illustrate, in 1997/98, 80% of all children who started Grade 1, 9 
years before 1997/98 completed the full course of primary school and junior high while 20% failed to 
complete the 9 years. 
In the context of the Asian Financial Crisis, in the school year 1997 / 98 80% of all 
children who started Grade 1, 9 years before 1997 / 98 completed the full course of 
primary school and junior high. However over the period of the crisis, this rate 
declined to 75% in the school year 1998 / 99 and to 73.30% in the school year 1999 / 
00. By the school year 2001 / 01 which is after the crisis, the rate deteriorated further 
to 52.40%. Suryadarma, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2006) investigate this declining 
trend where they find that there is near universal primary school attendance but 
attrition occurs after the children sit for EBTANAS and do not transition to junior 
high. 
Children who attend non-formal schools do not sit for EBTANAS. As a substitute 
they take the primary school level or junior high level equivalency tests (Packet A 
or Packet B) which are set at a lower level than EBTANAS. The timing of taking the 
equivalency tests is independent of the child’s school age. This means that the child 
can sit for the primary school equivalency tests even though s / he is older than the 
school age of 7 – 12. Likewise the child can sit for the junior high equivalency tests 
even though s / he is older than the school age of 13 – 15. Because of the structure of 
equivalency tests in the national education system, one of the tradeoffs for the child 
choosing this source of skill formation is the s / he falls behind children of the same 
school age in the formal system. This is related to the lower amount of time 
allocated for learning and the flexibility in completing course work. Another 21 
 
tradeoff is that the child forgoes the EBTANAS credential for entering the labor 
market. This is unless the child enters the formal system and starts the education 
process from the beginning at grade 1. 
 
The informal school is a source of skill formation that is derived from education or 
skill development in the home. This includes apprenticeships, learning-on-the-job 
or home production / domestic work. Children from informal schools also do not 
sit for EBTANAS. However like children in non-formal school, they sit for the 
equivalency tests. Children who make this schooling choice experience different 
tradeoffs from children in non-formal schools. On the one hand, these children are 
developing productive skills within the family business or trade and these skills 
may also have private returns in the economy. The acquisition of such skills is 
consistent with Becker’s theory of human capital accumulation. On the other hand 
the tradeoff is that these skills may be valued in the economy as unskilled or low 
skilled wages in comparison to the premium that skilled wages receive in the labor 
market. However the wage premium for skilled labor in the economy is dependent 
on the characteristics and relationships of the formal and informal sectors in 
Indonesia. Another tradeoff of skill acquisition from the informal school is that if 
parents perceive a higher value from the children working and learning within the 
family business, their children will spend more time in the household and be less 
inclined to allocate time for attending school.  
For this chapter we focus on basic education consisting of primary school, ages 6 – 
12; junior high school, ages 13 – 15 and the alternative schooling equivalent for 
these school ages. But we do not provide an in-depth analysis of alternative 
schooling in this chapter. We will do this in Chapter 4 when we examine the 
incidence of simultaneous work-schooling behavior. 
The education system is financed in broad terms by four sources: 1) funds from 
general government revenue 2) government revenues earmarked for education 3) 
tuition and other fees 4) voluntary contributions. In terms of the first two sources, 
this refers to central and regional government where by constitutional law, the 
central government should fund 20% of the total funding required each year. 
Revenues earmarked for education include foreign aid assistance. The third source 
of funding comes from the household and this varies based on the number of 
children being sent to school at the same time. The fourth source includes gifts 
from individuals, communities, charitable and religious bodies, domestic or 
foreign, whether in cash, kind or services; endowments, commercial or private 
loans; and the schools’ own efforts to raise funds (Daroesman, 1971). Based on 
World Bank records (2007), the general split of funding sources for the education 
system is 1) central government, 20% 2) regional / local government, 20% and 3) 
other sources including parents’ contributions, 60%. 22 
 
In end 1998, during the period of the financial crisis, MONE / MORA introduced a 
scholarship and block grant program for disadvantaged children in primary and 
junior high schools. This subsidy program was aimed at maintaining enrollments 
and maintaining the quality of basic education at pre-crisis levels. The scholarships 
were provided to the schools who then selected the children who would receive the 
scholarships. Groups of children identified by MONE / MORA as having the 
highest likelihood of dropping out of school because of the crisis were students 
from households with reduced incomes; primary school leavers who were not 
likely to transition to junior high; junior high school leavers who were not likely to 
transition to senior high; and girl teenagers who did not complete primary and 
junior high schooling. These groups of children were targeted by MONE / MORA 
as being in the poorest schools in a district and this was defined as schools in low 
income districts; schools that required parents to make higher than average 
monthly scheduled payments to cover operating costs; and schools that served 
students who live in government designated left behind villages (INPRES Desa 
Tertinggal, IDT). However it was acknowledged by MONE/MORA that it did not 
have full information concerning school conditions and the socio-economic 
background of the disadvantaged communities. This is because such information is 
mostly unavailable at the aggregate district level.  
Using this description of the Indonesian education system, we document 
household spending behavior that includes the different groups of children defined 
as being at risk of dropping out. Given the institutional context, educational 
spending behavior entails credit constrained parents making decisions on whether 
to finance their children’s education given upfront costs and delayed benefits and 
the mechanics of how their children receive an education.  Various schooling 
participation strategies available to parents were - children could attend formal 
schooling or alternative schooling – religious schooling, home schooling 
apprenticeships, on-the-job training or a combination of methods.  Within one 
school day, children could spend half their time in school and the other half of the 
time working with livestock, learning local animal husbandry.  
2.4 Data 
The dataset that is used is the RAND Corporation Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
(IFLS). We use Waves 2 – 1997 and 3 – 2000. The sample size for Wave 2 is 10,356 
individual observations and for Wave 3 it is 11,686 individual observations. Data 
for Wave 2 was captured at the end of 1997 when the financial crisis was about to 
occur and data for Wave 2 was captured at the end of the financial crisis in 2000. 
We use data from Wave 2 concerned with retrospective economic and schooling 
behavior covering the calendar year January – December 1997 and retrospective 23 
 
behavior for the school year July 1996 – June 1997.  Similarly we use data from 
Wave 3 concerning retrospective economic and schooling behavior covering the 
calendar year January – December 2000 and the school year July 1999 – June 2000. 
IFLS consists of an additional Wave 2+ which was collected during the period of 
the financial crisis but this data is not publicly available. So we assume that the 
market source of price changes experienced by the household by its given location 
in 1999 is the same in 2000.  
We merge observed data on household income to observed data on educational 
spending from separate IFLS books using an ID that matches the child aged 6 – 15 
to the household7. Only biological parent-child relationships are considered. We 
then proceed to match income and education spending data to schooling data from 
another IFLS book. The schooling data that we have covers the schools available to 
the children within each community. In the observed data, all children can reach 
their school in not more than thirty minutes whether they go on foot or by using 
different modes of transportation. In the data, we find that a child can report 
attending more than one school in the community in a school year. This can be seen 
by the presence of more than one school ID matched to each child.  The school 
types available are either MONE / MORA registered, publicly funded and 
managed; MONE / MORA registered, privately funded and managed or non-
registered schools with alternative learning methods. Also the schooling data 
covers information on whether the children benefitted from the national 
educational scholarship and whether schools participated in the block grant 
program for the school years 1999 and 2000. In the observed data, 4% of all children 
received MONE / MORA scholarships for the school years 1999 and 2000. 
Educational spending data is captured in IFLS as the annual amount of household 
spending on education. In the observed data, educational expenditures consist of 
one time payments in the school year and streams of repeated payments across the 
school year. One time payments are the registration fee on the first day of the school 
year, the fee for taking the exams at the end of the school grade, a set of textbooks 
for the current school grade, writing supplies, uniform, sneakers and sports 
equipment. Repeated payments within the school year consist of the monthly 
scheduled parental contribution to the school’s operating costs, transportation to 
and from school and private tuition outside of school hours. As described in Section 
2.2.2 parental contributions for keeping the school running makes up a dominant 
60% of total funding required.  
As comparable income and education variables are available in Waves 2 and 3, we 
carry out a pair-wise matching of children in 1997 and 2000 that have the same age 
                                                 
7 While the school age for starting primary school is 7, some children start primary school at age 6. 24 
 
group, household and schooling characteristics. These characteristics include where 
children reside and go to school in terms of island, province and urban-rural, school 
type; whether they have repeated a grade in primary school or in junior high8, the 
curriculum and by the school age of 12, the EBTANAS test score. Because of the 
consumer price variation over the period, we can then compare changes to spending 
strategies for children in the same age group progressing through the same 
educational system. In the next section, we will use general prices, income and 
education prices to document the changes. 
2.5 Prices, Income and Education  
2.5.1 Price Indices 
In this sub-section, we describe the price deflators in use, why we choose certain 
price deflators over others and the reasoning for the type of goods and services to 
include or exclude from the computations.  
As a departure point, we review the price and quantity data used by the Indonesia 
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) to calculate consumer prices and to estimate 
household purchasing power. BPS uses the Modified Lespeyres formula to 
calculate real prices. The bureau collects price and quantity data at the national 
level and provides information on household level consumption using the BPS 
SUSENAS household surveys. But we are unable to use the BPS price and quantity 
data for a more detailed analysis. This is because the BPS baseline quantities for 
urban areas are from 1996 and for rural areas from 1993, both periods that are 
before the financial crisis which are not representative of consumer prices during the 
crisis; and both baseline quantities had not yet been revised at the time of the crisis. 
To cover the period of prices before and during the financial crisis, we then 
reference Levinsohn, Friedman and Berry (1999) who have done extensive work 
measuring price changes and have the most available and reliable data. They use 
the Modified Lespeyres price deflator and the aggregate level SUSENAS data and 
their estimates capture 184 products and the price changes from January 1997 
through October 1998. These changes are estimated across provinces and as a 
consequence might not capture changes at the disaggregated community level and 
household level. Nonetheless this helps us to understand the general movement of 
prices even though further price data until beginning 2000 is not available in their 
calculations. Their estimates are in Table 2.4 which captures the price changes of by 
aggregated product groups.  
                                                 
8 In 1997, 18% of children reported repeating a grade once and in 2000, 15% of children reported 
repeating a grade once. 25 
 




















Foodstuff  262  1.13  0.81  -0.68  6.12 
 
Prepared Foods  72  0.78  0.42  0.00  1.69 
 
Housing  105  1.08  0.76  0.00  4.99 
 
Clothing  94  0.80  0.46  0.00  2.14 
 
Health Services  38  0.86  0.51  0.00  2.63 
 
           
Education and 
Recreation 
43  0.77  0.72  -0.10  3.10 
 
           
Transportation  48  0.77  0.84  0.00  4.82 
Notes: Price increases calculated by Levinsohn, Friedman and Berry are from January 1997 through 
October 1998. The price deflator used is the Modified Lespeyres. Average price increases are computed 
as the average across all provinces reporting price data for a given good. 
The average price increase for foodstuff is 112.8% and for housing is 107.7% from 
January 1997 to October 1998. The price increase for education at all school levels & 
recreation are lower at 77% from January 1997 to October 1998.  
Despite the lack of representativeness of data on quantities during the crisis, BPS 
reports similar levels of price increase. This can be seen in the following Table 2.5 
which shows estimated prices changes for each year from 1997 to 2001. Reconciling 
the estimates from the two sources, Levinsohn et al and BPS, consumer prices for 
the different product groups increased in the range of 77% to 159% (1.77 to 2.59). 
We use this range to get an idea about the magnitude of change in prices as a result 





Table 2.5 Consumer Price Index  
 
 
Product Aggregate  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
           
General Index  111.83  198.64  202.45  221.37  249.15 
 
Food and Food 
Services 
120.54  263.22  249.54  259.53  290.74 
 
           
Prepared Food, 
Beverages, Tobacco 
108.88  211.58  219.20  243.49  278.75 
 
 
Housing  107.84  159.03  166.77  183.61  208.57 
 
Clothing  110.58  219.71  233.21  256.98  277.90 
 
Pharmaceutical 
Products & Medical 
Services 
 
114.18  212.54  220.37  241.46  262.99 
Education, Recreation 
& Sports 
117.27  161.84  170.44  200.28  224.12 
           
Transportation & 
Communication 
105.24  163.70  172.20  194.00  221.47 
Source: BPS 
Using IFLS data for prices and quantities which were collected in 1997 and 2000, 
we measure disaggregated per capita household income using consumption and 
savings divided by the number of members in the household. By choosing the per 
capita measurement, we account for differences in household size. Regardless of 
how big or small the household size and how income is shared, we focus on the 
amount of consumption and savings for the child’s education. We choose to use 
consumption instead of income because the latter suffers from measurement error. 
In the observed data, we find difficulties with substantial missing values for 
income which we do not think we can adequately manage through imputing 
values. Missing values were recorded for various reasons including lack of recall 
for monthly income over the year; different household interpretations of what 
constitutes as income such as gifts from extended family members; and inaccurate 27 
 
estimates stemming from various types of short term income generating activities 
over the period of the financial crisis. We include savings in the measurement based 
on the empirical evidence that savings in developing countries play an important 
role in financing education. As pointed out by Deaton (1989) savings in developing 
economies often play a crucial role as a buffer between income and consumption. 
In our calculation we assume savings to consist of currency, bonds and stocks on 
hand given the period of observation; there is no accumulated stock. Goods and 
services that originate from in-kind transfers and self-production are excluded from 
this calculation. This is because the schools in our observed data receive monetary 
payments and not goods or services as payments. As such we calculate 
consumption and savings on the basis of goods and services in the IFLS that have 
market prices and the price deflator used is Modified Lespeyres9. The price index 
computed for household income is 1.99 where the base year is 1997. By using the 
Modified Lespeyres deflator for household income, we have the same official price 
deflator that is used in Indonesia. However the price changes that we measure are at 
the household level and not at the aggregate national level. Nonetheless  our 
computations show that price changes faced by the household are similar to the 
national level.  
We do not use the alternative Tornquist-Spatial deflator which will give a different 
result from the Modified Lespeyres deflator. The computed index for To rnquist-
Spatial is 2.0610 where the base year is 2000 using IFLS data. The main reason that 
we choose not to use the Tornquist-Spatial deflator is because we would like to 
study price differences while holding quality constant. The Tornquist-Spatial 
deflator uses 2000 instead of 1997 as the base year with the main reason to capture 
both price and quality effects to determine if the standards of living in 2000 after the 
crisis are the same as 1997 before the crisis. Also the Tornquist -Spatial deflator 
captures price differences geographically using Jakarta as the index  because 
available price data from IFLS has an urban reporting bias 11 which will overstate the 
value of goods and services from rural areas when compared with urban areas; and 
overstate the value of goods and services from other regions when compared with 
Jakarta. Furthermore the Tornquist-Spatial deflator does not capture the prices of 
seasonal goods and services while the Modified Lespeyres deflator does.   
For calculating the cost of education, we construct our own price deflator for 
education using available data on the wages of primary and junior high school 
                                                 
9 The modification for this deflator is a different treatment for elementary and seasonal goods and 
services. For elementary goods and services, the arithmetic mean for price relatives is used. For seasonal 
goods and services, the geometric mean is used. 
10 We thank the RAND Corporation for the price data to compute the Tornquist – Spatial index 
11 IFLS price data comes from BPS. Weekly price data is primarily collected from urban centers and less 
from remote rural areas. 28 
 
teachers that are in the same schools in the same communities in 1997 and 2000. 
Data on other education costs is not available. The price index computed for 
education is 2.47 where the base year is 1997. Wages are used because changes over 
time are caused by the price effect and not the quality effect. The education price 
deflator enables us to hold school quality reasonably constant in 1997 and 2000 to 
isolate the pure income effect on education. One of the drawbacks of using teacher 
wages is family educational spending is primarily for school fees and monthly 
scheduled payments to cover school operational costs and not teacher wages. 
However the cost of schooling related fees are nonetheless indirectly related to 
teacher wages. We use this price deflator for education specifically covering primary 
school and junior high instead of using the Modified Lespeyres deflator which is 
computed using savings and all consumption goods including education at different 
school levels.  
Table 2.6 provides a summary of the different price indices. A review of these price 
indices show that price changes for different consumer goods at the national 
aggregate level are in a similar range as at the disaggregated household level. As 
such our choice of the Modified Lespeyres deflator for household income and our 
self-constructed priced deflator for education are robust for computing real prices. 29 
 
Table 2.6 Price Indices 
 
Price Deflator  Data for 
Quantities 
Base Year  Index 
 
Modified Lespeyres for 
income  




surveys and BPS 
(Table 2.4) 






Modified Lespeyres for 
income 
BPS (Table 2.5)  1996 – urban 
1993 - rural 
1.94 – 2.59 
 
 
















Our self constructed 
deflator for education 
Our calculations 
using IFLS 
1997  2.47 
2.5.2 Income 
Using the Modified Lespeyres price deflator where the index is 1.99, we calculate 
changes to household income per capita between 1997 and 2000. These changes are 
expressed in log terms. We find that average household income per capita 
decreased by 1.89 log points from 1997 to 2000. Median income per capita has 
decreased by 1.97 log points between the two periods. These descriptive statistics 
are in Table 2.7. 30 
 
Table 2.7 Household Income Per Capita  
 
 
   Mean 
  
Median        SD  Minimum  Maximum 
1997 
          General  16.3191  16.2909  0.8207  12.4408  21.8592 
            Urban  16.3011  16.2639  0.8789  9.3359  21.8588 
            Rural  15.9193  15.9366  0.8155  12.2584  20.3557 
            2000 
          General  14.4276  14.3259  0.8688  11.7272  19.2953 
            Urban   14.2581  14.1296  0.9256  12.0122  19.2413 
            Rural  13.7335  13.6622  0.7653  11.1641  18.1649 
            Notes: The measurement for household income is consumption and savings. Consumption is measured 
using the market valued prices of goods and services. The price deflator used for the calculations is the 
Indonesian official Modified Lespeyres, index is 1.99. The IFLS price data comes from BPS price tracking 
which has an urban bias because prices predominantly come from urban outlets spread across 
Indonesia. The values of in-kind transfers and own production are not included. Savings is measured 
using cash on hand, bonds and stocks at the point in time observed. 
From this table, rural incomes were lower than urban incomes in both periods. 
Reduced income and increased consumer prices point towards a severe 
deterioration in household purchasing power. This weakened purchasing behavior 
occurred for most households and this can be seen in the household income per 
capita distribution in the following Figure 2.4. There is a shift leftwards of the 
income distribution and there is a lower peak in the distribution in 2000 with more 
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Notes: The measurement for annual household income is consumption and savings. Consumption is 
measured using the market valued prices of goods and services. The price deflator used for the 
calculations is the Indonesian official Modified Lespeyres, index is 1.99. The IFLS price data comes from 
BPS price tracking which has an urban bias because prices predominantly come from urban outlets 
spread across Indonesia. The values of in-kind transfers and own production are not included. Savings 
is measured using cash on hand, bonds and stocks at the point in time observed. 
2.5.3 Education 
Using the education price deflator, we find that average household spending on all 
education expenditures expressed in log terms fell by 0.13 log points from 1997 to 
2000. This can be seen in Table 2. 8.  32 
 
Table 2.8 Household Spending on Education  
 
Mean  Median  SD  Minimum  Maximum 
1997 
          General  10.5378  10.5966  0.8755  6.2146  12.6835 
            Urban  10.9312  11.0021  0.7759  7.4673  12.6835 
            Rural  10.2465  10.3089  0.8301  6.2146  12.5061 
            2000 
          General  10.4084  10.3979  0.8991  1.3983  13.2114 
            Urban   10.7594  10.7549  0.8329  6.0035  13.2114 
            Rural  10.1414  10.1916  0.8546  1.3983  12.8021 
Notes: Education expenditures are calculated using the education price deflator, index is 2.47. 
In relation to the financial crisis, the average household could afford to only 
purchase a lower amount of education. In 1997, average educational expenditures 
were 10.53 log points and in 2000 this fell to 10.40 log points. In this respect, on 
average urban households were worse off than rural households, purchasing less 
education in 2000. But the minimum value for spending in rural households in 2000 
was substantially lower at 1.39 log points compared to urban households at 6.00 log 
points.  
Investigating this further in the following Figure 2.5, it can be seen that the 
distribution of spending in education has shifted from the right to the left from 1997 
to 2000. Also the 2000 distribution has a greater spread to the left towards zero. 
However the extent of the leftward shift in the educational spending distribution is 
less than the leftward shift in the income distribution. This implies that despite a 
severe reduction in household income, families are inclined to protect their 
children’s education by continuing to spend albeit at a lower proportion than before 
the crisis. 33 
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Notes: Annual education expenditures are calculated using our self constructed education price deflator, 
index is 2.47. 
Annual educational expenditures are split by type into registration fees, monthly 
scheduled fee payments, exam fees, books and writing supplies, school uniform and 
sports equipment; and transportation. Table 2.9 provides information concerning 
each expenditure type as a share of total expenditure on education.  34 
 
Table 2.9 Expenditure Type as Share of Total Educational Expenditures  
 










Monthly Scheduled Fee Payments  0.26  0.30 
Exam Fee  0.03  0.03 
Books & Writing Supplies  0.34  0.38 
Uniform & Sports Equipment  0.26  0.21 
Transportation  0.04  0.04 
Spending on books and writing supplies takes up the highest share of educational 
expenditures. Payment of monthly scheduled fees takes up the second highest share 
of educational spending. However, the one-time payment for the registration fee 
and the payment of the monthly scheduled fees are the crucial educational 
expenditures for continued participation in the full school year. These expenditures 
for fees are more important for uninterrupted schooling compared to other 
educational expenditures that can be compressed (e.g. uniform and sports 
equipment spending). As documented by Jones and Hagul (2001), registration fees 
enable the child to be enrolled in a school grade. The monthly scheduled fees enable 
the child to continue attending classes throughout the school year. Failure by 
parents to make the timely monthly payments results in the child being penalized 
by the school and withheld from class. Interestingly, Jones, Hagul and Damayanti 
(2000) also document the incidence of children who chose not to attend school 
during the crisis because parents could not afford to pay for a set of school 
uniforms. 
Based on MONE / MORA district level school record data, a school that serves in a 
tax jurisdiction that receives lower fiscal transfers from government tends to set the 
level of monthly scheduled fees higher. Also based on World Bank documentation, 
privately funded and managed schools are more dependent on these monthly fees 
compared to publicly funded and managed schools. This is because public schools 
receive up to 40% of their total operating costs from central and local government 
fiscal transfers. Given this situation, parents have to ensure that a timely and reliable 
flow of fee payments are made each month. This situation is exacerbated when 
general price changes in the economy have volatile fluctuations. As such it can be 
strongly inferred that it is parental funding for school registration and monthly 
scheduled fees that ensures schooling participation continues throughout the school 
year. 35 
 
Table 2.10 presents the number of households that report zero spent by expenditure 
type. The expenditure type reported with highest zero spending is registration fees. 
The percentage of respondents reporting zero expenditure for registration fees is 
0.65 in 1997 and this increases to 0.75 in 2000. This may at first appear to mean that 
far fewer children were enrolled in school in 2000 compared to 1997. But based on 
unobserved factors, there are two possible reasons why this may not be the case. 
Table 2.10 Households Reporting Zero Spent by Educational Expenditure Type 
 
Expenditure Type      1997    2000       % Point Diff.  
 
Registration Fee        0.65    0.75    10 
Monthly Scheduled Payments    0.09    0.17     9 
Exam Fee        0.67    0.60    (7) 
Books & Writing Supplies    0.03    0.08    5 
Uniform & Sports Equipment    0.30    0.41    11 
Transportation        0.92    0.91    (1) 
First, the registration fees may be waived by the school or the state or second, the 
child is not registered to attend formal school. If not registered in formal school, this 
may then mean that the child is at home, at work or in an alternative to formal 
school. As the percentage of zero expenditure for registration fees has increased in 
2000, this may mean that more children are not registered and / or not attending 
formal school during the crisis. To further investigate these registration fee statistics, 
we study the pattern of monthly scheduled fee payments. In marked contrast to a 
high proportion with zero spending on registration fees, only 0.09 of respondents 
reported a zero amount spent on monthly scheduled payments in 1997 and this 
percentage figure was 0.17 in 2000. This means that the non-payment of registration 
fees does not necessarily mean that the child is not attending school as the 
household is still paying the monthly scheduled fees; children are still attending 
some form of schooling.  
We un-censor the distributions of these two main educational expenditure types 
required for uninterrupted schooling participation to enable a comparison between 
1997 and 2000. See the following Figure 2.6 which is a kernel density for 




Figure 2.6 Registration Fees Censored Distribution 
 
There is a peak for 1997 and 2000 where most values are clustered around zero. 
This does not imply that this is the true density. In Figure 2.7, the distribution from 
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Figure 2.7 Registration Fees Uncensored Distribution 
 
The selection problem can be seen where the un-censored distribution in 2000 
compared to 1997 has shifted further to the left. This may be interpreted as a 
worsening of household behavior in registering their children for school. But as 
previously discussed, this household behavior may either be related to a 
registration fee waiver by the state subsidy program for education during the 
financial crisis or children are not enrolling in formal schooling. We attempt to 
investigate this further by referring to the observed data to disentangle the two 
possible explanations. In the data, we find only 4% of children reporting that they 
received any assistance from the state subsidy program. As such the alternative 
explanation may be non-enrollment in formal schooling and instead enrollment in 
alternative schooling. 
The kernel density for monthly scheduled fee payments is in Figure 2.8. Again the 
highest density is around the zero value. This does not provide us with enough 
information. But based on Figure 2.9 the un-censored distribution, it can be seen 
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out in 2000. There is greater variability in the pattern of monthly fees paid across 
households in 2000. Upon a more in-depth look at responses in the data concerning 
monthly scheduled fees, we find that parental contributions in 2000 are being made 
to not just formal schools that are regulated but to also alternative schools. 
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Figure 2.9 Monthly Scheduled Fees Uncensored Distribution 
 
Since we have found that the fall in educational spending is in a smaller proportion 
than the fall in income (Figures 2.4 and 2.5), this leads us to follow the possible line 
of inquiry that parents may have maintained a similar or slightly smaller proportion 
of the total household budget for education in both periods but could only then 
purchase lower quality schooling in 2000. This line of enquiry is carried out in the 
next sub-section where we document the different educational strategies taken and 
the ensuing outcomes. 
2.5.4 Family Strategies for Education 
We start by looking at the fulltime schooling choices available to households. Table 
2.11 shows that in 1997, 87% of children were in public schools and 13% of children 
were in private school. In contrast in 2000, 69% of children were in public schools, 
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Table 2.11 Children Attending Different School Types 
 
     
School Type  1997  2000 
     
Public  0.87  0.69 
Private  0.13  0.24 
Alternative   0.00  0.07 
     
Children Attending Different School Types by Urban / Rural 
 
School Type               1997    2000 
  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban 
Public  0.60  0.40  0.60  0.33 
Private  0.40  0.60  0.40  0.46 
Alternative         0.21 
 
 
Children from the Different Provinces by School Type Attended  














Sumatera Utara (12)  0.81  0.19  0.74  0.22  0.04 
Sumatera Barat (13)  0.86  0.14  0.80  0.17  0.03 
Sumatera Selatan (16)  0.86  0.14  0.74  0.17  0.09 
Lampung (18)  0.81  0.19  0.72  0.21  0.07 
Greater Jakarta (31)  0.74  0.26  0.60  0.37  0.03 
Jawa Barat (32)  0.91  0.09  0.75  0.15  0.10 
Jawa Tengah (33)  0.91  0.09  0.67  0.28  0.05 
Yogyakarta (34)  0.71  0.29  0.52  0.47  0.01 
Jawa Timur  (35)  0.83  0.17  0.65  0.29  0.06 
Bali (51)  0.97  0.03  0.87  0.06  0.07 
Nusa Tenggara Barat (52)  0.95  0.05  0.82  0.07  0.11 
Kalimantan Selatan, (63)  0.94  0.06  0.74  0.17  0.09 
Sulawesi Selatan (73)  0.96  0.04  0.83  0.06  0.09 
Notes: Children are asked to report on the school type that they attend fulltime.41 
 
In the IFLS surveys in both years, households were asked to write down the type of 
schooling received if the other closed ended school type options (formal public or 
private schools) did not apply. We determined these open ended written 
descriptions to be alternative ways of learning which corresponds to descriptions 
provided by MONE and MORA in Section 2.2.2 and Figure 2.3. We add this 
alternative method into the portfolio of school choice. As argued by Heckman and 
Lochner (2000), we recognize non-institutional sources of skill formation like 
families, neighborhoods and firms to be as important as the formal school system 
for learning. Alternative schooling and the characteristics of children who attend 
these schools such as child laborers and child apprentices will be examined further 
in Chapter 4. 
From Table 2.11, in terms of the urban-rural split, in 1997 60% of children from 
rural households went to public school and 40% went to private school. For urban 
children, the reverse pattern occurred where 40% went to public school and 60% 
went to private school in 1997. In 2000 the rural household public – private school 
split remained the same as in 1997. But there were changes for children from urban 
households. In 2000, 33% of urban children were in public school; 46% of urban 
children were in private school and 21% of urban children were in a third type being 
alternative school.  
32% of total observed alternative schools in Indonesia were located in Java and Bali 
Islands and the rest split up between the Outer Islands. Because of modernization 
and consequently urbanization, Java and Bali Islands have attracted the majority of 
the population. Java and Bali based on BPS estimates in 2003 is home to 60% of the 
total country population but represents less than 7% of total land mass in 
Indonesia. Particularly the urbanization of Java is seen through the greater Jakarta 
area which is characterized by slum dwellings and landless labor and this is 
documented by BPS. Perhaps the majority population in Java and Bali has promoted 
the availability of more alternative schooling choices.  
From these findings it is inferred that given the larger school type choice available to 
urban households, they had various ways to adjust their behavior when income fell. 
It is posited that parents could look for market driven solutions (unregulated by 
MONE and MORA) to maintain their children's education. Given these different 
strategies, households appear to vary the amount of school quality that they can 
afford to purchase. They choose to substitute between low quality and high quality 
schools. One of the possible consequences is the increased incidence of children 
attending low quality non-formal and informal schools while working. In the next 
section,  we  study  whether  this  substitution  in  schooling  quality  has  negatively 
affected the children in terms of educational outcomes.  42 
 
2.5.5 Quality of Educational Outcomes 
Based on the observed data, there are EBTANAS test scores for children who on the 
basis  of  their  scores  have  qualified  to  transition  from  formal  primary  school  to 
formal junior high school. This means that in 1997, we have test scores for children 
who were at the junior high level. This level of schooling consists of three years. As 
such there are score records for students in the first, second or third year in this 
level. For a student in the first year of junior high in 1997, his / her test score is from 
1996. For a student in the second year, the score is from 1995. For the third year, the 
score is from 1994. The same sequence applies to 2000 for the first, second and third 
school years being 1999, 1998 and 1997 respectively. We use EBTANAS to study 
which children succeeded or failed to transition and relate this to the period of the 
financial crisis.  We  use  this  measure  of  transition  instead  of  years  of  schooling 
because entry into the Indonesian formal labor market is primarily determined by 
completion of successive school levels.12 As such the school level completed instead 
of  schooling  years  completed  is  a  more  valid  measure  of  human  capital 
accumulation. 
From  the following  Table  2.12, we  find that there are two types of schooling 
behavior in the observed data. The first type consists of children who  completed 
primary school, took EBTANAS and transitioned to junior high. The second type 
consists of children who completed primary school, took EBTANAS but failed to 
transition to junior high.  For both periods, children who  chose to transition have 
higher average test scores than children who do  not transition. This suggests that 
higher ability children selected to progress on to junior high.  
                                                 
12 The level after SMP is senior high school for minimum entry into the formal labor market. 43 
 
Table 2.12 Characteristics of Children who Transition and Do Not Transition to 
Junior High 
1997 
Transitioned to Junior High: 
Percentage Transitioned in 1997  0.87       
Transitioned by Urban / Rural       
Urban  0.51       
Rural  0.49       
Transitioned by School Type       
Public  0.89       
Private  0.11       
  Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
EBTANAS Score  32.00  31.55  5.36  18.31  46.40 
Income  16.3491  16.3093  .7547  14.0391  20.6554 
 
Did Not Transition to Junior High: 
Percentage Did Not Transition in 1997  0.13       
Did Not Transition by Urban / Rural       
Urban  0.25       
Rural  0.75       
Did Not Transition by School Type       
Public  0.94       
Private  0.06       
  Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
EBTANAS Score  27.57  27.57  5.53  14.61  39.61 
Income  16.0401  16.5964  .7626  14.2409  18.4817 
 
2000 
Transitioned to Junior High: 
Percentage Transitioned in 2000  0.83       
Transitioned by Urban / Rural       
Urban  0.49       
Rural  0.51       
Transitioned by School Type       
Public  0.88       
Private  0.12       
  Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
EBTANAS Score  33.53  33.45  5.56  14.10  46.5 
Income  13.93  13.8327  .8429  11.97  17.62 
 
Did Not Transition to Junior High: 
Percentage Did Not Transition in 2000  0.17       
Did Not Transition by Urban / Rural       
Urban  0.22       
Rural  0.78       
Did Not Transition by School Type       
Public  0.95       
Private  0.05       
  Mean  Median  SD   Min           Max 
EBTANAS Score  30.04  29.81  5.34  13.90  43.30 
Income  13.3981  13.3669  .6601  12.1711  16.6185 44 
 
Also average test scores overall are higher in 2000 compared to 1997. But there is a 
larger spread of scores in 2000 compared to 1997. In 2000, 17% of students did not 
sit for all 5 tests compared to 1997 where only 1% of students did not sit for all 
tests13. This affected the lower bound of the cumulative test score reported in 2000.  
The second type of schooling behavior, qualifying but not transitioning was also 
observed by Suryadarma, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2006). They investigate  the 
causes  of  low  junior  high  enrollment  despite  near  universal  primary  school 
attendance. They find that attrition during the transition between primary school 
and junior high is the main cause.  Our findings concerning this second type of 
schooling behavior can be seen in Table 2.11 and the following Figure 2.10.   
                                                 
13 We carried out tabulations for the EBTANAS test scores by of the five individual subjects but do not 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Figure 2.10, for each year observed, we split children with EBTANAS test scores 
into two groups by whether they qualified and transitioned to junior high or not. 
As seen first in Table 2.12 and then in Figure 2.10, there are then two groups each 
for 1997 and 2000 and their position in the household income distribution.  
Children who qualify but do not transition to junior high in both periods are fewer 
than those who do qualify and transition. But when comparing the percentage of 
all  qualified  children  who  do  not  transition  for  1997  and  2000,  we  find  a 
deterioration of this outcome in 2000. In 2000, 30% more children qualified but did 
not transition compared to 1997. 
 In the observed data a majority of almost 90% of the children who transition come 
from public schools and this appears to be a naturally occurring trend because the 
same proportion is seen in both periods. This may because most children select 
into public schools because of higher quality than private schools and this is also 
observed by Newhouse and Beegle (2005). When viewed in terms of the income 
distribution,  in  2000,  the non-transitioned children come  from households  with 
lower incomes than in 1997. In Figure 2.10, upon further investigation there is a 
greater distance in test scores between non-transitioned and transitioned children 
in  2000.  In  1997  children  up  to  the  50th  percentile  of  the  distribution  did  not 
transition. But in 2000 this became worse where children all the way up to the 60th 
percentile of the distribution did not transition to junior high. Since these children 
were still in primary school in the prior crisis years of 1998 and 1999, it can be 
inferred that reduced household incomes for up to the 60th percentile resulted in 
failure to transition to junior high. Also it may appear that some of these children 
chose alternative schooling which would have compromised their eligibility to sit 
for EBTANAS. 
2.6 Conclusions  
In this chapter we documented family spending behavior adjusting to an 
unanticipated reduction in household income. We find that the amount of 
education that is purchased is reduced and in relation to this, the quality of 
educational outcomes over the period of the AFC is compromised. By analyzing 
un-censored distributions for education related expenditures, we are able to 
document and infer unobserved differences in education spending behavior. It is 
found that parents used various strategies to maintain their children’s schooling 
participation – struggling to keep up with making timely monthly scheduled fee 
payments, substituting between public and private school, choosing alternative 
schooling and deciding for their children to combine work with learning. The 
ability of the child on the basis of EBTANAS test scores is also a factor that parents 47 
 
took into consideration where children with a better educational performance 
qualified and transitioned to junior high. But despite the different education 
strategies taken there were children with household incomes up to the 60th 
percentile who qualified but did not transition to junior high. This raises the 
question whether the children continued their formal education later in time after 
the AFC or never resumed their formal schooling. 
 
The effects of the AFC washed away relatively quickly at the macroeconomic level. 
But we argue that given the empirics on family background and intergenerational 
mobility (Becker and Tomes, 1964), such associated effects can be profound in 
terms of labor market outcomes and social changes. By losing out even temporarily 
on a quality education in the formal education system, there may be a generation of 
children who have come of age now a decade later and unable to effectively 
compete in the formal labor market. Or this generation of children may have lost 
out on further building socially productive skills. 
Given this documentation and our arguments, we have provided justification for 
the use of the AFC as an instrumental variable that is relevant and exogenous. We 
show that the AFC is relevant because it is correlated with income and it is 
plausibly exogenous because it is not directly correlated with educational spending 
but through its correlation with income. As such we will use the AFC as an 
instrumental variable in Chapters 4 and 5. However we are fully cognizant of the 
possibility of the differential effects of the AFC on education across the archipelago. 
As such we will examine this aspect of regional variation in Chapter 3. 48 
 
Appendix 2.7 Censored Normal Distribution  
 
We remove the assumption of normality for the distributions of interest. This is to 
enable the analysis of a dependent variable that is a zero for a non-negligible 
proportion of the observations. Formally, the problem reads as follows. Let Y be a 
random variable that is normally distributed with mean   and variance 
2  . Let 
i y , i=1,…, N be independent draws from this distribution. Let  i i y y 
* if  i y > 0 and 0 
otherwise. Suppose only 
*
i y is observed and the following method will recover 
 and 
2   from the data on 
*
i y  
From the theorem of the moments of the censored normal variable, we have: 
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and  and  respectively are the standard normal PDF 
and CDF. 
We replace the moments with their empirical counterparts. Note that    0 Pr
*  Y  is 
the share of zeroes in the data. By inverting the standard normal at    0 Pr
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In developing countries, promoting schooling includes establishing and 
maintaining physical infrastructure. One of these basic facilities is the availability of 
electricity in the school and the household. This enables children to learn efficiently 
where studying can take place in both the classroom and at home. Doing 
homework and study revision at home complements classroom instruction. 
However in a large developing country like Indonesia, there is wide regional 
variation in the distribution of electricity where underdeveloped areas have less 
access to electricity compared to industrial and growth areas. Unequal access to 
electricity is a potential constraint for educational performance. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to study the proposed correlational relationship between 
the availability and use of electricity and educational performance; given regional 
variation14. We investigate the standardized achievement test scores of Indonesian 
children aged 12 where we exploit variation in the availability and in the use of 
electricity in the school and the household across different communities. We 
examine whether available electricity is used as electric light for learning or 
whether different uses of electricity influence outcomes. We study the children’s 
educational performance using test scores for two periods, 1997 and 2000.  
 
In the literature, Glewwe and Kremer (2005) write about the wide variation in 
educational input levels and education systems across developing countries which 
affect the quality of schooling. Teachers are often absent from classrooms and many 
children learn much less than the learning objectives set in the official curriculum 
(Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991; Harbison and Hanushek, 1992; Hanuskek, 1995; 
Glewwe, 1999). Also many schools lack the most basic equipment and school 
supplies and sometimes even classrooms, in which case classes meet outside and 
are cancelled when it rains (World Bank, 1997 and Glewwe, 2004). But Kremer et al 
(2005) find that in India one of the positive correlates of teacher presence is school 
infrastructure which represents better working conditions. In Honduras, Bedi and 
Marshall (2001) find that better school facilities increase primary school attendance. 
Also Alatas (2000) finds that the introduction of basic infrastructure in left behind 
villages in Indonesia improves school enrollment. More specifically, Bacalod and 
Tobias (2006) find that minimal basic facilities in the school, particularly electricity 
matter more for test score performance in the Philippines than class size and 
teacher training programs. This chapter contributes to this strand of the literature 
by focusing on the availability and use of electricity in the school and household in 
Indonesia on educational achievement. 
                                                 




The rest of the paper is set up in the following way. Section 3.2 provides a 
description of the energy sector in Indonesia and how electric energy is delivered 
from the source to the final user. This description consists of the layout of the 
energy sources, power plants and transmission lines in the main islands. We also 
include the distribution trends for industrial, household (including school) and 
transport use. Section 3.3 provides a description of schooling provision in 
Indonesia and how school quality is documented by the national school census. 
Section 3.4 covers the empirical specification and the data we use, the Indonesian 
Family Life Surveys (IFLS). In Section 3.5 we provide descriptive statistics followed 
by results in Section 3.6. Conclusions are made in Section 3.7. 
3.2 The Energy Sector in Indonesia  
According to the Energy Information Administration of the US Government which 
compiles energy statistics from around the world, Indonesia’s power generation 
sector is dominated by the state-owned electric utility PT PLN (Persero), formerly 
known as Perusahaan Listrik Negara. The history of PT PLN in Indonesia began at 
the end of 19th century stemming from the Dutch East India Company establishing 
power generation for its trading interests in certain geographical areas in the 
archipelago. The electrical energy enterprise then expanded into the public interest 
company, NV.NIGM. In World War II, the Japanese seized control of the electric 
companies. After Indonesian Independence in 1945 the Republic of Indonesia 
assumed ownership of the energy infrastructure.  PT PLN operates 45 power plants 
and transmission lines for on-grid energy supply, or roughly two-thirds of the 
country’s generating capacity.  
 
Indonesia’s electricity sector faces severe underinvestment, and the country’s 
energy officials have set out on a program to expand generation capacity. The 
consequences of underinvestment are bottlenecks in provincial level 
interconnections between bulk transmission and sub-transmission levels, 
overloading and voltage problems at sub-transmission levels (World Bank, 2003). 
The bottlenecks in provincial level interconnections negatively affect the efficient 
transmission of electric power. As such the outcome of transmission inefficiencies 
is uneven and interrupted electricity transmission. These interruptions can 
manifest themselves in terms of brownouts where there is a drop in voltage and 
lights dim and / or; blackouts where there is a total loss of power.  
 
One of the major obstacles to increasing Indonesia’s power generating capacity is 
pricing. The government sets the price at which PT PLN sells electricity in the 
country. In relation to the Asian Financial Crisis, from end 1997 – end 2006 the 
central government suspended PT PLN automatic tariff adjustments annually for 52 
 
the price of electricity and made a guarantee of electricity distribution for non-
industrial sector use i.e. households. In certain regions of the country there is then 
the rationing of how much electricity that a household can consume. PT PLN’s 
financial difficulties, coupled with its inability to increase power prices, have 
prevented the company from investing in new infrastructure projects to build up 
capacity.  
 
The following Figure 3.1 provides the layout of power plants, existing bulk 
transmission lines and planned transmission lines. Sub-transmission lines at the 
provincial level are not included due to unavailability of data. Tracing the bulk 
transmission lines without going on to trace the sub-transmission lines provides 
sufficient information for which islands receive most of the electricity capacity; 
without the main transmission lines electricity cannot be delivered. 
 
Figure 3.1 Indonesia Main Power Plants and Transmission Lines 
 
 
Source: Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) 
 
In this map, it can be seen that the islands of Java and Bali have four power plants 
and transmission lines extending from one tip of Bali Island and connecting to the 
other tip in Java Island. The concentration of power plants and main transmission 
lines on these two islands are a part of the legacy of the Dutch East India Company. 53 
 
As such, much of Java and Bali are on the grid where up to 77% of total country 
capacity is available to the residents of these two islands. These transmission lines 
extend west toward Sumatera Island where there are three power plants. Sumatera 
receives 13.3% of total country capacity available. The disproportionate distribution 
when measured in spatial terms is exacerbated for Kalimantan which receives only 
3% of total capacity available. This disproportionately low percentage is associated 
with the absence of any power plant on the island. Kalimantan is located on Borneo 
Island and this island is shared by three countries – Brunei, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Kalimantan to a certain extent is dependent on the Malaysian grid for the 
transmission and distribution of electricity. The more underdeveloped Eastern 
Indonesia which consists of Sulawesi and the Nusa Tenggara & Papua cluster of 
small islands, receive the remaining miniscule percentage of capacity available. 
Areas that are not covered by the main and sub-transmission lines are off-grid and 
rely on alternative energy sources and delivery of electricity such as gas power 
generators and the use of firewood or candles for light. 
 
The measurement of electricity distribution and consumption in Indonesia is by 
final use in a given sector. From Table 3.1, when reviewing the periods 1997 - 2000, 
total installed capacity in the country increased but at a slower rate compared to 
consumption needs. 
Table 3.1 Indonesia Total Installed Capacity and Electricity Consumption 1997 - 
2000 
 
Indonesia  1997  1998  1999  2000 
 
Recent Total Installed Capacity 
(Billion Kilowatt Hours)   97,549  100,233  103,445  108,147 
Rate of Increase     2,75%  3,20%  4,55% 
Electricity Consumption   64,23  67,07  71,97  77,57 
Rate of Increase     4,42%  7,31%  7,78% 
Source: Department of Energy, US Government 
Notes: “Recent Total Installed Capacity” is the measure for how much cumulative capacity a country 
has to generate electricity. “Electricity Consumption” measures how much electrical power is used by 
all sectors in the country. 
 
Table 3.2 provides the national distribution trend from 1990 – 2005 for use in i) 
industry ii) household (including school) and commercial enterprise iii) transport 
and iv) others.  
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Table 3.2 Distribution of Final Energy Use by Sector in Indonesia  
 









1990  33.25  23.93  34.91  7.90 
1991  32.56  23.64  35.64  8.16 
1992  33.75  22.63  35.87  7.75 
1993  34.11  22.18  35.13  8.58 
1994  35.67  21.94  33.52  8.87 
1995  36.03  21.50  33.26  9.21 
1996  34.16  21.63  34.43  9.78 
1997  34.60  21.91  33.98  9.52 
1998  34.79  23.34  34.71  7.16 
1999  39.93  21.68  32.08  6.31 
2000  41.81  21.05  31.21  5.94 
Source: Indonesia Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
 
Notes: This table provides a breakdown of electrical power consumed by different 
users from 1990 – 2000. The users are defined as i) industry ii) household and 
commercial use (including schools) iii) transportation and iv) others. The definition 
for electrical power used includes all sources of energy - petroleum, dry natural 
gas, coal, net hydro, nuclear, geothermal, solar, wind, wood and waste electric 
power. But biomass energy is excluded. 
 
But there is no information available on sub-national distribution trends. Industrial 
use dominates in the range of 33% to 42% of total consumption in this time series; 
energy for transport use takes up 31% to 35% while household, school and 
commercial use tend to make up about 20% of electricity consumption. From 1997 
to 2000, percentage use by industry increases for each year. The percentage use for 
household / school and commercial use increases by 6% from 1997 to 1998 and then 
dips by 7% from 1998 to 1999 and falls again by 3% from 1999 to 2000. 
3.3 School Quality and the National School Census 
Since the end of the Suharto regime and the introduction of regional autonomy 
laws, there is an increasing trend of schooling provision adjusted to a greater extent 
to meet local indigenous needs. These needs include the curriculum adjusted based 
on the religious, social and cultural characteristics of a community, flexible 
classroom sessions in the mornings or afternoons and classroom sessions on 
weekends. For a full description of the curriculum and the national education 55 
 
system, refer to Chapter 2. Geographic factors in relation to building schools and 
maintaining school quality also have to be taken into consideration. As such 
schools that are regulated and managed by MONE and MORA are registered in the 
national school census. To ensure that the registered schools maintain a minimum 
standard of school quality such as the level of teacher qualification and the 
availability of teaching and learning material, there is also a checklist for required 
physical school conditions that will promote an effective learning environment. The 
checklist is in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 MONE / MORA School Census Data – School Conditions Checklist 
 
1.  What is the number of seats in the classroom? (If one bench can be used for 
6 students, then the count is 6 seats) 
 
2.  Are the blackboards, chalk and erasers in the classroom usable? 
 
3.  Is teaching in this classroom ever disrupted by inadequate lighting from 
the main source of light, like window, door and opening? 
 
4.  Does the classroom use any electric lighting? 
 
5.  If yes, what is the main source of electricity?  
  PLN  
  Local Government Agency 
  School Generator  
  Social Self Reliance  
  Private Company or Cooperative 
 
6.  Did this classroom ever lose electrical power, and did this disrupt the 
study activities? 
 
7.  When disruptions occur, is a substitute electricity source available? 
 
8.  Describe the floor of the classroom 
 
9.  Describe the walls in this classroom 
 
10.  Describe the roof used in this classroom 
 
11.  During the rainy season, did this classroom experience problems with: 
leakage / floods / flash rains 56 
 
Ensuring that schools have physical conditions that meet the minimum standards 
of school quality is considered a pressing issue for schools serving in the central 
government designated INPRES Desa Tertinggal (IDT) or Villages Left Behind 
Program. This redistribution program is designed to identify underdeveloped 
villages for the reduction of regional inequality. These neglected villages tend to be 
characterized as being underdeveloped communities that include farm laborers, 
peasants, fishermen, forest dwellers and young dropouts. These villages are 
classified as left behind using population statistics; data on the village’s local 
economic characteristics; whether the local population lives below the poverty line; 
and the presence or absence of basic infrastructure and provincial government 
provided facilities such as health services, schools, marketplaces, potable water, 
electricity, and roads.15 Based on the program’s statistics, 94% of the villages 
classified as IDT are located in rural areas. The 6% located in urban areas are in 
slums. Because of underdevelopment, school quality in IDT villages is lower than 
schools that are not serving in IDT villages. Consequently children’s educational 
performance in IDT villages is very likely to be negatively affected.  
3.4 Empirical Strategy   
The dependent variable is educational performance as measured by the children’s 
standardized achievement tests EBTANAS taken at the school age of 12. EBTANAS 
assesses the child’s historical performance from age 6/7 at grade 116, to age 12 at 
grade 6. EBTANAS is used to assess cognitive skills in the Indonesian language, 
math, science, social studies and religious studies. The maximum score possible for 
EBTANAS is 50 points. We compare the children’s EBTANAS educational 
performance over two periods, 1997 and 2000 using pooled cross sections. We 
investigate whether there exists a relationship between the availability of electricity 
and electricity use in schools and households within a community and the child’s 
educational performance. As our investigation is carried out when the Asian 
Financial Crisis occurred in 1998, 1999 and to some extent in 2000, we factor this 
context into our analysis. 
 
We carry out the analysis at the community level which consists of the child’s 
school and home. Our sample is restricted to communities that have schools and 
households that report on whether they have access to electricity or not, if yes the 
source of electricity (on the grid or off grid) and subsequently electricity use. We do 
not have sufficient observations for schools that have access to the other types of 
school infrastructure as described in Table 3.3. As such the sample is restricted to 
                                                 
15 The selection of villages into the program will also be politically driven and this was pointed out by 
Perdana and Maxwell (2004). But our main consideration is the classification of this set of villages which 
we will use in our empirical specification to identify villages that have low access to electricity. 
16 While the starting school age for primary school is 7 years old, some children start at 6 years old. 57 
 
electricity access in the school as well as in the household. We start with an OLS 
base specification consisting of teacher quality, textbook loans to students and IDT 
schools as educational inputs explaining the child’s educational achievement. From 
IFLS, textbook loans are represented by Indonesian language and Math textbooks 
only. The IDT variable represents underdevelopment in the child’s school and 
household where there is only basic infrastructure available. The IDT variable is 
then a proxy for low access to electricity. This is because in IFLS there is no data 
available on the number of watts used in each community and there is no data on 
the frequency of blackouts and brownouts. This base specification is similar to 
Glewwe and Jacoby (1995) who attempt to isolate the school based determinants of 
school achievement – teacher experience, the availability of textbooks and the 
physical quality of a school. Also we include the availability of textbooks following 
findings by Newhouse and Beegle (2005) where public schools in Indonesia that 
have textbooks available for use are of higher quality. The number of sub-
transmission lines and connections to the national PLN grid in IDT are lower than 
in developed communities. It is then more likely that schools and households in an 
IDT community have low access (number of connections, volume and frequency) to 
electricity compared to other communities that have high access to electricity. Also 
the IDT variable is highly likely to be associated with low quality of educational 
inputs compared to a developed community. That is, there may be fewer highly 
qualified teachers who are willing to be posted to an underdeveloped community 
and the latest textbooks may not be easily available.  
 
We then expand the OLS base specification to include the endogenous explanatory 
variables family income and the amount of the family budget allocated for 
educational expenses. We do this to determine if the family has any role in 
influencing test score variation. Then we introduce various variables measuring 
electricity access and use to determine if there exists a relationship between 
electricity and educational performance, after controlling for the child’s school 
characteristics, household characteristics and underdevelopment in the community 
(IDT).  
 
We add an island control variable to the specification where a community is 
located in Java and Bali Islands or not because of the placement of the grid and the 
main transmission lines across the Main Islands. As 77% of the country’s total 
energy capacity (both on-grid and off-grid) is available to Java and Bali, 
communities located on these two islands are more likely to have access to 
electricity as opposed to communities in Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the 
cluster of small islands in Nusa Tenggara and Papua. The bulk of energy capacity 
available on these two main islands also demonstrates that the major concentration 
of economic activity, 60% of the country’s GDP is in Java and Bali (Hill, 1992; Hill et 
al, 2008) In addition, we add a control variable for the community being located in 58 
 
an urban area where there is presumably more waged economic activity than a 
rural area. 
 
As we investigate the proposed correlational relationship between electric light and 
educational outcomes between 1997 and 2000, there are potential unobserved 
community characteristics that drive the correlation between using electric light 
and educational performance. For example, a family with limited access to 
electricity because of poor electricity infrastructure may choose to substitute away 
from activities that depend on the use of electricity. This may then enable their 
children to use the limited electricity available for studying. To address this issue, 
we add community level fixed effects in some of the specifications to capture time 
invariant community characteristics that may be related to educational 
performance.  
 
The empirical specification to estimate the relationship between electric light and 
educational performance are first in the following reduced forms: 
        ij j ij ij r s a         2 1 0                                                …(1) 
                     ij ij j ij ij y r s a           3 2 1 0                                       …(2) 
where  ij a = child i educational performance in community j;  0  = child constant / 
base state;  ij s = child i attends school s in community j which has the educational 
inputs of teacher quality measured using the percentage of teachers in the school 
with an undergraduate degree; the number of students who borrow Indonesian 
language and Math textbooks because they do not have any of their own and the 
characteristic of whether the school serves in an IDT (dummy variable);  i r = 
controls for the regional distribution of electricity to Java and Bali Islands and the 
Outer Islands (dummy variable) and distribution to urban areas (dummy variable) 
that have industrial and commercial activity compared to rural areas that have 
agricultural activity and subsistence economies;  ij y = child i household 
characteristics of income per capita and educational spending expressed in log 
terms. Specification (1) provides estimates for the relationship between school 
educational inputs and test scores. Specification (2) incorporates the role of income 
and family background in terms of willingness to finance education into the 
estimation. These two specifications provide estimates for how educational 
performance is influenced by school quality and the family at the community level 
without yet factoring in the availability of electricity. These two specifications cover 
underdeveloped and developed communities. Measures of electricity access in the 
school and household and community level fixed effects are added in specification 
(3) as follows: 
                                        i j ij j ij ij ij c e r y s a              4 3 2 1 0                          <(3)                                               59 
 
where   ij e school and household have access to electricity in community j (dummy 
variables);  j c = fixed effects to capture time-invariant community characteristics 
that may be related to educational outcomes. There is a small percentage of missing 
values for the electricity access variables which we do not drop. Finally 
specification (4) introduces the interaction between community underdevelopment, 
electricity availability and electricity use as follows: 
                    ij j ij ij ij j ij ij ij c su u e r y s a                  6 5 4 3 2 1 0                <(4) 
where  ij u = uses of electricity in the school and the household in community j 
(dummy variables); ij su = the interaction of the school characteristic of serving in an 
IDT (Left Behind Village) with electricity use in school and at home in community 
j. The interpretation of  6   is the number of EBTANAS points increased that is 
explained by the availability of electricity in the child’s school and home and 
electricity use for schooling and learning (low availability, low use if IDT, high 
availability, high use if not IDT). 
 
The data that we use is the RAND Corporation Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
(IFLS) Waves 2 – 1997 and 3 – 2000. In IFLS, there is information on family income 
and family spending on education. Educational expenditures are detailed by 
expenditure types and whether spending is on a one time basis in the year or a 
monthly flow of payments throughout the school year. The expenditure types 
consist of registration fees, scheduled fee payment / contributions to the school, 
textbooks for each course taken, writing supplies, uniforms, transportation costs, 
private tuition, special courses and field trips. There is also a detailed description of 
the household’s physical living environment; and whether it has any electricity 
connection, a television and a refrigerator to store perishable food. Watching 
television may be of indirect if not direct educational value which we will include 
in our analysis. We exclude the refrigerator variable from our estimations because 
the IFLS question is concerned with the use of the refrigerator to store perishable 
food. There is no direct relationship with education. This dataset also provides 
information on schooling inputs which consists of teachers, textbooks and 
classrooms equipped with electricity. The data on schooling inputs is the same as 
the MONE / MORA school census data. The questionnaire for the school physical 
conditions component can be seen in Table 3.3. In the data there is also the child’s 
officially reported EBTANAS test scores. The regional variables that we use from 
the data are by island, community, urban / rural and whether the village is 
underdeveloped (IDT). 
 
We merge the variables of interest for community level of analysis using available 
identifiers for the school, the household and the child. Because children can shift 
between available schools of close proximity within the same community, we do 
not observe the same individual children from the same household and from the 60 
 
same school over the two periods of time. Also we do not observe a large sample of 
the same households17 with two siblings the older aged 12 and the younger aged 9 
in 1997 or aged 12 and 9 in 2000. As such we use the two pooled cross sections to 
observe children from a given household attending school within a given 
community. In addition, the use of repeated cross sections increases sample size 
and power for analysis. 
 
The main potential concern faced is the endogenous explanatory variables 
representing where the family resides and whether there is out-migration for 
schooling reasons. We address this in various ways. First, within our sample we 
analyze family responses to IFLS questions concerning migration and the education 
of primary school age children. This is done for 1997 and for 2000. From our 
analysis, the family does not move to another community even if the choice of 
schools available or the quality of schooling is low within the existing community. 
Also we find that there is no household breakup since none of the children aged 12 
in the sample have moved away from their parents for schooling reasons. Second, 
we cross check these family responses by their location at the sub-district level and 
the district level and find that there is still no movement at the higher 
administrative levels. Third, further observations show that in the 99th percentile, 
the children take not more than 30 minutes to travel from home to school be it on 
foot, by bicycle or another mode of transportation. This means that the home and 
the school are located in the same community. However these observations are 
only based on the families observed once in 1997 and families observed once in 
2000. There may have been out-migration from the community to schools in other 
communities in prior periods.  
 
An additional potential issue faced in this estimation is that the endogenous 
exploratory variables representing schooling inputs and access to electricity are 
time lagged with respect to the dependent variable. That is, the inputs are used in 
the educational production function over the 6 grades of primary school and the 
outcome is only observed at the end of the primary school level. The outcome 
variable EBTANAS test scores are only arrived at when the child is age 12. So in the 
first period of observation 1997, the 12 year old has educational performance that is 
related to schooling inputs and unobserved variables from 1996 and 1995. 
Correspondingly in the second period of observation 2000, performance is related 
to time-lagged variables from 1999 and 1998. To address this issue, in our sample 
we limit the time lagged schooling input variables to two prior years to observing 
the outcome because it is likely that the children’s preparation for EBTANAS is 
more focused when the child is aged 10 and 11, closer to age 12. Also this two prior 
year limit enables us to capture the child’s schooling behavior during the two years 
                                                 
17 The balanced panel for households was only a small sample of 45 units. 61 
 
of the financial crisis 1998 and 1999 and how this affects educational performance 
in 2000.  
 
In Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 we further outline the proposed relationship of children 
having and using electric light for improving educational performance.  
Table 3.4 Measures of Association between Educational Performance, Electricity 
in School and Electricity at Home in 1997 
 
 
Test Scores for Children with the Characteristics of i) Using Electricity in School ii) 
Using Electricity at Home iii) Attending School in IDT in 1997 
Means and SD (in Parentheses) Are Reported 
 




No, School is Not in IDT in 1997  Yes, School is in IDT in 1997 





















































Table 3.4 provides 1997 measures of association for EBTANAS test scores along 
three dimensions IDT status, school electricity access and household electricity 
access. If a child in a non-IDT is in a school and house that do not have access to 
electricity, average test scores are 29.14 points. But when the house has electricity 
access average test scores are a higher 30.19 points. In the reverse, if a child in a 
non-IDT is in a school with electricity access but in a house without electricity, 
average test scores are a lower 27.67 points. The positive measure of association 
electricity in the household and test scores is higher than for electricity in the school 
and test scores. However the combination of available electricity in the school and 
the home in a non-IDT, average test scores are the highest in all the reported cells in 
Table 3.4 at 32.04 points. If a child in an IDT is in a school and house that do not 62 
 
have access to electricity, average test scores are 28.07 points. But when the house 
has electricity access average test scores are a higher 30.14 points. Interestingly in 
the reverse, if a child in an IDT is in a school with electricity access but in a house 
without electricity, average test scores are 25.81 points which is the lowest score in 
all the reported cells in Table 3.4. For the combination of available electricity in the 
school and the home in an IDT, average test scores are at 31.75 points which is 
lower than the same combination in a non-IDT. 
 
Table 3.5 provides 2000 measures of association for EBTANAS test scores along 
three dimensions IDT status, school electricity access and household electricity 
access.  
Table 3.5 Measures of Association between Educational Performance, Electricity 
in School and Electricity at Home in 2000 
 
 
Test Scores for Children with the Characteristics of i) Using Electricity in School ii) 
Using Electricity at Home iii) Attending School in IDT in 2000 
Means and SD (in Parentheses) Are Reported 
 




No, School is Not in IDT in 2000  Yes, School is in IDT in 2000 




















































If a child in a non-IDT is in a school and house that do not have access to electricity, 
average test scores are 29.49 points. But when the house has electricity access 
average test scores are a higher 32.16 points. In the reverse, if a child in a non-IDT is 
in a school with electricity access but in a house without electricity, average test 
scores are a lower 31.67 points. The positive measure of association electricity in the 
household and test scores is higher than for electricity in the school and test scores. 63 
 
However the combination of available electricity in the school and the home in a 
non-IDT, average test scores are the highest in all the reported cells in Table 3.5 at 
34.43 points. If a child in an IDT is in a school and house that do not have access to 
electricity, average test scores are 28.67 points. But when the house has electricity 
access average test scores are a higher 30.54 points. If a child in an IDT is in a school 
with electricity access but in a house without electricity, average test scores are 
30.17 points. This measure of association for 2000 in contrast to 1997 is not the 
lowest reported average score in all cells in Table 3.5. The lowest average score in 
Table 3.5, 28.67 points is the cell for a child in IDT where there is no electricity in 
the school and house. For the combination of available electricity in the school and 
the home in an IDT, average test scores are at 30.67 points which is lower than the 
same combination in a non-IDT. 
 
The following Table 3.6 presents the pooled cross section measures of association 
for EBTANAS test scores along three dimensions IDT status, school electricity 
access and household electricity access. The positive measures in Table 3.6 follow 
the same pattern as in Table 3.5 for 2000. 
Table 3.6 Measures of Association between Educational Performance, Electricity 
in School and Electricity at Home for 1997 / 2000 
 
Test Scores for Children with the Characteristics of i) Using Electricity in School ii) 
Using Electricity at Home iii) Attending School in an IDT Program in 1997/2000 
Means and SD (in Parentheses) Are Reported 
 




No, School is Not in IDT in 
1997/2000 
Yes, School is in IDT in 1997/2000 





















































If a child in a non-IDT is in a school and house that do not have access to electricity, 
average test scores are 29.35 points. But when the house has electricity access 
average test scores are a higher 31.33 points. In the reverse, if a child in a non-IDT is 
in a school with electricity access but in a house without electricity, average test 
scores are a lower 29.90 points. For the combination of available electricity in the 
school and the home in a non-IDT, average test scores are the highest in all the 
reported cells in Table 3.6 at 33.55 points. If a child in an IDT is in a school and 
house that do not have access to electricity, average test scores are 28.24 points. But 
when the house has electricity access, average test scores are a higher 30.26 points. 
If a child in an IDT is in a school with electricity access but in a house without 
electricity, average test scores are 28.38 points. For the combination of available 
electricity in the school and the home in an IDT, average test scores are at 31.18 
points which is lower than the same combination in a non-IDT. To summarize for 
the pooled cross sections, the highest positive measure of association for test scores 
is when the child is in a developed community attending a school and residing in a 
household that have access to electricity. The lowest positive association is when 
the child is in an underdeveloped community without energy infrastructure or 
only with basic energy infrastructure where both the school and household do not 
have access to electricity. 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics  
3.5.1 Educational Performance 
Table 3.7 provides the descriptive statistics for individual EBTANAS test scores; 
and the school and household characteristics of the children in the sample selected 
on observable outcomes and measures of electricity access and use in 1997 and 
2000. In 1997, average individual test scores were 31 points with a standard 
deviation of 5.18 points. In 2000, average scores were 32.98 points with a standard 
deviation of 5.64 points. The maximum possible EBTANAS score is 50 points. The 
scores in 2000 have a wider spread than in 1997. In 1997, the minimum score is 
14.61 points and the maximum score is 44.38 points. In contrast in 2000, the 
minimum score is 3.88 points and the maximum is 46.5. 
3.5.2 School Characteristics 
From the following Table 3.7, we present the statistics for school characteristics for 
1997 and 2000. The percentage of teachers in a primary school with an 
undergraduate degree increased from 59% in 1997 to 76% in 2000.  The average 
number of hours the teachers worked per week is lower in 2000 compared to 1997; 
teachers reported working 31 hours per week in 1997 and 25 hours per week in 
2000. Work includes classroom instruction and administrative tasks.  65 
 
Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for Educational Performance, School 
Characteristics and Household Characteristics 
  1997  2000 
Educational Performance     
EBTANAS Test Scores                                                                           Mean          31  32.98 
SD  5.18  5.64 
Min  14.61  44.38 
Max  3.88  46.5 
School Characteristics     
Teachers with Undergraduate Degrees (%)                                                  
Mean   
0.59  0.76 
SD  0.31  0.18 
Number of Hours Teachers Work Per Week                                                
Mean 
31  25 
SD  9  10 
Schools Serving in an IDT (%)  0.40  0.21 
Schools in Java and Bali Islands (%)  0.60  0.55 
Schools in an Urban Area (%)  0.64  0.40 
Schools with Access to Electricity (%)  0.63  0.74 
If School has Access to Electricity, Main Source of Electricity (%):     
On Grid     
National PLN Grid  0.97  0.99 
Off Grid     
Local Government Agency  0.00  0.002 
School Generator  0.00  0.002 
Social Self Reliance  0.01  0.003 
Private Company or Cooperative  0.02  0.00 
Does School have Power Loss that Disrupts Studying?  0.14  0.15 
If School has Power Loss, There is Substitute Electricity Source (%)  0.01  0.19 
School Sessions (% of Schools)     
Morning Session   0.89  0.83 
Afternoon Session   0.11  0.17 
Children Borrow Textbooks from School to Study in the Evening  0.81  0.90 
Household Characteristics     
Household Income Per Capita (Ln)                                                                
Mean      
16.34  13.78 
SD  0.81  0.83 
Educational Expenditures (Ln)                                                                        
Mean 
10.84  11.19 
SD  0.82  0.83 
Households in IDT (%)  0.40  0.21 
Households in Java and Bali Islands (%)  0.60  0.55 
Households in an Urban Area (%)  0.64  0.40 
Households with Access to Electricity (%)  0.77  0.90 
If Household has Access to Electricity, Type of Use (%):     
Television  0.67  0.66 
Read books in the Evening  0.93  0.95 
Use the refrigerator to store perishable food  0.11  0.13 




Notes: Reported teacher hours worker per week consists of classroom instruction and administrative 
tasks. For households with access to electricity, there are three possible types of use as asked by IFLS 
(television, reading books in the evening and using the refrigerator to store perishable food). Each use is 
separate from the other as IFLS does not ask if these uses overlap. 
 
Based on the national curriculum, the number of teacher classroom instruction 
hours should be 42 hours per week for fifth grade and sixth grade (our two grades 
of interest in the specifications) but reported hours worked from Table 3.7 is lower.  
The percentage of schools targeting children residing in an IDT is 40% in 1997 in 
contrast to 21% in 2000. In the data we check that the children attend a school and 
reside in a village within the boundaries of the same community classified as an 
IDT. There is no incidence of a child for example attending a non-IDT designated 
school while residing in an IDT. 
 
Table 3.7 also provides statistics on the availability of electricity in schools. In 1997, 
63% of schools observed report having electricity available. In 2000, 74% of schools 
observed report electricity availability. For schools that have electricity, they also 
report on the main source of electricity. In both 1997 and 2000, the main source of 
electricity reported is the PLN grid; 97% of schools observed in 1997 and 99% of 
schools observed in 2000. The remaining schools report other main sources of 
electricity as the local government agency, school generator, social self reliance and 
a private company or cooperative. In comparing school and household access to 
electricity, in 1997, 63% of schools have electricity access compared to 77% of 
households with electricity access. In 2000, the percentage of schools with 
electricity access increases to 74% and there is also an increase to 90% in the 
percentage of households being able to access electricity. In the IFLS questionnaire, 
the schools are also asked if they lose electrical power which disrupts schooling. In 
1997, 14% responded that there is power loss; in 2000 this response was 15%. A 
subsequent IFLS question asked is when there is power loss the school has a 
substitute electricity source available. In 1997, only 1% of schools observed 
reported the availability of a substitute source but in 2000, an increased 19% of 
schools have a substitute. 
 
From IFLS, there is also information on start and end times for classroom sessions. 
If schooling time is in the morning and afternoon, then natural sunlight is a 
substitute for reading what is written on the blackboard, reading a book or writing 
in class. However if an afternoon school session is running, classes end at 18:00h. 
Natural sunlight ceases to be a substitute for electric light as the sun sets at 17:53h 
in Western Indonesia and at 18:53h in Eastern Indonesia. In Table 3.7, schools 
report that they offer two school sessions a day which maximizes the use of 
classroom space. The two sessions are in the morning and in the afternoon. There 
are no evening sessions. 
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In relation to how much learning material children can cover in the school day, 
children can borrow Indonesian language and Math textbooks from the school. 
Schools provide the children textbook loans for various reasons as documented in 
IFLS – parents cannot afford to purchase the textbooks; parents can afford to 
purchase the textbooks but the latest textbooks are not stocked in the local 
bookstore; the school substitutes for the parents by purchasing and making 
available the textbooks for use but the school budget is limited and children have to 
share the textbooks during class time; and only a few children can access a 
photocopier to make textbook copies. Because of these various reasons, in 1997 81% 
of children borrow textbooks; and in 2000 this percentage increased to 90%. 
3.5.3 Household Characteristics 
Table 3.7 shows that average household income per capita in log terms for this 
sample fell from 16.34 log points in 1997 to 13.78 log points in 2000. As detailed in 
chapter 2, this is as a result of extreme price changes and depressed purchasing 
power over the period of the financial crisis. The average deterioration in income 
for this sample is larger than for the unrestricted sample in Chapter 2. In contrast 
average household spending on education increased from 10.84 log points in 1997 
to 11.19 log points in 2000. The percentage of households residing in an IDT is 40% 
for 1997 and 21% in 2000. The percentage of all observed households that reside in 
Java and Bali is 60% for 1997 and 55% for 2000. The percentage of households 
residing in an urban area in 1997 is 64% and in 2000 it is 40%.  
 
For household measures of electricity access and use, the percentage of households 
that have access to electricity in 1997 is 77% and this rises to 90% in 2000. For 
households that have access to electricity, the IFLS questionnaire asks if the 
electricity is used for a television, a refrigerator to store perishable food or to read 
books in the evening. The percentage of households that have electricity and use it 
to watch television is 67% in 1997 and this percentage is 66% in 2000. In terms of 
the use of light bulbs, the IFLS questionnaire asks if children bring home textbooks 
from school to read in the evening. The percentage of children who responded 
“Yes” to this question is 93% in 1997 and 95% in 2000. But there is no further 
information on whether the children actually do read the textbooks that they bring 
home from school. 
3.6 Results  
In Table 3.8 we present the output for specifications (i), (ii) and (iii) from Section 
3.4. In column (1), using only the school characteristics base specification, the 
percentage of undergraduate level qualified teachers and the facility for borrowing 
school textbooks are positively related to EBTANAS test scores. Teacher quality 
increases test score points by only 0.02 points and this is statistically significant at 68 
 
the 1% level. Borrowing Indonesian language and Math textbooks from school 
raises test scores by 0.25 points and this is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
These very small gains to educational achievement compared to the other 
explanatory variables can be seen across all specifications in columns (1) – (8). This 
finding is then similar to what Bacalod and Tobias (2006) report that class size and 
teacher training programs in Philippines’ primary schools matter less than 
expected for test score performance. 69 
 
Table 3.8 Electricity Availability and Educational Performance 
 
DV = Child EBTANAS Scores 
 (SE is in Parentheses) 
 Pooled Cross Sections  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
School Characteristics         








Children Borrow School Textbooks to 

















Household Characteristics         












Electricity Access         








Location of School and Household         
















Community Level Fixed Effects        Yes 
         








R2  .10  .13  .14  .14 
Observations  1,525  1,525  1,525  1,525 
Statistically significant at the *** 1%, **5% and *10% level 
Notes: Teacher quality is measured as the percentage of undergraduate level qualified teachers in the 
whole. Schools provide an Indonesian language and Math textbook loan service to students. As such the 
school textbook loan is measured in this specification as the number of 12 year old children who borrow 
these Indonesian language and Math textbooks because they do not have any of their own .70 
 
From Table 3.8, column (1) the negligible gains of teacher qualification and school 
textbook loans are negated if the school is in an IDT where test scores drop by 2 
points and this is statistically significant at the 1% level. The constant  0   is 29 
points. If a child is in an IDT, the child has a lower starting score of 27 points 
compared to a child in a developed area with 29 points. The result that a 
disadvantaged child in an IDT school is in a lower starting position than a child 
who is not in an IDT school is consistent across columns (1) – (4) in Table 8. This 
suggests that a 12 year old child who attends school and resides in an IDT is in an 
environment that negatively affects educational performance.  
 
For the regional control variables, a child in Java and Bali Islands has a 1 point 
advantage over a child in the other islands and a child in an urban area has a 2 
point advantage over a child in a rural area. This implies that even if a child is in an 
IDT and the IDT is in Java or Bali, instead of scoring 2 points less than a child in a 
non-IDT, the performance gap is reduced to a 1 point difference. The estimate that 
children in Java and Bali have better test scores than children in other islands, 
holding other variables constant is seen across the specifications in columns (1) – 
(8). But the size of the coefficient is reduced when household characteristics and 
electricity access and use measures are included. This implies that children who 
attend school and reside in Java and Bali have better educational performance 
because school quality and the quality of the household environment including 
access to electricity are higher in these islands compared to the other islands. 
Similarly the estimate that children in urban areas have better test scores than 
children in rural areas, holding other variables constant is seen across the 
specifications in columns (1) – (8). However the coefficient size for urban areas 
across the specifications is larger than the coefficient size for Java and Bali. This 
may possibly suggest that within each of the main islands, when a child attends 
school and resides in an urban area, this environment is conducive for schooling 
and learning compared to a rural area. 
 
In column (2), household characteristics are added to the specification. Household 
income is positively related to test scores where a 1 log point change in income 
shows a 0.002 change in test scores. But this estimate is not statistically significant. 
A similar result is found across all specifications in columns (1) – (8). However 
educational expenditures for the child show a positive relationship where a 1 log 
point change in spending provides a 0.64 point change in test scores. This result is 
statistically at the 1% level and is consistent across the specifications in columns (2) 
– (4). This implies that family willingness to spend on education is far more 
advantageous for a child’s education and this can be observed through educational 
expenditures instead of family income. Also when taking into account in the 
unpredictability of events of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, 1999 and to some 71 
 
extent 2000, this result suggests that for this restricted sample reduced income has 
less negative effect on outcomes than expected. The coefficients for school 
characteristics have the same direction and magnitude in the second specification 
as in the first specification. When viewing the influence of both the school and the 
home on outcomes, it appears that the family has a more favorable role in 
improving educational performance. This appears to be particularly the case when 
the family is willing to set aside a proportion of available income specifically for 
schooling expenditures. When considering that in this sample, families are less 
inclined to migrate for schooling reasons, the family manages the existing quality 
of schooling that they are confronted with by spending on different educational 
expenditures that may improve performance e.g. private tuition, special courses, 
writing supplies and different types of books. 
 
In Table 3.8 columns (3) and (4), we now introduce measures of electricity 
availability in the school and household. Community level fixed effects are 
controlled for in column (4). The endogenous explanatory variables qualified 
teachers and the school textbook loan lose statistical significance while the negative 
relationship of an IDT school and test scores continues to hold and be statistically 
significant at the 1% level. However the introduction of electricity access slightly 
reduces the magnitude of the IDT school variable by 0.1 points. Of the two 
measures of electricity access, school availability of electricity is related to slightly 
higher test scores than household electricity availability. When the school has 
access to electricity, test scores increase by 1.4 points and this is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. When the home has access to electricity, test scores 
increase by 1.4 points in column (3) and increase by 1.3 points when community 
level fixed effects are added which can be seen in column (4). Both estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Based on our empirical specification, the 
availability of electricity has a time lagged effect on test scores. So the increase in 
test scores is likely to be cumulative over the period of time the child has access to 
electricity in school and the household. This implies that when the child is in an 
environment where both the school and the home have continued access to 
electricity, educational performance improves substantially. Since in this sample, 
families do not move to communities that have better quality schools, by merely 
having electrical connections in school and the household, children’s educational 
performance can improve.  
 
In Table 3.9 we present the output for specification (iv) from Section 3.4. This 
expanded specification introduces measures of electricity use in the school and 
household. While the use of electricity in school is for studying, families use 
electricity at home for various work and leisure activities. These activities may 
directly or indirectly influence learning over time. To examine the potential 
pathways from electricity availability to electricity use in the household, Table 3.9 72 
 
columns (5) and (6) provide estimates of the child who studies at home using 
borrowed textbooks from school and the child who watches television at home. 
Columns (7) and (8) sub-divide these activities by IDT to assess if within an 
underdeveloped environment, unobserved factors will influence these two 
activities differently compared to a developed community. For example, in an IDT 
basic infrastructure provides lower access to electricity. Scholastically motivated 
families may then choose to use the limited or rationed electricity by substituting 
away from non-learning related activities to learning activities in favor of their 
child’s development.73 
 
Table 3.9 Electricity Availability, Use and Educational Performance 
 
DV = Child EBTANAS Scores 
 (SE is in Parentheses) 
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Household has Access to Electricity, 
Study Using Borrowed Textbooks 




         
Location of School and Household         
















Community Level Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 








R2  .15  .15  .15  .15 
Observations  1,514  1,514  1,514  1,514 




Notes: Teacher quality is measured as the percentage of undergraduate level qualified teachers in the 
whole. Schools provide an Indonesian language and Math textbook loan service to students. As such the 
school textbook loan is measured in this specification as the number of 12 year old children who borrow 
these Indonesian language and Math textbooks because they do not have any of their own. 
 
In Table 3.9 columns (5) – (8), household access to electricity now provides larger 
estimates for test score performance compared to school access to electricity. When 
the home has electricity access scores increase by 1.65 points (column (5)) and 1.83 
points (column (6)). Column (6) includes community level fixed effects. In contrast, 
when the school has electricity access scores increase by 1.42 points (column (5)) 
and 1.39 points (column (6)). All four estimates are statistically significant. This 
result appears to be the case because of the introduction of the variables 
representing the type of use for electricity at home. When the household has access 
to electricity and this variable interacts with the number of children who borrow 
school Indonesian language and Math textbooks to read at home, test scores are at 
a lower 0.02 points in column (5) and a lower 0.03 points in column (6). But these 
results are statistically insignificant. This may suggest the children are less likely to 
read their Indonesian language and Math textbooks in the evening. Instead they 
may prefer to read other textbooks that their parents have purchased such as 
science, social studies and religious studies. Children from Muslim households and 
who attend MORA religious schools may prefer to recite the Koran. Or they may 
prefer to read other types of books, comics and newspapers, all of which can 
positively influence their cognitive skills. More interestingly, in columns (5) and (6) 
when the household has access to electricity and this interacts with the variable for 
whether the child watches television, test scores increase by 0.93 points. With a 
control for community fixed effects, scores increase by 0.81 points. Both results are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. A possible interpretation is that when the 
child is able to watch television after school, the child watches programs with 
educational content such as the Indonesian television channel Television Pendidikan 
Indonesia (TPI or Education Television Indonesia). Or the child is able to watch 
general programs on television that improve his or her language skills. Our 
findings are similar to Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) who use the American 
Coleman Study data to show that younger children with an additional year of 
television exposure have higher reading and verbal test scores when they are older. 
 
In Table 3.9 columns (7) and (8), we study more in-depth the access and use of 
electricity in the household by IDT status. Without controls for community level 
fixed effects, if the child is in an IDT school, test scores fall by 0.11 points. But 
unexpectedly, with fixed effects a child in an IDT school now has an increase in test 
scores by 0.48 points. While these results are not statistically significant, they may 
be of education significance. This may be of significance because despite 
disadvantages faced in a community, families in such a community still have a 
high preference for their children to have high educational achievement. The 75 
 
magnitude of the IDT school coefficient in these two specifications is much smaller 
than the specifications in columns (1) – (6). This is because of the introduction of 
electricity access and use in IDT communities. When children attend an IDT school 
that has access to electricity, test scores fall by 1.3 points (column (7)) and with 
fixed effects fall by 1.2 points (column (8)). Both estimates are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. In comparison, all children without conditioning on 
IDT, access to electricity in school and test score performance is positive at 1.7 
points and statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly children are in IDT 
households that have access to electricity, test scores fall by 0.4 points and with 
community level fixed effects scores fall by 1.3 points. But these estimates are not 
statistically significant. A possible interpretation is that in an IDT community, 
schools and households have only basic infrastructure and electricity access may be 
capturing the negative effect of underdevelopment on children’s performance. IDT 
underdevelopment where there is poverty, a lack of employment opportunity and 
a lack of public services including quality schooling may perhaps be viewed as a 
source of disadvantage for children.  
 
From Table 3.9, when we assess the use of electricity by IDT status, interestingly we 
find that in an IDT household with electricity and children study using borrowed 
Indonesian language and Math textbooks, test scores increase by 0.02 points. With 
community level fixed effects scores increase by 0.03 points. In contrast, the 
association for these two variables is negative for all children who have electricity 
available for reading textbooks. This may imply that given the disadvantaged 
position that children have in education in IDT communities, the mere opportunity 
to borrow school textbooks and to be able to have electricity at home to read these 
textbooks may motivate them to study. However the coefficient for the interaction 
between household access to electricity and watching television has a negative sign 
for children in IDT and is statistically insignificant. This is as opposed to all 
children who watch television. Possible reasoning for this negative relationship is 
IDT households while able to watch television may not have a reliable signal 
reception since they may be located in a remote area. In the literature, Olken (2009) 
finds that the variation in television signal reception and strength in Java Island 
affects how many hours a day that Indonesians can watch television. If this is the 
case for children in IDT households, they may be less likely able to watch 
educational programs (e.g. the TPI channel). As such the television variable in the 
specification may not be able to capture the positive effect on test scores.  
 
In reconciling the estimates for IDT school status and the use of electricity in an IDT 
household, the specification in column (8) with community level fixed effects raises 
an interesting observation. In this specification, the negative relationship between a 
child attending an IDT school and educational performance reverses and becomes 
positive. The possible pathway from basic infrastructure that introduces access 76 
 
(albeit low access) to electricity in an IDT community may lead to parents 
preferring to let their children use the limited electricity available for studying in 
the evening. This implies that low income families from underdeveloped areas may 
demonstrate a preference for education if the physical environment is conducive 
for them to choose learning for their children instead of other activities. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have investigated if there is a relationship between the 
availability and use of electricity and the educational performance of 12 year old 
Indonesian children in primary school. Using EBTANAS test scores which capture 
the child’s historical performance from grade 1 to grade 6 of primary school we 
find that for 1997 and 2000, the availability of electricity in school and the 
household raises test scores substantially and these results are statistically 
significant. In establishing a potential pathway between electricity availability and 
test scores, we find that how families use electricity in the household influences 
outcomes. When children watch television at home, test scores markedly increase 
after controlling for community level fixed effects. This may perhaps be attributed 
to educational programming on national television. Conditioning on attending 
school in an underdeveloped, below the poverty line, left behind village (IDT) 
children who borrow school textbooks to study at home in the evening have 
slightly improved test scores. While households use electricity for various reasons, 
there is evidence that there are families who choose to use electricity for activities 
where their children can learn better. This may be particularly the case for families 
in underdeveloped areas where they are constrained in electricity access because of 
rationing by the state. 
 
Over the period of 1997 and 2000, more schools and households in our sample are 
connected to the national PLN grid as well as off the grid to access electricity. 
Particularly there are a higher proportion of households than schools that have 
access to electricity. Studying and doing homework in the evening most likely 
complement what the child learns in the classroom in the day. By having access to 
electricity in the child’s daily environment both in school and at home, it is very 
likely that the child is more motivated to learn and complete primary school. This 
is regardless of a disadvantaged background such as the child coming from an 
underdeveloped community or regardless of volatilities faced by the family during 
the Asian Financial Crisis. However given the fixed placement of the national PLN 
grid, where over 70% of energy is allocated for industrial use (industrial sector and 
transport sector) and where Java and Bali receive 77% of total energy capacity, not 
all communities are able to receive full access to electricity. Also children who 
attend school and reside in urban areas tend to have more access to electricity and 
better educational outcomes. This strongly implies that access to electricity is a 77 
 
potential resource constraint on children’s educational outcomes. This is unless 
families move from areas that have low access to electricity to areas with high 
access to electricity in order to ensure that their children have a favorable learning 
environment. However using available data, we are unable to conclude whether a 
family’s out-migration for schooling reasons in Indonesia will improve outcomes. 
 
On the basis of these results, the supply and provision of electricity to the 
communities of the Outer Islands - Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Nusa 
Tenggara is a concern. The public policy issue then is about the distribution of 
energy for final use to all islands and not just the availability of energy. The 
distribution of energy should cover all parts of an island and not just the urban 
areas that have more waged economic activity. By considering that electricity 
access promotes an environment that is conducive for schooling more children will 
be motivated to pass their achievement tests at the primary school level. Then they 
are more likely to progress on to junior high. But until then, the lack of access to 







4. Household Income, Simultaneous Work-





This chapter studies the phenomenon of joint child work-schooling decisions in 
Indonesia from the view of human capital theory. Productive skills are developed 
in childhood for generating future returns. Human capital can be accumulated not 
just by attending formal schooling but also through informal schooling such as 
learning skills from the family. In Indonesia the national labor force starts at age 10 
and this consists of economically active children who have either never attended 
school or who combine work with schooling. For children who are in the labor 
force while simultaneously attending school, this raises the question as to the 
extent that the child’s labor supply affects the amount of time available to develop 
skills. To address this, consideration has to be given to the timing of schooling, 
whether this timing conflicts with work and the extent of this conflict. If there is 
conflict this arises from the joint work-schooling decision that is influenced by 
whether the child’s income augments household income and possibly the social 
norms towards children working. 
 
This chapter studies Indonesian child workers aged 6 – 15 who simultaneously 
attend school. Two questions are asked. Does a reduction in parental income 
change simultaneous work-schooling behavior? If yes, do these changes impair 
human capital accumulation? In this chapter, I view child labor in terms of 
economic work and unpaid household production / domestic work and I use the 
terms schooling and skill formation interchangeably. I sequence the behavior of 
simultaneous work-schooling as a child who first works and then second attends 
school. As child labor and school decisions are joint outcomes out of a single time 
allocation problem, I analyze the joint decision-making by studying the children’s 
types of work and learning activities in and outside of the household and time 
allocated to these activities. Using the Indonesian education system which 
recognizes the phenomenon of child labor and provides skill development 
alternatives for child workers18, I study three sources of skill formation. The first is 
the formal and mainstream system of primary school and junior high. The second 
is non-formal school which consists of alternatives to the mainstream system that 
target child workers (refer to Chapter 2 for a full description of these three sources 
of skill formation and how they are structured with the education system). 
Educational service delivery for non-formal schooling includes the use of privately 
managed religious schools; learning time is flexibly built around the child’s 
working time. The third is informal school which consists of the provision of 
independent study modules to complement the skills acquired from education 
                                                 
18 The previous chapters were related to the formal and mainstream education system. This chapter 
expands on the system to examine alternative schooling for child workers. 80 
 
within the home. Households that typically have informal schooling are parents 
who are traders or entrepreneurs and have children who act as apprentices. Apart 
from skill development, children who work in the household should face fewer 
safety and health risks compared to children working outside without parental 
supervision or monitoring. 
 
In the literature on household income and child labor, Basu, Das, and Dutta (2007) 
provide a discussion on child labor responses to variations in household income. 
These responses include whether the child shifts from work within the household 
to work outside the household. Work within the household is more likely if the 
household has its own business as discussed by Edmonds and Turk (2004) for 
Vietnamese households. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the work 
performed by children takes place within the household – usually household 
chores and work on the family farm (Basu and Ray, 2002). Wage work and work in 
small enterprises which take place outside the household remains an exception 
(ILO, 2002). The UNICEF definition of child labor reflects the distinction made 
between working outside and in the household as well as recognizing that the 
intensity of child labor is higher when the child is older19. In Asia, a further 
distinction is made where child labor is primarily regarded as an urban as opposed 
to rural phenomenon (Fafchamps and Wahba, 2006). However it is unclear whether 
the activities carried out in the household necessarily constitute child labor if the 
child is an apprentice in the family enterprise, building skills through on-the-job 
learning. Given the state of the literature, my contribution is to produce more 
insight on how joint work-schooling does not impair human capital accumulation. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following way. In Section 4.2 I describe 
national level trends of child labor in Indonesia and how this changed over the 
period of the financial crisis. Section 4.3 describes the natural experiment and a 
description of the dataset, the RAND Corporation Indonesia Family Life Surveys 
(IFLS). Limitations arising from the observed data i.e. child labor as the dependent 
variable is a censored variable (Basu et al, 2007) are discussed. Section 4.4 details 
the child and household characteristics associated with work-schooling behavior 
which I use for the estimations. Section 4.5 reports the results. Conclusions are in 
Section 4.6. 
 
                                                 
19 UNICEF definition of child labor: children aged 5 – 11 who work at least 1 hour of economic work or 
28 hours of domestic work per week; children aged 12 – 14 who work at least 14 hours of economic 
work or 28 hours of domestic work per week. 81 
 
4.2 National Child Labor and Schooling Trends 
The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) occurred at the end of 1997 with effects in the 
financial markets felt until the beginning of 2000. For the household, much of the 
impact of the aggregate shock was felt in the 52.16 percentage point or eightfold 
increase in inflation rates from 1997 to 1998. With reference to Chapter 2 Table 2.1, 
annual inflation rates increased from 6.23% in 1997 to 58.39% in 1998 and then 
improving to 20.49% in 1999 before resuming a considerably lower rate of 3.72% in 
2000. Inflation rates were then less substantial in 1999. The significant increases in 
inflation rates for the two years 1998 and 1999 compared to 1997 and 2000 severely 
weakened household purchasing power of all goods including education.   
 
In terms of schooling indicators, between 1997 and 199820 the percentage of 13-19 
year olds that were not currently enrolled in school rose. The percentage not 
enrolled increased more in urban centers - from 33 percent in 1997 to 38 percent in 
1998, a change that is statistically significant. Children from poorer households in 
general were more likely not to be enrolled in school compared to children from 
higher income households — a phenomenon that intensified between 1997 and 
1998. Younger children were less likely to be in school in 1998 as well. This is 
especially true for the poorest. The percentage of 7 - 12 year olds in the bottom 
quartile of the distribution of per capita expenditure that were not enrolled 
implying delayed starting in school doubled, from about 6% in 1997 to about 12% 
in 1998. But based on an empirical investigation carried out by Cameron (2001) in 
Indonesia declines in schooling do not appear to be accompanied by a rise in 
formal employment amongst children.  
 
In terms of the occurrence of child labor, the Indonesian Census Bureau of 
Statistics, BPS national labor force surveys SAKERNAS show that at least 1% of 
children starting from age 5 to 9 are economically active (SAKERNAS 1998; Asra et 
al 1995 and 1997). However detailed information is not available for this age group. 
Using SAKERNAS, available data shows that the percentage and absolute number 
of economically active children in Indonesia becomes noticeable when the child is 
aged 10 onwards. With reference to Figure 4.1, it can be seen that there is a trend 
where there are children who simultaneously work and attend school.  
                                                 
20 World Bank Indonesia Statistics 82 
 




Source: Census Bureau of Statistics BPS National Labor Force Surveys SAKERNAS  
Notes: This figure shows the time series for the group of children who simultaneously work and attend 
school. This figure corresponds to the same sample of children from Figure 4.3. Data is only available to 
the author for the period of 1996 – 1998. 
 
While children at age 10 are less inclined to work while attending school, the 
following time series in Figure 4.2 will show that for each additional year of aging 
up to 17, the percentage that reports working full time increases and inversely the 
percentage that reports combining work with schooling decreases. 83 
 
Figure 4.2 National Level Trend of Simultaneous Work-Schooling Behavior, 
Ages 10 - 17 
 
 
Source: BPS National Labor Force Surveys SAKERNAS  
Notes: These national labor force surveys interview individuals who are economically active from age 
10 onwards. The respondent is first asked if s / he is working and then asked if s / he is enrolled in 
school. Responses are then aggregated and reported by the age of the individual. The formula for 
calculating school enrollment is the individuals at age x are currently in school divided by all 
individuals aged x who have never been in school or or who have finished school. Data is only available 
to the author for the period of 1996 – 1998. 
 
Within the age range of 10 – 17 in Figure 4.2, it can be seen that at the legal 
minimum employment age of 15, 0.7% of the children work and within this age 
group 0.2% points or 71% of them attend school and the remaining 29% work full 
time. The relationship between working and schooling changes further when the 
individual is aged 17 where 0.3% of all those aged 17 work. Within this group, 0.5% 
points or 40% attend school while the remaining 60% work full time. As such these 
national labor survey trends suggest that as child workers become older, they 
attend school less and work more or leave school completely and work full time.    
 
According to SAKERNAS, the incidence of child labor is gradually shifting away 
from rural areas to urban centers. Possible explanations for this have been offered 
by Pardoen et al (1996). First, as the contribution of the agricultural sector to the 
gross domestic product has become smaller over time, employment opportunities 
in rural areas have become fewer. Second, the informal sector in urban, economic 
growth centers tends to attract unskilled laborers like children in the age group of 
10 – 14 and this is prior to the child reaching the legal employment age of 15 where 84 
 
labor laws can afford protection to the child. Also when comparing urban 
employment with rural employment opportunities, it has been reported that the 
urban informal sector provides higher and more stable incomes for child workers.  
Particularly over the period of the financial crisis, Imawan (1999) documented that 
in urban centers the number of working children rose from 1% to 1.5% in the 
period of August 1997 to December 1998. Although the majority of the children 
observed in this period still worked in the agricultural sector (64.4%), it is reported 
that 14.7% worked in the manufacturing sector and 20.9% worked in the services 
sector which includes street children who will provide services for a fee (BPS, 
1998). 
 
The gradual shift from the primary (agricultural) sector to secondary 
(manufacturing) and tertiary (services) sectors has also gradually reduced the 
number who work for less than 24 hours a week (Pardoen et al, 1996). This is 
associated with children shifting from non-wage employment to wage 
employment. Non-wage employment tends to occur when the child is engaged in 
work in the household such as family farm production or home production / 
domestic work. As a result, their working status as classified by BPS and 
SAKERNAS as changing from unpaid family workers to laborers is when they shift 
from non-wage employment to wage employment. With reference to the publicly 
available BPS household survey SUSENAS 2000 as detailed in Table 4.2, the 
working status of children can be defined as being i) self employed without family 
assistance ii) self-employed with family assistance iii) self-employed with non-
family assistance iv) paid worker and v) unpaid worker in the family. For 
definitions i) to iii), the child worker may or may not receive a wage. 85 
 
Table 4.1 Working Status of Children by Urban / Rural and Gender 
 (% and Count is in Parentheses) 
  Urban  Rural  Girl  Boy 
Self-employed without 
family assistance (paid and 
unpaid) 
9.4 (63)  5.7 (287)  5.0 (107)  6.8 (243) 
         
Self-employed with family 
assistance (paid and unpaid) 
3.9 (26)  4.0 (202)  3.6 (77)  4.2 (151) 
         
Self-employed with non-
family assistance (paid and 
unpaid) 
0.3 (2)  0.2 (8)  0.6 (6)  0.4 (4) 
         
Paid worker  32.1 (216)  7.5 (375)  12.3 (265)  9.2 (326) 
         
Unpaid worker in the family  54.5 (366)  82.7 (4,160)  78.8 (1,693)  79.6 (2833) 
         
Total  100 (673)  100 (5,032)  100 (2,143)  100 (2,889) 
Source: BPS Household Survey SUSENAS 2000.  
Notes: Given restrictions on accessing data, this is the only nationally representative sample publicly 
available on child labor. 
 
From Table 4.1, definitions i) and ii) when contrasted against iii) suggests that the 
child worker may face higher safety and health risks without the presence of the 
family. From this table too, it appears that the vast majority of child workers are 
unpaid workers in the family located in rural areas. Also both female and male 
child workers tend to be unpaid workers in the family. 
 
The labor surveys also show that the proportion of male children who are 
economically active has tended to rise over time (SAKERNAS 1998 – 1993, Pardoen 
et al, 1996). However, according to Irwanto et al (2001) the national level trends 
may be under-reporting the incidence of girls working. This is because they tend to 
engage in home production / domestic production for the family and are not 
remunerated.  86 
 
4.3 Empirical Strategy   
 
My research design is a natural experiment where I exploit the timing of the RAND 
Corporation Indonesia Family Life Surveys (IFLS) wave 2 (1997) and wave 3 (2000) 
to identify an exogenous source of variation in income - the Asian Financial Crisis. 
This instrument enables me to study the variations to simultaneous work-schooling 
behavior.  
 
I define child work as i) a child aged 6 – 15 who works outside the household and 
may or may not receive a wage and ii) a child aged 6 – 15 who works in the 
household and does not receive a wage. I define schooling in terms of the three 
sources of skill formation – formal, non-formal and informal. I have the two 
definitions for work outside and in the household which follows from the 
analytical model by Edmonds (2008) and the generalized child labor model by 
Cigno and Rosati (2005). Both models imply that for most children the return to 
time for work in the household (household production) is at least as large as the 
value the family places on the child’s wage contribution from working outside the 
household. These two labor definitions are also operationally similar to the 
UNICEF definition of child labor and the information that I have concerning the 
work status of children as defined in Table 4.2 particularly that the vast majority of 
children are unpaid workers in the household. Work activities in the household 
include participating in the family enterprise, farming, home production and 
domestic work. I only consider the age range of 6 – 15 because children in the 
formal education system start basic education either at end of age 6 or beginning 
age 7 and complete their education at the end of age 14. Starting age 15, the child 
can legally enter the labor market. 
 
There are 3 different specifications for the dependent variable, child labor for its 
response to a reduction in household income. This is because I would like to 
capture different dimensions of child labor to prevent understating the magnitude 
of child labor. Also these specifications enable me to study the dynamics of child 
time allocation between work and learning activity. Using these specifications, I 
explore i) the changes to the shift between work activity and schooling activity, ii) 
changes between working outside the household and within the household; and iii) 
if the child works outside the household, changes to the number of hours worked 
per week. I match the children in the 1997 wave and the 2000 wave using the same 
household characteristics, child characteristics and schooling type / source of skill 
formation. These characteristics and how they relate to my two research questions 
are detailed in Section 4.4. Only biological parent – child relationships are 
considered. The estimates for child labor are then specified in the following 
reduced form: 87 
 
it t i it it it f s c m y             4 3 2 1 0                               <(1) 
 
where  ic y  is the dependent variable with three different specifications for work by 
child i  
i) if child works and attends school then 1 and if child has no work and attends 
school full time then 0, 
ii) if child works outside the household and attends schools then 1 but if child 
works in the household and attends school then 0 and  
iii) if child works outside the household and attends school, the number of hours 
worked per week;  it m  represents household characteristics that vary before and 
after the financial crisis – income and educational expenditures;  it c captures child 
characteristics over time t;  i s  is a dummy variable that represents each of the three 
schooling types / sources of skill formation and  t f is a dummy variable for the 
financial crisis. 
 
Since I can only observe child and household behavior in 1997 and 2000, it is 
acknowledged that I cannot observe anything spread across 1998 and 1999 given 
data unavailability; this is where there is severe unpredictability in behavior. 
Consequently, I carry out instrumental variable estimation to isolate the 
relationship between parental income and simultaneous work-schooling behavior. 
The IV approach is used to manage the omitted variable bias problem that is faced 
from not being able to observe child and household behavior over the period of 
1998 and 1999 as well as to enable a discussion of alternative explanations for 
variations in child labor. As the instrument I use is the financial crisis, this 
instrument works through the value of child time where the variation in child labor 
is owing to the family’s need for the child’s contribution to household income or 
the relative return to work rather than school. This is written as equation (2) where 
the endogenous explanatory variable income mit is a linear function of the 
exogenous variable the AFC z4, a dummy variable and an error term. 
 
it it z z z z m             4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0                               <(2) 
 
I run OLS and IV regressions using the three different specifications for the 
dependent variable. An alternative method considered would have been a 
multinomial logit (MNL). But I do not choose this alternative because I am unable 
to determine or order the hierarchy of choices for MNL.  In the first restricted 
sample, the dependent variable consists of both children who combine work with 
school or who combine zero work with school full time. In the second restricted 
sample, the dependent variable consists of both children who work outside the 
household or in the household and gain a skill from one of the schooling types – 88 
 
formal, non-formal and informal. Children who attend school full time are not 
included in this second restricted sample. The size for the second sample is larger 
than for the first sample because in the data there are more children who 
demonstrate the behavior of work combined with schooling compared to children 
attend school full time. In the third restricted sample, I then proceed to focus only 
on children who work outside the household who report the number of hours 
worked while simultaneously attending one of the school types. This is because in 
IFLS waves 2 and 3 only children who work outside the household report the 
number of hours worked. The sample size becomes substantially smaller which 
then inevitably reduces the power of the analysis. However by comparing the 
direction and magnitude of the relationship between the main variables of interest 
using all 3 samples, I will have more information for analysis and interpretation. 
 
A limitation of IFLS which is unavoidable and I account for this in my empirical 
strategy is the possibility of household break-up in longitudinal study designs. This 
limitation arguably cannot simply be explained away in terms of attrition. As 
explained by Rosenzweig and Foster (2001) this design problem stems in part from 
the relative absence of attention in the theoretical and empirical literature to the 
determination of household structure. I try to address this problem by looking at 
the data in terms of household splitting. That is, there may be children who out-
migrate for employment reasons. But none of the children aged 6 – 15 report 
leaving the household to start a new household in another location. 
4.4 Child and Household Characteristics in Simultaneous 
Work-Schooling Behavior  
 
The allocation of child time is an important component of a household's decision-
making process. The household must weigh the value of child time spent in many 
activities including schooling, wage work, work inside the household, and work in 
household chores or other components of household production. The value of child 
time in any of these activities depends on both child and household attributes. In 
this section I consider how observable child and household characteristics are 
associated with the degree to which household income is improved over the period 
of the financial crisis. To do this I carry out semi-parametric estimation and I 
assume a normal distribution. 
 
To capture child characteristics I use the variables gender, age and schooling type 
or source of skill formation. But there is a limitation where there is no data 
available on the type of work activity that the child carries out outside the 
household or in the household. As detailed in Section 4.3, these are the 
characteristics that are associated with the value of child time. National level trends 89 
 
show that boys tend to work outside the household and this work can be waged or 
non-waged. Wage work can be valued in terms of hourly wages or a fixed wage for 
a given amount of work. In contrast girls tend to work in the household or also 
known as attending informal school, primarily in farming, home production or 
domestic work which is unremunerated. It is then difficult to monetize the value of 
their work and how it improves family welfare. It is also difficult to measure the 
number of hours girls allocate to work because there is no incentive to determine 
the monetary value of an hour’s work. Because of these intrinsic differences in how 
the work effort of boys and girls are viewed, there will also be differences in terms 
of how boys and girls shift more towards work and less towards schooling given 
joint work-schooling decisions. I capture these differences using the two definitions 
of child work – work outside the household and work in the household. 
 
In terms of household characteristics, I focus on the variables annual total 
household income and household educational expenditures. Household income is 
proxied by household reported expenditures on all market valued goods and 
services. Educational expenditures consist of spending in the whole school year 
related to learning activity such as books, private tuition and transportation to 
school or the learning center. Because of the unanticipated reduction in household 
income, adjustments to household expenditures may necessitate reducing or 
foregoing educational expenditures entirely. However scholastically motivated 
parents may likely continue to allocate a proportion of the household budget to 
learning activity. 
 
In relation to child and household attributes, I consider too the regional differences. 
This is because of the vastness of the country and its different socio-economic 
characteristics. To capture the regional differences, I use two variables – all 
households residing in Java and Bali Islands and households split by urban and 
rural in each of the main islands. Because of modernization and consequently 
urbanization, Java and Bali Islands have attracted the majority of the population. 
Java and Bali based on BPS estimates in 2003 are home to 60% of the total country 
population but represent only 7% of the total land mass in Indonesia. In contrast 
the Outer Islands are considered to have less industrialization, are less developed 
and have a lower population density. 
4.4.1 Distribution of Time for Work and Schooling  
I present the distribution of hours worked per week while attending school and 
one of the sources of skill formation. The kernel densities to be presented in Figures 
4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 represent child work outside of the household but not child work in 
the household. Based on the survey question asked in IFLS, children report on 
actual number of hours worked in the previous week and the hours reported do 90 
 
not reflect any other related activity such as travel time to work. The following 
Figure 4.3 presents children who work and attend the formal and mainstream 
education system where children in 1997 have a lower spread of hours worked per 
week compared to 2000. 
 
Figure 4.3 Kernel Density for Number of Hours Worked Per Week outside the 
Household & Attending Formal School 
 
 
In 1997 there is a peak in the range of 0 – 20 hours but this peak disappears for in 
2000. While the density is higher in the range of 0 – 30 hours in 1997 compared to 
2000, this becomes different after 30 hours. The density is then higher in the range 
of 30 – 80 hours in 1997 compared to 2000. As such it can be seen from Figure 4.3, 
the children in 2000 work more hours a week than the children in 1997 while 
attending formal schooling. The total time allocation for work and at least 42 hours 
a week for classroom learning as dictated by the national curriculum for 11 – 15 
year olds (refer to Chapter 2) is in the range of 72 hours – 142 hours a week in 2000. 
In contrast the total time allocation for joint work-schooling in 1997 is in the range 
of 42 hours – 72 hours a week for 11 – 15 year olds. The total time allocation is less 
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week of classroom instruction. But classroom learning time increases to 38 hours 
for 9 year olds and 40 hours for 10 year olds.  
 
The following Figure 4.4 presents child workers who attend Packet A and Packet B 
equivalency programs. The density of hours worked in 1997 peaks at 0 – 20 hours. 
In comparison, the distribution is further spread out in 2000 where children work 
from 20 – 80 hours after the financial crisis. However information on the total time 
allocated to work and skill formation is not available for this segment. This is 
because the equivalency programs are designed by the Ministry of Education in a 
flexible manner where the children can decide how much time to allocate for 
curriculum learning (refer to Chapter 2). 
 
Figure 4.4 Kernel Density for Number of Hours Worked Per Week outside the 






0  20  40  60  80 
Hours Worked / Week 
1997  2000 92 
 
Figure 4.5 Kernel Density for Number of Hours Worked Per Week outside the 




From Figure 4.5, it can be seen that children who work and attend informal school 
also known as education within the home have similar distributions as the children 
attending the other two sources of skill formation. However the time allocated for 
work and the time allocated for skill development cannot be disentangled because 
it is most likely that both activities are synonymous. Both activities build 
productive skills as viewed by the family. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the density 
in 1997 is in the range of 0 – 30 hours and is higher than 2000. This pattern reverses 
for the higher range of hours from 30 – 80 hours where the density in 2000 is higher 
than in 1997. 
 
When studying these kernel densities, the caveat is that the distributions only 
represent children who work outside the household and this understates the full 
extent of child labor. The substantial increase in the number of hours worked per 
week in 2000 merits further investigation and this means exploring other 
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4.4.2 Relationship between Household Income and 
Simultaneous Work-Schooling  
From Figures 4.3 – 4.5, child workers in 1997 worked a higher number of hours 
than in 1997. How does this pattern of increased working outside the household 
and in the household relate to household income? From Figure 4.6, it can be seen 
that as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis and the extreme inflation levels 
affecting purchasing power, for this restricted sample household income in 2000 
was severely reduced compared to 1997.  
 




The distribution of household income per capita in log terms shifted left from the 
range of slightly more than 12 log points – 22 log points to the range of less than 12 
log points – 19 log points. The distributions show that higher income households in 
2000 were more negatively affected by the crisis than the lowest income 
households. Also the spread of the income distribution becomes narrower in 2000 
compared to 1997. By comparing Figures 4.3 – 4.5 that depict the distribution of 
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depicts income, it can be seen that children worked more hours per week when 
income fell. 
 
Given the kernel densities from Figures 4.3 – 4.5, I pool the observations of child 
labor and their family’s income for 1997 and 2000. Figure 4.7 presents the estimated 
fit between these two main variables.  
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From Figure 4.7 it can be seen that the slope for the estimated fit between child 
labor and income is nearly flat. This suggests that the contribution of child time for 
wage work to household income is minimal. Put another way, the supply of child 
labor may be less than elastic.  It appears that a small proportion of child income is 
endogenous to household income which is generated by working outside the 
household.  This in turn implies that the time value of children working is higher in 
the household than the market value of working outside the household. This time 
value working in the household may also be partly reflected in the terms of child 
work viewed as skill formation.  95 
 
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 provides information on working children and their sources of skill 
formation – formal school or alternative school.  
Table 4.2 Children Working and Different Sources of Skill Formation 
 
Source  1997  %  2000  % 
Formal  1,638  0.20  1,616  0.22 
Non-Formal  229  0.03  196  0.03 
Informal  6,518  0.77  5,511  0.75 
Observations  8,399    7,323   
Notes: This table provides statistics on all working children – i) children who report working for a wage 
outside the household  and ii) children who report working in the household which includes the family 
business or farm and home production / domestic production and they do not receive any wages. All 
children are reported as being registered in one school type / source of skill formation while working.  
 
In both 1997 and 2000 a majority of the children attend informal school to learn 
independent courses that complement work for the family. The statistic is 77% in 
1997 and 75% in 2000 which is in similar proportion. 20% in 1997 and 22% in 2000 
work and attend the formal mainstream education system. 3% in 1997 as well as in 
2000 work and attend non-formal school where the curriculum consists of an 
equivalency program designed to accommodate child workers who might then 
return to the mainstream system. These statistics are then disaggregated by the 2 
definitions of children working outside the household and in the household.  
 
From Table 4.3, 51% in 1997 and a reduced 44% in 2000 who report working 
outside the household attend informal school. 41% in 1997 and an increased 51% in 
2000 work and attend formal school. Exploring further this 10 percentage point 
difference, it is found that a higher proportion of older children in 2000 attend 
formal junior high. 7% in 1997 and a slightly smaller 5% in 2000 outside the 
household and attend non-formal school.  
Table 4.3 Children Working outside the Household and Source of Skill Formation 
 
Source  1997  %  2000  % 
Formal  50  0.41  85  0.51 
Non-Formal  9  0.07  7  0.05 
Informal  63  0.52  75  0.44 
Observations  122    167   
Notes: This table provides statistics on only children in the observed data who report working outside 
the household and may or may not receive a wage. 
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Proceeding to Table 4.4 which provides the statistics for children who work in the 
household, the pattern of the majority attending informal school is similar to that of 
children who work outside the household. 78% in 1997 and a similar proportion of 
76% in 2000 work within the household and simultaneously build their skills 
within the home. 19% in 1997 and 21% in 2000 work in the household and attend 
the formal, mainstream system. For both periods, 3% work and attend non-formal 
school. 
Table 4.4 Children Working in the Household & Source of Skill Formation 
 
Source  1997  %  2000  % 
Formal  1,588  0.19  1,531  0.21 
Non-Formal  220  0.03  189  0.03 
Informal  6,456  0.78  5,436  0.76 
Observations  8,277    7,156   
Notes: This table provides statistics on only children in the observed data who report working in the 
household which includes the family business or farm and home production / domestic production and 
they do not receive any wages. 
 
The following Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide further descriptive statistics for the 
characteristics of the group of children who work outside the household in 1997 
and 2000 and for the characteristics of the group of children who work within the 
household. 97 
 
Table 4.5 Characteristics of Children Working outside the Household  
 
1997  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Hours Worked / Week  22.19  17.68  2  72 
Household Income (ln)  16.18  0.61  14.20  18.12 
Educational Expenditures (ln)  10.28  0.84  7.71  11.98 
  Percentage       
Girl  0.38       
Boy  0.62       
         
Urban  0.30       
Rural  0.70       
         
Java and Bali Islands  0.40       
Outer Islands  0.60       
         
Distribution by Age  Percentage       
6  0       
7  0.008       
8  0.04       
9  0.06       
10  0.08       
11  0.09       
12  0.16       
13  0.25       
14  0.31       




2000  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Hours Worked / Week  30.26  23.04  1  84 
Household Income (ln)  13.69  1.08  12.30  18.86 
Educational Expenditures (ln)  10.34  0.89  1.39  13.21 
  Percentage       
Girl  0.58       
Boy  0.42       
         
Urban  0.41       
Rural  0.59       
         
Java and Bali Islands  0.63       
Outer Islands  0.37       
         
Distribution by Age  Percentage       
6  0       
7  0.01       
8  0       
9  0.01       
10  0.08       
11  0.05       
12  0.11       
13  0.08       
14  0.31       
15  0.34       
 
By exploring the characteristics of the child and the household for those who work 
outside the household, it is observed in the Table 4.5 that the children in 1997 
report working an average of 22.19 hours per week. Also it is observed that the 
minimum number of hours worked per week is 2 hours and a maximum of 72 
hours. Average household income per capita is 16.18 log points with a minimum of 
14.20 log points and a maximum of 18.12 log points. Parents of children who work 
outside of the household invest on average 10.28 log points in educational 
spending. In 1997, 62% of the children are boys and 38% are girls. The majority at 
70% of children are in rural areas and 60% are located in the Outer Islands where 
there is less economic development compared to Java and Bali Islands. The 
observed data shows that in 1997 children aged 6 – 9 make up a smaller percentage 
of child workers. Older children age 12 – 14 make up a higher proportion of 
workers.  99 
 
In contrast, for the characteristics of the child and the household in 2000 it can be 
seen that the mean hours worked per week increased to 30.26 hours per week. 
Compared to 1997 this is an increase of 36% of hours worked per week. Also the 
range of hours worked has a far greater spread in 1997 to 2000. The minimum 
number of hours worked in 2000 is 1 hour and the maximum if 84 hours which 
raises the question whether the child workers are allocating more hours for work 
than what is possibly conceivable given the number of hours available in the day. 
The child workers in 2000 have on average a household income per capita of 13.69 
log points which is lower than for the child workers in 1997. The reduction in 
average household income is 2.49 log points. Despite this severe reduction in 
income, parents in 2000 on average increased educational spending to 10.34 log 
points compared to 1997 at 10.28 log points (calculated in real terms using a self-
constructed price deflator for education based on teacher wages21). In 2000, the 
composition of girl and boy workers has changed compared to 1997. In 2000, girls 
make up 58% of workers and boys make up 42%. In terms of the urban / rural split, 
the majority of child workers in 2000 at 59% are from rural areas and this is similar 
in 1997. However like results from the SAKERNAS labor surveys, there is a shift 
towards child employment in urban centers in 2000 where the percentage of 
workers in the urban centers is a larger 41%. When looking at the incidence of child 
labor by islands, in 2000 63% of child workers are from Java and Bali. This pattern 
is the reverse of what is observed in 1997 before the financial crisis when the 
majority of child workers were in the Outer Islands. As there is more economic 
development in Java and Bali where there is a higher concentration of the tertiary 
services sector, the observed data appears to follow the national level trends of 
child work shifting away from the primary agricultural sector to the tertiary 
services sector. When looking at the age distribution of child workers in 1997 the 
pattern is similar to 2000 in terms of younger children ages 6 - 11. The pattern 
becomes different in 2000 for older children particularly aged 14 and 15 who work 
more instead of the spread of ages 12 – 15 as seen in 1997. The higher incidence of 
15 year old children working in 2000 after the financial crisis coincides with the 
legal minimum age for employment in the country. 
                                                 
21 Refer to Chapter 2 for the computation of this education price deflator. 100 
 
Table 4.6 Characteristics of Children Working in the Household  
         
1997  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Household Income (ln)  16.24  0.77  12.25  21.53 
Educational Expenditures (ln)  10.55  0.87  6.21  12.68 
  Percentage       
Girl  0.49       
Boy  0.51       
         
Urban  0.44       
Rural  0.56       
         
Java and Bali Islands  0.59       
Outer Islands  0.41       
         
Distribution by Age  Percentage       
6  0.11       
7  0.10       
8  0.11       
9  0.10       
10  0.11       
11  0.10       
12  0.11       
13  0.11       
14  0.10       




         
2000  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Household Income (ln)  13.78  0.82  11.66  18.16 
Educational Expenditures (ln)  10.34  0.89  1.39  13.21 
  Percentage       
Girl  0.50       
Boy  0.50       
         
Urban  0.39       
Rural  0.61       
         
Java and Bali Islands  0.75       
Outer Islands  0.25       
         
Distribution by Age  Percentage       
6  0.08       
7  0.11       
8  0.11       
9  0.10       
10  0.11       
11  0.11       
12  0.10       
13  0.11       
14  0.10       
15  0.05       
Notes: Respondents when asked if they work in the household which includes domestic production, the 
family business or the farm reported either Yes or No but they do not provide the number of hours per 
week used to carry out these activities in the household. As such this table only reports on children who 
have the status of working in the household and the household’s total annual expenditures and annual 
educational expenditures. 
 
For Table 4.6 which provides the descriptive statistics for children who work in the 
household, the children do not report the number of hours worked in IFLS. They 
only report that they do work and the work is for the family. The non-reporting of 
hours worked is most likely related to not having the need to recall hours worked 
because they do not receive hourly wages. In 1997, mean household income per 
capita is 11.27 log points and the range covers 8.79 – 16.65 log points. Mean 
educational expenditures is 10.55 log points with a minimum of 6.21 log points and 
a maximum of 16.65 log points. Mean household income and mean educational 
spending is slightly higher for children who work in the household compared to 
children who work outside the household. There is even split of girl and boy 102 
 
workers in 1997. Like children who work outside the household in 1997, the 
majority who work in the household at 56% are from rural areas. But 59% are 
located in Java and Bali and 41% are located in the Outer Islands. This is the reverse 
of children who work outside the household. In terms of the age distribution, the 
children ages 6 – 14 are evenly spread out in 1997 where there does not appear to 
be any difference whether a younger or older child works in the household. The 
slight exception is that a smaller percentage of 15 year olds work in the household. 
 
As a comparison, in 2000 for children who work in the household, average 
household income per capita is higher than in 1997. After the crisis, average 
household income is 11.87 log points with a minimum of 9.86 log points and a 
maximum of 14.78 log points. However mean educational investments at 10.34 log 
points are lower in 2000 for children who work in the household compared to 1997. 
Also the range for educational investments has severely deteriorated after the crisis 
in terms of the minimum value is at a low of 1.39 log points. However the range 
has a greater spread compared to 1997 with the maximum value at a high of 13.21 
log points. In terms of gender and the urban / rural split, there is the same pattern 
in both 1997 and 2000. The incidence of child labor in 2000 shows the same pattern 
as in 1997 in terms of the majority who work in the household being located in Java 
and Bali Islands. The age distribution for the children who work for the family in 
the 2000 remains the same as in 1997 including 15 year old children working less at 
home compared to the children aged 6 – 14. 
4.5 Results 
In Table 4.7, I present the results for the first sample that consists of children who 
work and attend school and children who do not work and only attend school full 
time. Full time schooling is in terms of any of the three sources of skill formation. 
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Table 4.7 Household Income, Joint Work-Schooling and Fulltime Schooling 
 
 DV = child who combines work with school is 1, 
Otherwise child has no work and attends school fulltime is 0 
 (Robust SE is in Parentheses) 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Household         








Asian Financial Crisis  0.0624*** 
(0.0062) 
  0.0628*** 
(0.0066) 
 




         
Child         
































         
Schooling Type         
















R2  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.06 
Observations  14,338  14,338  13,145  13,145 
Statistically significant at the *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level  
Notes: The instrumental variable for income in (ii), (iv), (vi) and (viii) is the Asian Financial Crisis. In 
Table 4.7, the number of observations for children who attend one of the sources of skill formation full 
time and does not work is smaller than the observations in Table 4.7. In Table 4.8, there are more 
children observed with joint work-schooling behavior. 104 
 
 In columns (i) and (ii) the regressions do not include the endogenous explanatory 
variables, schooling expenditures and schooling type. I find that the OLS estimate 
in (i) for household income per capita is negative and comparable in magnitude to 
the IV estimate in (ii). However the IV estimate is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and the OLS estimate is not significant. As expected when income is lower, 
the child combines work with schooling and does not attend school full time. 
Correspondingly, an increase in schooling related expenditures increases the 
likelihood that the child will attend school full time. However the effect of 
schooling expenditures on the child’s work – schooling behavior is smaller than the 
effect of income. In columns (iii) and (iv) the coefficient size for schooling 
expenditures is smaller than for income. While the OLS estimate for these 
expenditures is statistically significant it is no longer the case for the IV estimate. In 
terms of the age effect, I find that across columns (i) to (iv), the older the child is, 
the higher the propensity for the child to work. This is similar to the national level 
trend highlighted in Figure 4.1. The OLS and IV estimates for age are similar in 
magnitude across the four columns and all are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. As the OLS and IV estimates are similar, there is little bias. I also find that 
children who reside in urban centers have the propensity to attend school full time 
and not work. This is a statistically significant result across (i) to (iv) which is when 
the endogenous explanatory variables are not included and when included. I do 
not find any other significant results to explore further in terms of child attributes. 
This includes the gender of the child which suggests there is minimal bias whether 
a boy or a girl attends school full time or works full time. When I focus on the three 
sources of skill formation, I find that the provision of non-formal schooling by non-
governmental organizations including religious schools increases the propensity of 
joint work-schooling. This is consistent with the design of non-formal schools for 
accommodating the skill development needs of child workers. However this result 
is not statistically significant. In contrast, when the source of skill development 
comes from the family, there is a positive relationship between attending school 
full time and not working. The OLS and IV estimates have similar coefficients and 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
In Table 4.8, I present the results that use the dependent variable of children who 
work outside the household combined with attending school and children who 
work within the household while attending school.  
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Table 4.8 Household Income, Joint Work Outside-Schooling and Joint Work in 
Household-Schooling 
 
DV = child works outside the household and attends school is 1,  
Otherwise child works in the household and attends school is 0 
(Robust SE is in Parentheses) 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Household         








Asian Financial Crisis  0.0009 
(0.0042) 
  0.0026 
(0.0045) 
 




Child         
































         
Schooling Type         
















R2  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Observations  15,780  15,780  14,151  14,151 
Statistically significant at the *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level  
Notes: The instrumental variable for income in (ii), (iv), (vi) and (viii) is the Asian Financial Crisis. In 
Table 4.8, the number of observations for children with joint-work schooling behavior is larger than the 
observations in Table 4.7. In Table 4.7, there are fewer children observed who attend school full time. 
 
The role of income in affecting child labor now changes. With income decreases the 
incidence of children working outside the household increases. The size of the 106 
 
income coefficient as reported by OLS and IV is similar to the size of the income 
coefficient when the dependent variable is specified as whether a child attends 
school full time (Table 4.7). However only the IV estimate is statistically significant 
and this is at the 5% level. Household investment in schooling as represented by 
schooling expenditures in columns (iii) and (iv) have the same relationship as 
income in terms of how it relates to child labor. With a fall in schooling 
expenditures, the incidence of children working outside the household increases. 
The OLS and IV estimates for spending are similar in magnitude and statistically 
significant. More importantly, the size of the coefficients for schooling expenditures 
is now larger than for household income. The significance of schooling 
expenditures when child labor is now specified in terms of working outside or 
within the household suggest that when parents choose to keep their children 
working in the home, there are likely to be elements of skill formation. As 
described in Chapter 2, children complement learning in the informal school with 
individual courses provided by the Ministry of Education. Parents can make these 
investments in their children when they are in the home enterprise but this may be 
less likely when the child works outside of the household for an employer. 
 
In comparing the relationship between an income reduction and the incidence of 
joint work-schooling (Table 4.7) with the relationship between an income reduction 
and the incidence of working outside of the household (Table 4.8), decreases in 
income drive the shift towards joint work-schooling. But the reduction in income 
does not determine if the child will have a higher likelihood of working outside the 
household or in the household.  This can be interpreted as a fall in income causes 
simultaneous work-schooling decisions but working can just as likely take place 
outside the household or in the household. 
 
The relationship between the age of the child and the incidence of working is also 
borne out in Table 4.8 but now specifically in terms of an older child is more likely 
to work outside the household while attending school. This result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with the intuition that when 
older the child is expected to be better equipped to manage the safety and health 
risks of working outside without parental supervision. In Table 4.8, I now have a 
new result that I did not have from Table 4.8 which is related to the child’s 
residential location. On the one hand residence in Java and Bali Islands does not 
play a substantial role in determining whether a child is in school or at work full 
time. But on the other hand, location becomes important for whether a child works 
outside the household or in the household. From Table 4.8, across columns (i) – (iv) 
it can be seen a child worker residing in Java and Bali Islands will work outside the 
household and attend school and this is statistically significant. This strongly 
suggests that there are more economic opportunities available in Java and Bali 
compared to the Outer Islands that have lower levels of economic development. As 107 
 
such when the child has to work, it is more likely that the child will work outside of 
the household because the relative returns will likely be higher than what is gained 
by working for the family in the household. I also find that the source of skill 
formation that now plays a noticeable role is non-governmental organization run 
schools for child laborers. This coefficient has a negative relationship with children 
working outside the household which can be interpreted as non-formal schooling 
reduces the incidence of working outside the household while attending school. 
This is consistent with the design and availability of this school type to 
accommodate the needs of child laborers. Schooling time is structured around the 
working hours of the child laborers so as not to deprive them of the opportunities 
for skill development. However the negative relationship between non-formal 
schooling and working outside the household is not statistically significant. The 
relationship between informal schooling and working outside the household is also 
negative and not statistically significant. However the size of the coefficient for 
informal school is smaller than for non-formal school. This implies that non-formal 
schools have a more important influence than informal schools in the skill 
development of children working outside of the household. 
 
Table 4.9 shows the results for the specification of child labor in terms of the 
number of hours worked per week outside the household while attending school. 
Given the kernel densities from Figures 4.3 – 4.5, it was found that children in 1997 
worked more hours per week while attending school compared to children in 2000. 
This raises the question of how much time is available for a child to work and to 
learn while contributing to household income. 
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Table 4.9 Household Income and Hours Worked by Child outside the Household 
while Attending School 
 
DV = Hours Worked per Week by Child who Works Outside the Household and Attends School 
(Robust SE is in the Parentheses) 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Household                 
















Crisis  13.2350* 
(4.4960) 
  14.1238** 
(5.1700) 
  18.4696*** 
(4.4740) 













                 
Child                 








       








       








































                 
Schooling 
Type 
               
Non-Formal 
School 


















                 
















R2  0.16  0.12  0.20  0.15  0.09  0.002  0.14  0.07 
N  290  290  252  252  290  290  252  252 
Statistically significant at the *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level  
Notes: Only children who work outside the household report the number of hours worked per week. 
The instrumental variable for income in (ii), (iv), (vi) and (viii) is the Asian Financial Crisis.109 
 
From column (i) in Table 4.9, the OLS estimate for income is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. When household income decreases by one 
log point, a child works nearly four hours less per week. The IV estimate in column 
(ii) negates this relationship where when household income decreases by one log 
point, the child works one more hour per week. But this result is statistically 
insignificant. In comparing the OLS and IV estimates, there is selection bias in the 
observed data where lower income households have children who work fewer 
hours outside the household. The different directions of the OLS and IV estimates 
for household income also hold in columns (iii) and (iv) when the endogenous 
explanatory variables are included. In terms of schooling expenditures, its effect on 
the number of hours worked outside the household is miniscule. This appears to be 
consistent with the findings in Table 4.9 when child labor is specified in terms of 
working outside or within the household. This implies that parents are less inclined 
to invest in the skill formation process when the child works outside for an 
employer. 
 
As per the previous two specifications for the dependent variable, the OLS and IV 
estimates for age reinforce the finding that as the child is older, the incidence and 
intensity of child labor increases. The results across columns (i) – (iv) show that 
when the child is older by a year, the child works over three hours more per week. 
This is statistically significant at the 1% level. This strongly suggests that it is more 
the age of the child worker that shifts a child’s time more towards work outside the 
household than variations in household income. In terms of geographical factors, I 
find that children in urban centers across all the main islands work on average four 
hours more per week and this is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result 
can be seen across columns (i) – (iv). The IV estimates are a half hour to an hour 
higher than the OLS estimates for each week of work and this is most likely due to 
attenuation bias.  
 
Because of the statistically significant results from the age and urban center 
exogenous covariates, I now interact the two covariates and run the regressions 
from columns (v) – (viii) in Table 4.9. I now have different results for the main 
relationship of interest which is income and hours worked per week. The OLS 
estimates for income are positive and larger than for the IV estimates which mean 
that the OLS estimates are overstating the relationship between income and hours, 
due to omitted variables. Using the IV estimates from (vi) and (viii) and comparing 
them with the IV estimates from (ii) and (iv), it can be seen that when income 
decreases by one log point, the child works two hours more per week controlling 
for the child’s age and urban location. This estimate is statistically significant at the 
5% level. This finding also reflects the selection bias that lower income households 
have children who work fewer hours outside the household. When I study the 
interaction between age and urban center, I see that the IV estimates in (vi) and 110 
 
(viii) are slightly higher than the OLS estimates in (v) and (vii) which are likely 
related to attenuation bias. It can be seen that when the child is older by a year and 
residing in an urban center, the child works 30 minutes more per week and this 
finding is statistically significant at the 5% level. This interaction produces 
coefficient sizes that are noticeably smaller compared to the prior separate 
estimates on age and urban center in (i) – (iv). Another new finding from this 
additional specification can be seen in columns (vii) and (viii) where boys tend to 
spend more time outside the household working compared to girls. The OLS 
estimate is 6 additional hours of work per week, statistically significant at the 5% 
level and the IV estimate is at a lower 4.5 hours of more work per week statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This strongly implies that there is a gender bias where 
boys tend to work outside the household compared to girls and while working 
outside for a wage or an in-kind transfer, boys increase hours worked more than 
girls. However if the child worker is combining work outside with gaining skills 
from informal schooling, hours worked per week fall substantially. When 
schooling type as endogenous explanatory variables are included into the 
additional specification of the interaction of age and urban center, accounting for 
attenuation bias, the child works 7 hours less per week. This finding can be seen in 
the IV estimate in column (viii) which is statistically significant at the 5% level. An 
interpretation for this finding is that the practice of the family enterprise with child 
apprenticeships downplays the need for the child’s market income to complement 
household income when there is reduced income. The returns to work for the 
family appear to be higher than the returns to work in the market. In addition, by 
being an apprentice, the child’s skill formation process continues and this is less 
likely when the child works outside the household.  
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided evidence on the variations in simultaneous work-
schooling behavior when income falls. I used different operational definitions for 
the joint work-schooling decision: joint work and schooling, joint work within the 
household and schooling, joint work outside the household and schooling; and 
number of hours worked per week and schooling. A fall in income results in a shift 
away from full time schooling to joint work-schooling. An income decrease is also 
found to increase the propensity to shift away from schooling and towards more 
work for children who demonstrate joint work-schooling behavior. But it is not 
clear whether the increased incidence of working takes place outside or within the 
household. When isolating only child work behavior outside the household for 
wages or in-kind transfers, it is found that an income reduction increases the 
number of hours worked per week but the increase is small. A one log point 
decrease in income only increases work by 2 hours in a week which is not likely to 
conflict with time for schooling. To reconcile these findings, a fall in income does 111 
 
increase the propensity of simultaneous work-schooling behavior. However this 
does not appear to be captured by the child’s contribution to household income. 
Instead the reduction in income may be compensated by a higher relative value of 
child time used for work. As such, income does not appear to be the main influence 
for the incidence and intensity of child labor.  
 
The main influence driving joint work-schooling is the age of the child. It is more 
likely that the child who already demonstrates simultaneous work-schooling 
behavior from an age as young as 6 is driven to work more when s/he is older. 
When the child is 12 years old, there is a higher propensity for the child to work 
outside the household while attending school. In addition this appears to be an 
urban phenomenon in Indonesia where wage opportunities are higher in areas 
with more economic development. As the 12 year old child becomes older until 
s/he reaches the legal employment age of 15, the hours worked per week increase 
and there is a greater shift towards full time work. This strongly implies that if the 
child is in the formal school system in an urban center, the age range of 12 – 15 is 
where the risk increases that the child will fail to complete junior high. This implies 
that human capital accumulation will peak at the completion of primary school at 
age 12. 
 
This chapter has also provided insight into the schooling choices of child workers – 
formal school, non-formal school or informal school. On the one hand the extent of 
child labor is arguably overstated if the child is an apprentice in the family 
enterprise where work and learning activity are occurring simultaneously; both 
types of activity are the one and the same where work is carried out within the 
household. As there are productive skills built during the apprenticeship which 
provide social returns to the household if not private returns in the market, human 
capital accumulation does not appear to be impaired. The child’s health and safety 
are also more likely to be assured compared to if the child works outside the 
household unsupervised by the parents. On the other hand the extent of child labor 
is likely to be understated because in this chapter, a main limitation is that there is 
no data available on the type of activity that is carried out. Activities in the 
household that can be physically harmful or do not require any skills such as 
mundane, repetitive tasks are not observed in the data. As such the child who shifts 
more towards work and away from learning may be less likely to build human 
capital.  
 
From the perspective of the national education system, the institutional recognition 
of both the informal school and non-formal school suggests that the relative value 
of time working outside or within the household is higher than schooling for some 
families. This then implies that in certain areas particularly urban centers, parents 
perceive that the returns to schooling are low. The presence and development of 112 
 
the informal school and non-formal school may then be an appropriate educational 
policy response to ensure that economically active children aged 6 – 15 are 
guaranteed some form of schooling.  However another limitation of this chapter is 
that there is no wage data available to assess this to what extent the returns to 











Education is generally considered as an important investment for economic 
growth. Optimal investments in human capital depend on the direct and 
opportunity costs of schooling and the future expected benefits and are thus not 
determined by parental income. If education is only considered to be a 
consumption good income would matter. But in Indonesia, monetary constraints 
together with other high priority expenditures could explain that parents invest 
less than is optimal in their children’s education. This is because parents may have 
a preference for spending on other urgent issues and perhaps have a preference for 
their children to work or to help within the household. Alternative explanations for 
sub-optimal investment would be that poorer parents differ in their characteristics 
from richer parents and that these characteristics rather than income explain 
differences in educational investment. These characteristics could include how they 
vthe future expected benefits from the human capital accumulated by their 
children. These benefits could be both private and social. 
 
The aims of this chapter are the following. The first aim is to investigate how 
income has a causal relationship with educational expenditures in Indonesia. The 
second aim is to determine whether time spent on schooling by Indonesian 
children is related to income. The third aim is investigate whether Indonesian 
parents respond to the expected future benefits of education in their current 
educational expenditures. To identify causality, we use the Asian Financial Crisis in 
Indonesia as a natural experiment to investigate educational expenditures. In this 
way, we obtain estimates of the impact of income on educational expenditures and 
time used for schooling while holding constant parental characteristics. The 
difference in the parameters between parents of children who have just started 
junior high and parents of children who have already attained a few years of a 
junior high education reveals whether parents react to differences in returns. Due 
to dynamic complementarity in the accumulation of human capital, the loss in 
returns due to lower investments for children in later grades of junior high is 
higher. Using repeated cross sections from 1997 and 2000, we find that about 80% 
of the cross-sectional link between income and educational expenditures is caused 
by differences in income. The remaining 20% is related to unobserved parental 
characteristics or to unobserved child characteristics. Lower educational 
expenditures due to less income are highly compensated by time investments. The 
effect of time investments is 50% stronger than suggested by cross-sectional 
evidence. This strongly implies that income related parental characteristics explain 
a substantial part of these compensating time investments. Finally the reduction in 
educational expenditures is much lower for children who have already attained a 115 
 
few years of junior high education. This implies that parents do take into account 
the loss in returns related to previous investments on the stock of human capital 
accumulated. Or put in another way, there is loss aversion. Thus this suggests that 
the future expected benefits of their children’s education do play a role in 
investment decisions. Taken together these results reveal that monetary constraints 
do restrict parents in their educational expenditures, that they are concerned with 
future returns; and that especially parents with favorable characteristics 
compensate reductions in educational expenditures by letting their higher ability 
children spend more time in school. 
 
This chapter is related to the literature on educational investments in developing 
countries. Optimal parental investments based on future expected benefits have 
tended to be concentrated on potential lost productivity from premature school 
dropout given credit constraints. Available estimates indicate that schooling in 
developing countries has a high payoff of a 25 – 30 percent real rate of return, 
especially for lower levels of schooling (e.g. Psacharopoulos 1994; Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos 2004). At the same time, school completion rates in developing 
countries are very low (Lockheed and Verspoor 1991). To reconcile the 
contradiction between high rates of return with low schooling attainment school 
quality and quantity of schooling completed may be positively correlated, leading 
to upward biases in the rates of return estimated by traditional approaches 
(Behrman and Birdsall 1983; Hanushek, Lavy and Hitomi, 2008). In his review of 
the literature on education investments comparing developed and developing 
countries, Hanushek sums up that parents in developing countries may not invest 
more in education if their children’s educational achievement and abilities do not 
translate into earnings opportunities outside of school (1995, 2008).  
 
This chapter is also related to the theory of the technology of skill formation in the 
child’s life cycle (Cunha et al 2004, 2005; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Caucutt and 
Lochner, 2008). Cameron & Heckman (2001), Keane & Wolpin (2001) and Cameron 
& Taber (2004) explore the positive correlation between college enrollment and 
family income. Using different methodology types, the authors argue that short-
run borrowing constraints do not drive schooling decisions such as staying on at 
school after the compulsory age. Rather, Cameron & Heckman (2001) argue that 
binding lifetime credit constraints alter human capital investment through the 
entire childhood and drive the stock of human capital at the time schooling 
decisions are made. We take these arguments into consideration for the Indonesian 
developing country context where there is no enforced compulsory schooling age, 
thus credit constraints can drive schooling decisions at any schooling level. 
 
The contributions of this chapter to the literature are threefold. First, optimal 
education investment does include accounting for the loss in returns from previous 116 
 
investments on the stock of human capital that has been accumulated. Put in 
another way, sunk costs matter. Second, this chapter expands the Cunha and 
Heckman (2007) technology of skill formation structural equation modeling to 
instrumental variable estimation. Third, this chapter provides the first piece of 
evidence on the technology of skill formation in a developing country. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following way. In Section 5.2, using the 
theoretical framework of the technology of skill formation, we will build a model to 
formalize our ideas. In Section 5.3 we outline the empirical strategy, introduce 
operational definitions related to the technology of skill formation framework; and 
describe the data we use. This is followed by descriptive statistics and results in 
Section 5.4. Conclusions are made in Section 5.5. 117 
 
5.2 A Model of the Distribution of Investments over the 
Child’s Life Cycle22  
Parental investments are distributed over 2 periods in childhood in the presence of 
incomplete credit markets and non-compulsory schooling. The child starts in the 
first period known as the primary school level. If the child passes the standardized 
test at the end of the first period the child will transition23 from this cycle or level of 
education to the next higher level. The child will go on to the second period known 
as the junior high level. At age 15, the child enters adulthood and can either 
continue on to higher education or work. This model follows the Indonesian 
national education system as described in detail in Chapter 2. The minimum legal 
age for employment is 15 years old. This model is laid out in Figure 5.1: 
 
Figure 5. 1 
--------------------------Childhood-------------------------                        ----Adulthood---- 
Age 
|_7_|_8_|_9_|_10_|_11_|_12_|       |_13_|_14_|_15_|                 |_16_|_-_|_N_| 
 
Grade 
|_1_|_2_|_3_|_4_|_5_|_6_|               |_7_|_8_|_9_|                 |_10_|_-_|_N_| 
 




It = parents’ financial and time investment in child at time t where t = 1 and 2. Time 
includes a preference that the child attends school instead of going to work or the 
                                                 
22 Adapted from Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (2005); Caucutt and Lochner (2008); and Su 
(2004).  
23 The transition indicator used is from UNESCO education indicators (refer to the publicly available 
technical guidelines, November 2009). Transition is used to convey information on the degree of access 
or transition from one cycle or level of education to a higher one. Viewed from the lower cycle or level of 
education, it is considered as an output indicator, viewed from the higher educational cycle or level, it 
constitutes an indicator of access. It can also help in assessing the relative selectivity of an education 










child can stay at home. It is a function of household income which consists of per 
capita consumption Ct and per capita savings Σt 
 
) , ( t t t t C f I    
 
Ct > Σt; Σt≠0 because of incomplete credit markets; Parents’ utility is increasing and 
concave.  
 
St for t = 1 and 2 where 1 = skills acquired at the primary school level and 2 = skills 
acquired at the junior high level. S1 skills consist of Indonesian language literacy, 
math, science, social studies and moral studies. S2 skills consist of Indonesian and 
English language literacy, math, science, social studies & moral studies. Implicitly 
the stock of skills acquired will depreciate over time as per the Ben-Porath Model 
(1967)24. This depreciation rate is dependent on the child’s innate ability. 
 
S0 are initial skills when the child is born. Assume that the child is born to family 
with a given occupation and initial skills are correlated with the family 
occupation25. The technology of skill formation can be written as 
 
) , ( 1 t t t t I S f S    
 
where ft is a stage-t function mapping skill (ability) levels and financial investment 
at stage t into skill(ability) levels at t+1. For simplicity we assume that ft is twice 
continuously differentiable in its arguments. Its domain of definition is the same 
for all inputs that make up the financial investment e.g. books, computers, 
contributions to the parent-teacher association, etc. The proportion of inputs may 
be different at different stages in childhood, so that the inputs in It may be different 
from the inputs at period τ different from t. 
 










Higher levels of It raise the productivity of St. Or there is the reverse relationship 
where higher levels of St raise the productivity of It 
 
This generalized notation entertains the possibility that some components of skill 
can only come together and be productive cumulatively at certain critical periods. 
Period t is critical for skill (ability) j if  
                                                 
24 The implicit assumption of this model with reference to the Ben Porath model  
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Crucial or sensitive points in time for investment are those where, at the same level 






 1 are high. More formally, let St = st, It = it, t is a sensitive 
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The sensitive time in our model is the period of junior high at t = 2 after the child 
has completed and transitioned from primary school at t = 1. This is a sensitive 
period in terms of maximizing the returns to education in an incomplete credit 
market. 
 
If there is the dynamic complementarity of investment, current investment should 
be at a higher level that prior investment. Intuitively, the current level of 
expenditures for junior high should be higher because the child is older and all 
educational expenditures should cost more. But it is not only age effects driving 
expenditures. Our focus is on how much more productivity is gained from having 
higher later investments on top of early investments. What the child learns in junior 
high are gains in advanced skills in language and math; and the spillovers these 
two subjects produce for the other subjects. To illustrate, when in primary school, 
the child gains a basic skill in literacy using the Indonesian language. This sets the 
stage for the child in junior high to learn a second language, English which 
incidentally has similarity in syntax to the Indonesian language. Also the 
Indonesian language has adopted much of the modern vocabulary of the English 
language. Put simply, early investments in primary school are not productive if 
they are not followed up by later investments in junior high.  
 
Proceeding from the theoretical generalized model of the technology of skill 
formation, we move on to a reduced form specification and we assume a linear 
model. Considering the dynamic complementarity of investment given income we 
have the following reduced form: 
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Investmentt = f(Incomet, Skills t-1, Aget) where t covers two periods 
 
Investment at t is for current investment and household income at t is for current 
income. Skills have been built up over the entire prior period t-1 to represent a 
stock of accumulated human capital. Age represents the current school age of the 
child and the schooling level. But there is an endogeneity problem. To be able to 
test this model, we use instrumental variable (IV) analysis as detailed in our 
empirical strategy in section 4 where the instruments work through the value that 
parents have for the future expected benefits of their children’s skills attained, 
where the variation in investment at t is owing to parental income at t. A 
comparison of the OLS and IV estimators then enable us to determine the extent to 
which unobserved parental characteristics influence educational investments. In 
section 2, we will describe the institutional context for our investigation. 
5.3. Operational Definitions and Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy consists of a natural experiment with instrumental variable 
(IV-2SLS) estimation. We closely follow the parameters in the theoretical model of 
the technology of skill formation as can been seen in the applied model in Section 
5.2. We proceed to test the causal relationship between income and educational 
investments in the presence of credit constraints. We exploit the AFC as the source 
of exogenous variation in income in order to carry out IV-2SLS analysis. Because of 
the AFC, households incomes are all reduced and it is assumed that there are no 
incomes moving in the other direction26. Heterogeneous responses are then 
assumed to be with respect to a fall in income. We observe the behavior of rich and 
poor households across the income distribution and how they adjust their 
investment decisions before and after the AFC. These investment decisions are with 
respect to their children transitioning from primary school to junior high. Our 
identifying assumption is that the AFC affected educational decisions only through 
income and not through other channels. 
 
The data that we use is the RAND Corporation Indonesia Family Life Surveys 
(IFLS) Wave 2, 1997 and Wave 3, 2000 repeated cross sections which we view 
opportunistically as being observations of the same group with the same 
characteristics in 1997 and 2000. There is no data publicly available for the period 
between 1997 and 2000 to give us more information about the dynamic 
relationships occurring during this period of extreme volatility and uncertainty. 
The unit of analysis is the child with biological parents. To ensure that the group 
observed in 1997 is the very similar to the group observed in 2000, we carry out a 
simple pair-wise matching of children with the same school age 11 – 15; the same 
                                                 
26 We use this monotonicity assumption for our instrument which is the crisis and so the instrument can 
only move the endogenous regressor in one direction. 121 
 
province and the same schooling characteristics – curriculum and standardized 
tests. The children in 1997 and in 2000 are all currently enrolled in junior high in 
the period of observation. There is an incidence of 18% grade repeaters in 1997 and 
15% grade repeaters in 200027. The children have all taken their national level 
standardized qualifying tests at the end of primary school and have entered junior 
high. As such they all have had the same national academic curriculum as 
described in Chapter 2, Table 2.2.  The children in both observed groups have 
information on their test scores for EBTANAS; these test scores are a proxy for 
skills attained in primary school prior to entering junior high. However the sample 
for each period is not random. There is self-selection from children who either 
qualified for junior high but did not transition or have qualified for junior high and 
did transition. In our sample we do not observe the children who qualified but did 
not transition from primary school to junior high. Also children who failed 
EBTANAS are unobserved in the samples. This results in positive selection bias in 
the samples where there are children with higher unobserved ability or children 
who have parents who are scholastically motivated. 
 
The data consists of children in junior high in each period of observation. With 
reference to Figure 5.1, the child observed can be 12, 13, 14 or 15 years old. This 
child has taken the qualifying tests EBTANAS, passed and transitioned which 
represents prior skills attained. The skills built up represent the amount of financial 
and time investment that their parents have put into their children in the previous 
6 grades of primary school. We do not have more information on income, financial 
and time investments for grade-to- grade. There is only data on current income and 
current investment in the period of observation. For the rest of the paper, we 
consider financial investment in terms of the annual educational expenditures 
particularly the monthly scheduled fee payments that have to be kept up in each of 
the grades in junior high. Failure to keep up payments is tantamount to schooling 
interruptions, i.e. children who are not allowed to attend classes which then 
negatively affect the skill formation process. Also we use time investment to 
represent the opportunity cost of time of the child where s / he chooses how to 
allocate time each day for schooling, work or for staying at home. Failure to keep 
the optimum number of hours of schooling because of work or staying at home 
may perhaps negatively affect the skill formation process. 
 
Using the AFC, we exploit changes in income for the whole time period between 
1997 and 2000. Children who are exposed to the AFC are in the group in 2000. By 
this period of observation they will be in junior high and have the school age of 12, 
13, 14 or 15. While junior high starts at the school age of 13, it is possible that some 
children will start at age 12 because they started primary school at the school age 6 
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instead of school age 7. They will have qualified to start junior high or are already 
in junior high in 2000 because they have reached age 12 and have their EBTANAS 
test scores. But before they transitioned in 2000, their parents experienced volatile 
and unpredictable reductions to income. Primary school investments were 
correspondingly affected. As graphically represented in Figure 5.2 this occurred 
when in 1997 the children had starting ages 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12; in 1998 their ages 
sequentially were 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13; in 1999 their ages were sequentially 10, 11, 12, 
13, and 14; and in 2000 the ages of the children were sequentially 11, 12, 13, 14 and 
15. Consequently, the starting age of the child in 1997 for each sequence determines 
the length of time the child’s investment at junior high is negatively affected by 
income. A child aged 12 in 1997 receives a depressed investment at age 13 in 1998, 
age 14 in 1999 and age 15 in 2000. This is different compared to children who turn 
12 and enter junior high after 1997 and receive a lower investment for a shorter 
period of time. 
 
Figure 5.2 School Age when Exposed to the Financial Crisis 
 
Year        Exposure to the 
AFC 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Age             
5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
 
We exploit this source of variation by estimating the regression in the reduced form 
of: 
it it it 4 it 3 1 it 2 it 1 i 0 it μ Y A β A β S β Y β S β I                                < (1) 
where I denotes current investment in child i in junior high at t; Si skills when the 
child is born; per capita household income Y for child i at t; Sit-1 skills already 
attained by child i when in primary school reported as EBTANAS test scores; A age 
of child i at t and the interaction of A age and Y income which provides a 
comparison between pure age effects and income effects on investment depending 
on age of the child. 
 
If equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), there will be biased 
and inconsistent estimates. As such IV estimation is used to isolate the relationship 
between income and investment. The IV approach is used to manage the omitted 
variable bias problem that is faced from not being able to observe parental 123 
 
investment behavior over the period of 1998 and 1999 as well as to enable a 
discussion of alternative explanations for variations in investment such as 
unobserved parental characteristics. As the instrument we use is the AFC, this 
instrument works through the value that parents have for the future benefits of 
their children’s education where the variation in investment is owing to current 
parental income. This is written as equation (2) where the endogenous explanatory 
variable income Yit is a linear function of the exogenous variable the AFC z4, a 
dummy variable and an error term. 
 
it 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 it υ z π z π z π z π π Y                                   < (2) 
 
Following from the theoretical framework, the critical periods for investment are 
magnified over the period of the AFC when household incomes are reduced. 
Parents have to adapt their labor supply, draw down on savings or smooth 
consumption and they will rearrange their decisions throughout 1998 and 1999. But 
if their child is very close to completing the junior high level and has attained skills 
from primary school as measured by EBTANAS, then their decisions over the crisis 
period may likely condition on the investments already made. By adding this 
condition, this may possibly show that there are parents who view current 
investment for their children in junior high as a priority in spite of the financial 
difficulties faced during the crisis.  This may especially be the case if the child is at 
a school age that is closer to the final grade of junior high (see Figure 5.2 when the 
child is 15 and at grade 9) compared to a child at a school age that is at the starting 
grade of junior high (see Figure 5.2 when the child is 13 at grade 7). If this 
prediction is correct then this implies that parents will take into account the loss in 
previous investments at the primary school level. As such from equation (1), we 
would like to further investigate coefficient β4 by decomposing the variable by each 
age in the observed in the data. This consists of age 12, age 13, age 14 and age 15. 
The relationship between available income at a given age of the child, is 
instrumented by the crisis occurring at the point in time when a child is at age 12 
completing primary school and then correspondingly when a child is at age 13 
starting junior high, then age 14 and age 15 which move closer to the completion of 
junior high. In so doing there are four instruments for four endogenous 
explanatory variables for age 12, age 13, age 14 and age 1528. Equation (1) is then re-
written as: 
 
it it it it
it it it it it it it i it
y A y A y A
y A A A A A S Y S I
   
       
  
         
15 14 13
12 15 14 13 12
10 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 1 2 1 0 <(3) 
                                                 
28 There is an additional instrument for children aged 11 in the observed data. However the number of 
children aged 11 observed is miniscule. While we do use this instrument, we do not report the results in 




Equation (2) is then re-written to represent the multiple instruments used and 
where the IV estimator then becomes a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator: 
 
it 10 10 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 it υ z π z π z π z π z π z π z π z π z π z π π Y             <(4) 
 
Because the AFC affected regions across the Indonesian archipelago differently, we 
account for this by adding controls for the child’s residential location where we 
aggregate Java and Bali Islands and the other islands as the Outer Islands and 
residency by urban and rural location. We do this because Java and Bali have 
higher levels of economic development, more waged labor opportunities and more 
school choice29. This is as opposed to the Outer Islands that consist more of 
subsistence economies, agricultural economies and with lower levels of economic 
development. Also because the Outer Islands are located further away from the 
central government in Java and more difficult to access geographically there are 
fewer education related choices available. We also include further controls that 
affect schooling investment which are school type and the child’s gender. The 
child’s past school type and current school type are included to control for school 
quality. School type is defined by whether it is a public school funded and run by 
the government or a private school that is funded privately and unregulated. 
Public school is a proxy for higher quality education than private school. 
5.4 Findings 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
With reference to the following Table 5.1 of descriptive statistics, on average 
incomes fell by 2.5 log points when comparing 1997 with 2000. Also there are 
extreme outliers to the right of the income distribution for both groups. Because of 
the disproportionately high incomes of the richest households in Indonesia, we 
look at the income distributions for both groups. Starting with the minimum and 
maximum points in the distribution, in 1997 the range was 14.26 – 21.05 log points. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
1997      Mean    SD    Min     Max  
Income per Capita (Ln)  16.47    .81    14.26    21.05 
Financial Investment (Ln)  11.69    .83    6.62    14.20 
Time Investment     5.88    .88    3    12 
EBTANAS     31.82    5.92    18.38    46.4 
 
          Percentage 
Child is not in school      .00 
Child is working        .005 
 
Java and Bali Islands      .36           
Outer Islands        .64 
Rural          .46 
Urban          .54 
 
Junior High – Public      .61 
Junior High - Private      .39 
Primary School – Public      .84 
Primary School – Private      .16 
 
Girl          .52 
Boy          .48 
N          569 
 
2000      Mean    SD    Min     Max  
Income Per Capita (Ln)  13.99    .83    11.76    18.29 
Financial Investment (Ln)  11.28    1.03    6.40    13.84 
Time Investment     5.04    2.37    0    15.81 
EBTANAS     32.55    5.59    14.10    46.5 
 
          Freq 
Child is not in school      .06 
Child is working        .16 
 
Java and Bali Islands      .54         
Outer Islands        .46 
Rural          .51 
Urban          .49 
 
Junior High – Public      .68 
Junior High - Private      .32 
Primary School – Public      .85 
Primary School – Private      .15 
 
Girl          .51 
Boy          .49 
N          833 
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In 2000, this became 11.76 – 18.29. The shift of the normal income distribution can 
also be seen in Figure 5.3 where there is a lower peak in 1997 compared to 2000. 
Arguably due to extremely unpredictable variability in the economy over the 
period of the crisis, there are far more different incomes levels which further spread 
out the tails of the normal distribution.  
 
Figure 5.3 Household Income Per Capita 
 
 
Notes: The proxy used for household income is consumption and savings. To calculate real prices, we 
follow the Indonesian Census Bureau of Statistics (BPS) convention of the modified Lespeyres deflator. 
Consumption is measured using the market valued prices of goods and services. This price data is 
tracked by BPS but has an urban bias because prices come from urban outlets spread across Indonesia. 
The values of in-kind transfers and own production are not included. Savings is measured using cash on 
hand, bonds and stocks. It is assumed that this liquidity stems from the year observed and is not 
accumulated stock over time. 
 
However the bounds for financial investments in education are tighter than for 
incomes both before and after the crisis. This can be seen in Table 5.1. The range for 
investments for 1997 is 6.62 – 14.20 log points and for 2000 they are 6.40 – 13.84 log 
points. Investments on average are 11.69 log points in 1997 and 11.28 log points in 
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The fall in investment is primarily coming from the highest 20% of households of 
the income distribution. 
 
Looking at the other specification for investment which is the amount of schooling 
time allocated we also find a reduction in 2000. On average time spent in school 
each day fell from 5.88 hours in 1997 to 5.04 hours in 2000. For both periods, this 
average time amount is below the required 7.6 hours based on the national 
academic curriculum. The range of schooling time in 1997 was 3 – 12 hours per day. 
In contrast, the range for 2000 was spread out to 0 – 15.81 hours per day with 
greater variability compared to 1997.  
 
The schooling time distributions also show that the 6th percentile of children in 1997 
reported zero hours allocated for schooling. In addition 0.16 of the 2000 sample 
reported working. The ages of the 0.16 of this 2000 sample are 14 and 15. In 
comparison, no children in the 1997 group reported 0 hours of schooling. We 
interpret this to mean that for the 0.06 not in school, they may either be at home or 
working; or at home and working. Since the percentage of children reporting 
working status is higher than the percentage of children with zero hours in school, 
this suggests that there are children simultaneously working and going to school in 
200030. We will investigate time investments further in the next section using IV 
analysis. When we do this, we will transform the variable into log terms to enable 
ease of comparison.  
 
Despite an income reduction, the children’s stock of skill was not severely affected. 
From the descriptive statistics in Table 5.1, it can be seen that average test scores 
were higher in 2000. On average test scores in 2000 were 32.55 points in contrast to 
31.82 points in 1997. But the minimum for scores in 2000 is an extremely low 14.10 
points compared to 18.38 points in 1997. For children in the lower end of the 
EBTANAS standardized test score distribution, more of them failed almost all of 
the five subjects tested over the period of the crisis, all of 1998, 1999 and most of 
2000. The lowest performance in 2000 versus 1997 came from the science test (this 
statistic is not reported). The best performance for the children in the lower end of 
the score distribution in 2000 against 1997 is the Indonesian language literacy test. 
Looking at the highest end of the test score distribution, there is no change for both 
groups. Children in the lower end of the EBTANAS distribution are pulling down 
performance while the achievements of the children from the median to the top 1% 
of the distribution remained unchanged. More importantly, the distribution of 
skills in both periods appears to be a result of selection bias. It seems that the 
children with test scores higher than the median score in both groups have the 
same stock of skills. But the children selected into the group in 2000 with lower 
                                                 
30 I investigate simultaneous work-schooling behavior in Chapter 4. 128 
 
than median scores have a lower stock of skills than children selected into the 
group in 1997.  
 
To gain a better understanding of the distributional relationship between the main 
variables of interest in the technology of skill formation, we run kernel regressions. 
This can be seen in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. The shape and slope of the kernel 
regressions in both figures are approximately linear given the several bandwidths 
we have tried using. As such we assume that the relationships are linear which is 
consistent with our model and the assumption of monotonicity for treatment type 
effects that are heterogeneous.  
 










































For financial investments given household income in Figure 5.4, the distribution 
shifts from the right in 1997 to the left in 2000 and in the direction of the origin. 
Families by and large were not able to keep up investments given how depressed 
their incomes became. This is especially the case for the poorest of the poor in the 
first quintile of the income distribution. However households in the fourth and fifth 
quintiles which include the richest households also failed to maintain investments 
at pre-crisis levels. Parents in the second and third quintiles were able to not only 129 
 
maintain investments but increase the level slightly in 2000. In the following Figure 
5.5 we learn more about parents’ investment responses to the crisis. We observe 
that for families with children who have low scores in the 30 – 35 test point range, 
investment in 2000 is higher than investment in 1997. For the rest of the score 
distribution above the 30 – 35 test point range, investment increases as scores 
increase; the 2000 investment level is higher than the 1997 investment level.  
 
Figure 5.5 Kernel Regressions of Financial Investments in Junior High given 






















































5.4.2.1 Financial Investments 
We first test the relationship between income and financial investment without 
factoring in the child’s skills attained and without any controls and the results are 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.2. A log point reduction in income causes 
financial investments in education to fall by 0.17 log points. The OLS coefficient 
size is 0.22 log points. In contrast IV coefficient size is 0.17 log points which reflects 
an upwards bias for the OLS estimate.  Both results are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. When prior skills attained as measured by EBTANAS are added and 130 
 
this is seen in specifications (3) – (10), the magnitude of the income coefficient 
remains at approximately 0.20 for OLS and at 0.17 for IV and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These estimates remain unaffected by the introduction of 
control variables. The IV estimates across specifications (1) – (10) indicate that the 
OLS estimates are biased upwards for unobserved reasons. This finding then 
strongly implies that in the presence of income constraints, 80% of the cross-
sectional link between income and financial investment in education is caused by 
differences in income. The remaining 20% of the cross-sectional link between 
income and educational investment is caused by differences in parental 
characteristics. 
 
When the stock of skills variable is included as a specification in (3) and (4), we find 
that prior skills attained have a smaller relationship with investment compared to 
the causal relationship between income and investment. A one test point increase 
in EBTANAS increases educational expenditures by 0.02 log points; this is for both 
the OLS and IV estimates and is statistically significant at the 1% level. It appears 
that the differences in the observed human capital accumulated earlier in primary 
school explain very little for later investment. When the control variables Java and 
Bali residency, urban residency, school type and gender are added in specifications 
(5) and (6), the impact of skills attained on investment weakens to 0.01 log points. 
Statistical significance falls to the 5% level. This suggests that differences in where 
the child resides and goes to school and gender differences further weaken the 
relationship between stock of skills and investment. From these results, we show 
that 0.8 of the cross-sectional link between income and educational expenditures 
are caused by differences in income and this result is robust across specifications 
(1) – (10). 131 
 
Table 5.2 OLS & IV-2SLS Complementarity of Financial Investments in Junior High 
                     
DV = Financial Investment in Junior High given Income in Junior High and Skills from Primary School, 1997 and 2000 
(SE for OLS and Robust SE for IV and IV-2SLS are in Parentheses) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV-2SLS  OLS  IV-2SLS 




















































































                     
Instrumented                     
Income by the 
Crisis 
  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Age_Income 
by Age_Crisis 
              Yes    Yes 
                     
Controls          Yes  Yes      Yes  Yes 
                     
R2  .11  .11  .13  .13  .22  .22  .14  .13  .22  .21 
Observations  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288 
Statistically significant at the *** 1% ** 5% and * 10% level 
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Notes: The age range is from 11 – 15. For the interaction of age and income, the age variable has been de-
meaned and the income variable has been de-meaned. The control variables are if the child resides and 
goes to school in the Java and Bali Islands; if the child is in an urban area; the child’s school type at the 
primary school level and junior high level and if the child is a girl or boy. 
 
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 5.3, we introduce the OLS estimates for comparison 
with the 2SLS estimates. We instrument income by the crisis and instrument the 
interaction of age and available income by age and the crisis and without controls. 
The OLS and 2SLS estimates for income are the same as the prior specifications and 
are robust. The skill variable is now increased back to 0.02 log points and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. But we find that the interaction of age with 
income has a negative causal relationship with educational expenditures. In 
response to a reduction in income, parents increase financial investment by 0.03 log 
points when the child is older by a year. The coefficient size for the 2SLS estimate is 
a smaller 0.09 which indicates that the OLS estimate is biased downwards for 
unobserved reasons. This result is statistically significant for the 2SLS estimate at 
the 1% level compared to the statistical significance for the OLS estimate at the 5% 
level. When controls are re-introduced, the results as can be seen in specifications 
(9) and (10) remain similar to specifications (7) and (8). The exception is that the 
size of the skills coefficient is reduced by half again where a one test point increase 
in EBTANAS only raises investment by 0.01 log points instead of 0.02 log points.  
 
As the sensitive time in our model (Section 5.2) is the period of junior high at t = 2 
after the child has completed and transitioned from primary school at t = 1, we 
proceed to detail which school ages within the junior high level are investment 
priorities. The relationship between available income at a given age of the child, is 
instrumented by the crisis occurring at the point in time when a child is at age 12 
completing primary school and then correspondingly when a child is at age 13 
starting junior high, then age 14 and age 15 which move closer to the completion of 
junior high and the beginning of the minimum legal employment age. The OLS and 
2SLS results are presented in Table 5.3 and the coefficient sizes are similar across all 
specifications (11) – (14).  
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Table 5.3 OLS & IV-2SLS Complementarity of Financial Investments in Junior 
High 
 
DV = Complementarity of Financial Investments in Junior High given Income in Junior High and Skills 
from Primary School, 1997 and 2000 
(SE for OLS and Robust SE for IV and IV-2SLS are in Parentheses) 
 
  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
         
Explanatory Variables  OLS  IV-2SLS  OLS  IV-2SLS 
Skills  .0223***  .0223***  .0096**  .0095** 
  (.0044)  (.0044)  (.0044)  (.0045) 
Age 12  -.1450  .0027  -.2536  -.0902 
  (.2224)  (.2180)  (.2111)  (.2066) 
Age 13  -.0335  .1504  -.0880  .1165 
  (.2141)  (.2005)  (.2035)  (.1893) 
Age 14  .0718  .2579  -.0241  .1818 
  (.2133)  (.2003)  (.2028)  (.1896) 
Age 15  .4917**  .7124***  .3489  .6512** 
  (.2442)  (.2028)  (.2324)  (.1932) 
Age 12_Income  .4094***  .4702***  .4124***  .4841*** 
  (.0464)  (.0657)  (.0440)  (.0631) 
Age 13_Income  .2707***  .2446***  .2464***  .2302*** 
  (.0305)  (.0320)  (.0292)  (.0304) 
Age 14_Income  .1438***  .0621*  .1350***  .0824** 
  (.0272)  (.0339)  (.0260)  (.0323) 
Age 15_Income  .3998***  .4342***  .3245***  .4146*** 
  (.0908)  (.0275)  (.0865)  (.0361) 
Constant  10.6991  10.5159  11.0174  10.8150 
  (.2518)  (.2405)  (.2442)  (.2318) 
Instrumented         
Age 11_Income by Age 11_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 12_Income by Age 12_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 13_Income by Age 13_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 14_Income by Age 14_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 15_Income by Age 15_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
         
Controls       Yes  Yes 
R2  .16  .15  .25  .25 
Observations  1,288  1,288  1,288  1,288 




Notes: The age range is from 11 – 15. The reference age group is 11. The results for age 11 (not reported) 
have a miniscule effect on the coefficient size for financial investments. For the interaction of each age 
and income, the variable for each age is represented by a dummy and the income variable has been de-
meaned. The control variables are if the child resides and goes to school in the Java and Bali Islands; if 
the child is in an urban area; the child’s school type at the primary school level and junior high level and 
if the child is a girl or boy. 
 
When the child is aged 12, has completed EBTANAS for primary school and given 
an income reduction investment falls by 0.4. This decrease in investment at age 12 
may perhaps be partly explained by government subsidies offsetting parental 
spending in order to ensure that children complete the final grade of primary 
school. But when the child is older by a year at age 13, has started junior high at 
grade 7 and given an income reduction, investment only falls by 0.2. When the 
child is aged 14, a year prior to taking EBTANAS for junior high to enter senior 
high; and a year prior to being old enough to enter the labor force, an income 
reduction causes investment to decrease by only 0.08. At age 15, an income 
decrease causes a larger decrease in investment of 0.3 for OLS and 0.4 for 2SLS. 
This implies that the 0.3 of the link between income and investment at age 15 is 
caused by income and 0.7 by unobserved factors. This substantial decrease in 
investment at age 15 then implies that investment decision making is influenced by 
a new set of factors. There is now a fork in the decision path where the child can 
either take EBTANAS to transition to senior high or take EBTANAS then enter the 
labor force at the legal minimum age of 15. The presence of two options – to 
continue with higher education or to work is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics where for ages 14 and 15 in the 2000 sample 0.06 of the children reported 
zero hours allocated for formal schooling and 0.16 reported working. In contrast no 
children of the same age in the 1997 sample reported zero formal schooling time 
and 0.005 of the children worked.  
 
The pattern of reduction in educational expenditures is much lower for children 
who have already attained a few years of junior high education. The reduction is 
lower for the child aged 14 than for the child aged 13 and both have reductions 
lower than for the child aged 12 who has only attained a primary school education. 
This means that junior high investments are a priority despite depressed household 
incomes. This implies that parents do take into account the loss in returns related to 
previous investments on the stock of human capital accumulated. But this 
investment behavior appears to only be partly explained up to 0.8 by differences in 
household income related characteristics. The remaining 0.2 explanation for this 
pattern of investment is related to parental characteristics such as scholastically 
motivated parents. Such parents may view education as a high priority in their 
children’s lifecycle. They allocate more of their children’s time for formal schooling 
and do not consider the possibility of their children working or helping in the 135 
 
household. We test this prediction in the next sub-section where investment is 
specified as schooling time. 
5.4.2.2 Time Investments 
In our model applying the technology of skill formation, the initial specification for 
investment was educational expenditures. We proceed to change the specification 
to investment in schooling time. We investigate whether schooling time 
compensates for educational expenditures given reduced household incomes. The 
results in the following Table 5.4 show that in the both groups 50% of the cross-
sectional link between income and schooling time investments is caused by 
differences in income and the remaining 50% is caused by differences in parental 
characteristics. In specifications (15) and (16) of Table 5.4, the OLS estimate for one 
log point reduction in income increases time investment by 0.4 log points while the 
IV estimate is 0.6 log points. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  The IV estimates indicates that time invested in schooling is higher than the 
OLS estimate by 0.5 because of unobserved behavioral factors. This result remains 
unchanged when the skills variable and control variables are included which can 
be seen across specifications (17) – (24). This infers that when there is an income 
reduction, resources for schooling is compensated by a time allocation increase. 
However the compensatory effect of time on expenditures is magnified by the 
higher ability children with a higher than median EBTANAS test score who are 
self-selected into junior high. The compensatory effect of time is dampened when 
factoring in lower ability children who report 0 hours of schooling. 136 
 
Table 5.4 OLS & IV-2SLS Complementarity of Time Investments in Junior High 
 
DV = Complementarity of Time Investments in Junior High given Income in Junior High and Skills from Primary School, 1997 and 2000 
(SE for OLS and Robust SE for IV and IV-2SLS are in Parentheses) 
 
  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24) 
                     
Explanatory 
Variables 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV-2SLS  OLS  IV-2SLS 




















































































                     
Instrumented                     
Income by the 
Crisis 
  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Age_Income 
by Age_Crisis 
              Yes    Yes 
                     
Controls          Yes  Yes      Yes  Yes 
                     
R2  .47  .39  .49  .37  .50  .41  .49  .41  .50  .42 
Observations  1,348  1,348  1,271  1,271  1,271  1,271  1,271  1,271  1,271  1,271 
Statistically significant at the *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level 137 
 
Notes: The age range is from 11 – 15. The reference age group is 11. For the interaction of age and 
income, the age variable has been de-meaned and the income variable has been de-meaned. The control 
variables are if the child resides and goes to school in the Java and Bali Islands; if the child is in an urban 
area; the child’s school type at the primary school level and junior high level and if the child is a girl or 
boy. 
 
When the stock of skills variable is applied in specifications (17) and (24), we find 
that prior skills attained have the same small relationship with time investment as 
the relationship with financial investments. The coefficient size of 0.02 for OLS and 
IV is unchanged and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is the same 
result when the control variables are added. This then strongly implies that the 
stock of human capital while important for investment decision making drives very 
little of current educational spending and amount of time allocated for schooling. 
 
When we investigate which school ages within the junior high level are investment 
priorities in terms of the allocation of schooling time the results in the following 
Table 5.5 show a different distribution pattern compared to educational 
expenditures.  138 
 
Table 5.5 OLS & IV-2SLS Complementarity of Time investments in Junior High 
 
DV = Complementarity of Time Investments in Junior High given Income in Junior 
High and Skills from Primary School, 1997 and 2000 
(SE for OLS and Robust SE for IV and IV-2SLS are in Parentheses) 
 
  (25)  (26)  (27)  (28) 
         
Explanatory Variables  OLS  IV-2SLS  OLS  IV-2SLS 
Skills  .0243***  .0268***  .0213***  .0233*** 
  (.0031)  (.0033)  (.0033)  (.0034) 
Age 12  .1828  .1432  .1699  .1165 
  (.1621)  (.2047)  (.1620)  (.2111) 
Age 13  .1709  .0196  .1683  .0144 
  (.1567)  (.1967)  (.1567)  (.2026) 
Age 14  .2463  .0945  .2384  .0829 
  (.1561)  (.1967)  (.1562)  (.2031) 
Age 15  .5504**  .1205  .5464  .1152 
  (.1771)  (.2094)  (.1775)  (.2132) 
Age 12_Income  -.4067***  -.6231***  -.4039***  -.6234*** 
  (.0323)  (.0448)  (.0323)  (.0445) 
Age 13_Income  -.4448***  -.5968***  -.4472***  -.6034*** 
  (.0214)  (.0240)  (.0215)  (.0242) 
Age 14_Income  -.4171***  -.5993***  -.4196***  -.6050*** 
  (.0190)  (.0239)  (.0192)  (.0242) 
Age 15_Income  -.2268***  -.4726***  -.2334***  -.4863*** 
  (.0628)  (.0620)  (.0631)  (.0564) 
Constant  1.6334  1.7149  1.6653  1.772 
  (.1837)  (.2218)  (.1873)  (.2308) 
Instrumented         
Age 11_Income by Age 11_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 12_Income by Age 12_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 13_Income by Age 13_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 14_Income by Age 14_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
Age 15_Income by Age 15_Crisis    Yes    Yes 
         
Control Variables       Yes  Yes 
R2  .50  .42  .51  .43 
Observations  1,271  1,271  1,271  1,271 
Statistically significant at the *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level 139 
 
Notes: The age range is from 11 – 15. The reference age group is 11. The results for age 11 (not reported) 
have a miniscule effect on the coefficient size for financial investments.  For the interaction of each age 
and income, the variable for each age is represented by a dummy and the income variable has been de-
meaned. The control variables are if the child resides and goes to school in the Java and Bali Islands; if 
the child is in an urban area; the child’s school type at the primary school level and junior high level and 
if the child is a girl or boy. 
 
The interaction of each age 12, 13, 14 and 15 with income as instrumented by each 
age with the crisis show that time investment is uniformly increased across age 12, 
age 13 and 14. For each additional year of the child’s age given an income reduction 
but only up to age 14, time investment increases by approximately 0.4 log points 
for OLS and 0.6 log points for 2SLS. This is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
These coefficient magnitudes hold with and without control variables as can be 
seen in specifications (25) – (28) in Table 5.5. Given the difference between 0.4 for 
the OLS estimate and 0.6 for the 2SLS estimate, it is strongly inferred that 50% of 
the cross-sectional link between schooling time investments at age 12, age 13 and 14 
and available income are caused by differences in income. The remaining 50% of 
the cross-sectional link is caused by differences in parental characteristics or 
differences in child characteristics.  This suggests that there are parents who favor 
education and are less inclined for their children aged 12 – 14 to allocate time for 
work or helping in the household. Likewise the children may be scholastically 
motivated and are more likely to spend more time studying. But the inclination to 
be in school more hours may be limited to high quality and affordable public 
schools. However there is a threshold at age 15 when time investment decision 
making changes. The OLS estimate reduces to 0.2 log points and the 2SLS estimate 
reduces to 0.4 log points and both are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Schooling time compensates less for educational expenditures at age 15 compared 
to ages 12 – 14 but the differences explaining for this remain as half for income and 
half for unobserved parental characteristics. This is reflected by 0.16 of the 2000 
group dividing time between schooling and working. Also this investment 
behavior may perhaps be attributed to the two choices that a 15 year old has – 
complete junior high and go on to senior high or complete junior high and enter the 
labor force. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Optimal parental investments in education depend on an evaluation of upfront 
costs and delayed benefits. If education was only viewed as a consumption good, 
income would determine optimal investments. In the Indonesian context of 
incomplete credit markets, we find that there is a causal interpretation between 
reduced income and financial investments in education. Using repeated cross 
sections from 1997 and 2000, 80% of the cross sectional link between income and 
educational spending is caused by differences in income. The remaining 20% is 140 
 
caused by unobserved parental characteristics or unobserved child characteristics. 
Our findings also show that the 50% of cross sectional link between income and 
time investment in education is caused by differences in income. Financial 
investments and time investments in education compensate for each other when 
household income is reduced. But this appears to only be for higher ability children 
who have completed primary school and selected to enter junior high. This does 
not appear to be the case for lower ability children in junior high where educational 
expenditures and schooling time do not compensate each other. 
 
This chapter has also shown that due to the dynamic complementarity of skills 
attained the reduction in educational expenditures is much lower for children who 
have already attained a few years of junior high education. This implies that 
parents do take into account the loss in returns related to previous investments on 
the stock of human capital accumulated. Put another way, parents do face a loss 
aversion where sunk costs do matter. But at age 15 the final year of junior high and 
the minimum legal age for employment, the reduction in expenditures is far greater 
than for the earlier grades of junior high. This suggests that the child may enter the 
labor force and have earning opportunities that match the skills accumulated up to 
junior high. As households bear up to 60% of the total educational cost, low income 
households may assess that going on to senior high may entail costs that far 
outweigh market earning opportunities. As pointed out in the literature on 
educational investment in developing countries, parents may view the market 
value of schooling up to a certain school level and in the context of Indonesia this 
may possibly be at junior high. Hence for low income households, educational 
investments may then be sub-optimal. 
 
The conclusions that we draw here is that monetary constraints drive schooling 
decisions for Indonesian children at the junior high level. This is not the case at the 
primary school level which is heavily subsidized by central and regional 
government. Parents make sub-optimal investments when they equate the direct 
and opportunity costs of education with future benefits up to only the junior high 
level and not at higher levels of education.  However, there are parents with 
children of higher ability who are favorably pre-disposed to higher education 
where they make investments in both time and money. The parents who are 
scholastically motivated are then inclined for their children to go on to higher 
levels of education. But for lower income households with lower ability children, 
junior high becomes the level at which children may end up working pre-maturely 
instead of gaining more education. The longer term consequence is then that in 
adulthood they will have a lower stock of human capital and will be unable to 






6. Main Findings and Implications142 
 
6.1 Main Findings 
 
Education is considered to be very important for economic growth.  But family 
investments in education are much lower in developing countries compared to 
developed countries. This leads to the question whether families in developing 
countries have a low preference to invest and whether the market rates of return 
are very low; or that there are actually constraints to investment.  
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to investigate whether families in developing 
countries face actual constraints to investing in their children’s human capital. 
Empirically we have determined two main constraints to educational investment in 
the Indonesian developing country context: resource constraints on basic facilities – 
we used the access to and use of electricity for studying; and monetary constraints 
as captured by family income. This empirical work is covered in four chapters. The 
method that we have used to determine these two main constraints on investment 
in basic education is the natural experiment or a comparative method focusing on 
Indonesian families over two periods, 1997 and 2000 where the Asian Financial 
Crisis occurred in 1998 and 1999.  
 
The main findings in Chapter 2 are that in response to an income reduction, 
families used various ways to ensure that their children continued their education 
in primary school and junior high. Parents’ adaptive strategies were to shift their 
children from high quality formal education to low quality non-formal and 
informal school; maintained a scheduled monthly flow of fees / contributions to 
keep the school operational or risk their children being withheld from school; 
trading off timely monthly flow payments by reducing spending on school 
expenditures at the intensive margin such as school uniforms and sports 
equipment; and only high ability children on the basis of test scores were selected 
to transition from formal primary school to formal junior high. An additional 
finding is that there are regional geographical patterns to the different school types 
that children attended before and after the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
In Chapter 3, the main findings stem from investigating the regional patterns in 
schooling across the Indonesian archipelago. 12 year old children who have more 
access to electricity have better educational performance. The potential pathway 
between the availability of electricity and test score performance is via how 
children use electricity in school and in the household to improve learning 
efficiency. However given the fixed placement of the national electricity grid which 
pre-dominates in Java and Bali Islands, children in economically developed areas 
have higher test score performance than disadvantaged children in 143 
 
underdeveloped, lagging behind areas. The regional distribution of electricity is an 
inherent resource constraint for schooling and learning. The lack of access to 
electricity is viewed as a non-monetary resource constraint on education as family 
income has a minimal influence on how the state distributes electricity.  
 
The main findings in Chapter 4 are that there are children who are pre-disposed to 
working from as young as age 6 and then starting to attend school and they 
continue to work more as they become older. Work manifests itself in terms of 
working within the household for the family (e.g. household chores or farm work) 
or outside of the household for wages or in-kind transfers. Children especially boys 
work more hours outside the household and for wages when they are older than 
12. We find that simultaneous work-schooling behavior does not interrupt 
schooling and does not impair human capital accumulation as much as would have 
been expected. However child workers who attend non-formal school with flexible 
hours that cater to their work patterns; and children who work as family 
apprentices have lower qualifications than children in the formal education system. 
This increases the probability of poor formal labor market outcomes later in life. 
But child apprentices appear to be able to continue the traditional family trade 
which may be viewed as having a high social return. 
 
In Chapter 5, the main findings are that there exists a relationship between family 
income and educational investment in Indonesia. A reduction in family income 
reduces the amount used to finance schooling in junior high but this is 
compensated by an increase in the amount of time invested in schooling and 
learning. Despite reduced incomes, the family is not likely to terminate schooling 
and this is as described in Chapter 2. Optimal education investment does include 
accounting for the loss in returns from previous investments on the stock of human 
capital that has been accumulated. Put another way, parents do face a loss aversion 
where sunk costs do matter. Using repeated cross sections from 1997 and 2000, we 
find that about 80% of the cross-sectional link between income and educational 
expenditures is caused by differences in income. The remaining 20% is related to 
unobserved parental characteristics. Strong influences for complementing prior 
educational investment are when the child is close to completing junior high as 
opposed to having just started junior high; and when the child has high cognitive 
ability on the basis of prior primary school test scores. 
6.2 Implications  
 
The central finding of this dissertation is that families in developing countries do 
not have a lower preference for education; but rather they are confronted with 
resource constraints – the lack of school quality; and income constraints. Because 144 
 
families are constrained, we will argue that policymakers can look at different ways 
apart from educational financing and the formal educational system to increase 
human capital. It is our position that understanding the social and economic status 
of individual families and the constraints they face plays an important role in 
educational policymaking. 
 
Developing country governments tend to intervene in the provision of education 
by building more schools, increasing the number of qualified teachers and 
providing scholarships to disadvantaged children. Yet in the Indonesian context, 
since 1997 when the Asian Financial Crisis occurred, the percentage of children 
who complete a full course of 9 years of primary school and junior high has 
steadily fallen from 75% in 1997 to 52.6% in 2001. Because of the main constraints to 
educational investment, we posit that different families by social and economic 
status have a different calculus of decision making. While in normative terms, 
parental financing of education is meant to improve the child’s labor market 
outcomes in adulthood, developing country families consider far more factors. The 
calculus of decision making is most likely not about progressing from one school 
grade to another. Instead the factors under consideration are concerned with 
progressing from one school level to another. Given the evidence provided in this 
dissertation, these factors are regional geographical constraints on school quality; 
joint work-schooling starting from age 6 until age 15 at the end of junior high when 
they can legally enter the labor market fulltime; and whether the children have the 
cognitive skills to merit investment in education in senior high and university. 
 
While near universal primary school education has been achieved, we posit that if 
there is a clear understanding of the factors and constraints that families face when 
their children are about to transition from primary school to junior high, there is a 
higher likelihood that they will achieve all 3 years of schooling at junior high. That 
is, the battleground to be fought for achieving 9 years of universal basic education 
is at the junior high level. The battleground is no longer at the primary school level. 
The school resource constraints and income constraints are likely to be tightest 
when the child is aged 12 – 15. If the child has attended 6 years of primary school in 
an underdeveloped, lagging behind village with only basic infrastructure, the 
family may choose for the child to drop out. The school and home environment 
may not be conducive for continued education at the junior high level. If a child 
who is accustomed to working since age 6 and has turned 12 after completing 
primary school, the child may be more likely to work more and attend school less. 
This is because the child especially a boy working in an urban area may have a 
higher relative value of time for working rather than attend a low quality school, 
learning little. But there is evidence that once a child has started a few years of 
junior high through ages 13 and 14, parents are more likely to continue financing 
the child’s education until junior high is completed. By concentrating on the 145 
 
educational choices that families make during this at risk period of three years of 
junior high, policymakers are likely to be more successful in increasing schooling 
attainment. 
 
There are various concrete ways to relax these constraints on educational 
investment. The resource constraint on basic facilities such as electricity access can 
be relaxed when the state increases the distribution of electricity for school and 
household use. This will mean redistributing energy capacity away from industrial 
and transport use. This can be carried out as a part of the country’s redistribution 
program that reduces not just income inequality but schooling inequalities. The 
family income constraint can be less tight when the state disproportionately 
increases student scholarships and expenditures for junior high schools when the 
child is aged 13 in grade 8 and aged 14 in grade 9. Since there is evidence that 
families substitute lower educational expenditures with higher time allocated for 
studying, increasing electricity access in the school and household increases the 
number of hours that a child can choose to use for learning activity. Hence, it is 
possible to cogitate that educational investment constraints may interact and that 
relaxing one loosens the other constraints. 
 
Because of unobserved ability that may perhaps include less scholastic motivation, 
there will be children who are less likely to complete a full course of 9 years of basic 
education in the formal education system. These are children who are child 
workers or apprentices who have gained marketable skills from young by learning 
on the job. There is evidence of children who self-select out of the formal education 
system and opt for non-formal and informal schooling. For this group of children, 
school resource constraints and income constraints may not be the main factors 
restricting decision making. Their families may view their children’s relative value 
of time to be higher in market work and household production compared to formal 
schooling. By recognizing these family perspectives, educational policymakers 
particularly in Indonesia should continue to expand on non-formal and informal 
schooling choices for this group of children. Based on our knowledge, Indonesia is 
the only developing country in the world to have a national educational system 
that provides schooling alternatives for child workers. These schooling alternatives 
guarantee that economically active children receive some form of schooling 
regardless of whether they work by choice or because they are forced to.  As akin to 
the Coleman Report and arguments made by Heckman and Lochner (1999), our 
position is about rethinking how education and training can be used to build 
socially productive skills and not just marketable skills in the formal sector. For 
example, a child apprentice from a fishing family in Indonesia may be able to carry 
on with the family tradition passing skills from one generation to another. This 
tradition may perhaps be protected when the child receives modern technical skills 
training to complement existing skills learnt on the job. 146 
 
 
In forthcoming work, we will reconcile the educational choices of children in the 
formal and alternative schools and examine their longer term educational and labor 
market outcomes. New available IFLS data in 2007 will enable us to investigate 
how family decision making over the period of the Asian Financial Crisis affects 
later outcomes. While the effects of the financial crisis washed away relatively 
quickly at the macroeconomic level, we would like to investigate if there are longer 
term consequences in the labor market and within society. 
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Onderwijs wordt gezien als erg belangrijk voor economische groei. Maar gezinnen 
in ontwikkelingslanden investeren veel minder in onderwijs in vergelijking met 
gezinnen uit ontwikkelde landen. Dit leidt tot de vraag of gezinnen in 
ontwikkelingslanden een lage prioriteit aan investeringen geven, de opbrengst van 
de investeringen laag is of dat de mogelijkheid om te investeren beperkt wordt. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is te onderzoeken of gezinnen in ontwikkelingslanden 
geconfronteerd worden met beperkingen om te investeren in de ontwikkeling van 
het menselijk kapitaal van hun kinderen. We onderzoeken empirisch twee 
mogelijke beperkingen van de investering in het onderwijs van Indonesië als 
ontwikkelingsland. Allereerst de beperking op het gebied van basisfaciliteiten, 
hiervoor gebruiken we de toegang tot en het gebruik maken van elektriciteit voor 
onderwijs. Daarnaast kijken we naar de monetaire beperking die tot uitdrukking 
komt in de hoogte van het gezinsinkomen. Dit empirisch onderzoek beslaat 4 
hoofdstukken. Om het effect van inkomen op investeringen in onderwijs te bepalen 
gebruiken we de Aziatische Financiële Crisis als een natuurlijk experiment dat de 
inkomens van Indonesische gezinnen beïnvloedde tussen 1997 en 2000, waarbij de 
crisis in de tussenliggende jaren 1998 en 1999 plaatvond. Om de invloed van 
toegang tot electriciteit op onderwijsinvesteringen te meten vergelijken we 
verschillende regio’s in Indonesië.  
De belangrijkste bevindingen in hoofdstuk twee zijn, dat in een reactie op een 
inkomensdaling, gezinnen verschillende manieren vinden om er voor te zorgen dat 
hun kinderen het basisonderwijs en de eerste drie jaar van het middelbaar 
onderwijs kunnen blijven volgen. Ouders kiezen ervoor om hun kinderen in plaats 
van officiële scholen van hoge kwaliteit naar kwalitatief mindere informele scholen 
te sturen naar lage kwaliteit niet formeel onderwijs of naar een informele school; 
onderhouden een geregelde maandelijkse stroom van vergoedingen en bijdragen 
om de school te kunnen bekostigen en daarmee te voorkomen dat de kinderen niet 
naar school kunnen gaan. Om deze maandelijkse contributie te kunnen betalen 
wordt er minder besteedt aan de eenmalige kosten voor een schooljaar, zoals 
schooluniformen en sportuitrustingen. Daarnaast krijgen alleen kinderen met 
goede leercapaciteiten, op basis van behaalde testscores, de mogelijkheid om de 
overgang te maken van formeel basisonderwijs naar de eerste drie jaar van de 
formele middelbare school. Een additionele bevinding is dat er regionale 154 
 
geografische patronen te herkennen zijn in de verschillende schoolsoorten waar 
kinderen naar toe gaan, voor en na de Aziatische financiële crisis. 
Hoofdstuk drie gaat in op de de regionale patronen in onderwijs in de 
Indonesische archipel. Kinderen van twaalf jaar, die meer toegang tot elektriciteit 
hebben, presteren beter op school. Dit verband tussen de beschikbaarheid van 
elektriciteit en de testscores op school kan mogelijk verklaard worden doordat het 
gebruik van elektriciteit op school en thuis de efficiëntie van het leren verbetert. 
Uitgaande van het bestaande elektriciteitsnetwerk, voornamelijk goed ontwikkeld 
op Java en Bali, blijkt dat kinderen in economisch ontwikkelde gebieden hogere 
testscores halen op school vergeleken met kinderen in economisch 
onderontwikkelde gebieden die achter lopen. De regionale distributie van 
elektriciteit is een inherente beperking voor scholing en leren. Het gebrek aan 
toegang tot elektriciteit wordt gezien als een niet-monetaire invloed op onderwijs, 
aangezien het gezinsinkomen een minimaal effect heeft op de verdeling van de 
elektriciteit door de overheid.  
In hoofdstuk vier vinden we dat er kinderen zijn die voorbestemd zijn om al op 
jonge leeftijd, vanaf zes jaar, te werken en op het moment dat ze naar school gaan, 
naarmate ze ouder worden steeds meer gaan werken. Bij werk moeten we dan 
denken aan werken binnen het huishouden (bijvoorbeeld huishoudelijke werk of 
werk op de boerderij) of buiten het huishouden voor loon of beloning in natura. 
Kinderen, vooral jongens, werken meer uren buiten het huishouden en voor loon, 
als ze de leeftijd van twaalf jaar hebben bereikt. We vinden dat de combinatie van 
school met werken niet zorgt voor een onderbreking van de scholing en minder 
schadelijk is voor de ontwikkeling van het menselijke potentieel dan gedacht. 
Echter kinderen die werken en naar een informele school gaan met flexibele uren, 
die inspelen op hun werktijden en kinderen die het vak leren binnen het gezin, 
behalen een diploma op een lager niveau dan kinderen in het formele onderwijs 
systeem. Dit verhoogt de kans om op latere leeftijd een slechte arbeidsmarktpositie 
in te nemen. Kinderen die het vak van de ouders leren lijken in staat te zijn om de 
traditionele familiezaak voort te zetten, wat kan worden beschouwd als een vorm 
van een hoog sociaal rendement. 
De belangrijkste bevindingen in hoofdstuk vijf zijn dat er in Indonesië een relatie 
bestaat tussen het gezinsinkomen en de investeringen in onderwijs. Een verlaging 
van het gezinsinkomen vermindert de hoeveelheid financiële investering in de 
eerste drie jaar van de middelbare school, maar dit wordt gecompenseerd door een 
toename in de hoeveelheid tijd die geïnvesteerd wordt in scholing en leren. 
Ondanks een vermindering in inkomen is het niet waarschijnlijk dat het gezin de 
scholing beëindigt, de reden daarvoor is eerder beschreven in hoofdstuk twee. Met 
behulp van herhaalde dwarsdoorsneden van 1997 en 2000, vinden we dat ongeveer 
80% van het cross-sectionele verband tussen inkomen en de uitgaven voor 155 
 
onderwijs wordt veroorzaakt door verschillen in inkomen. De resterende 20% is 
gerelateerd aan de niet waargenomen kenmerken van de ouders. Sterke invloeden 
om eerdere investeringen in onderwijs ondanks het lagere inkomen aan te vullen, 
zijn er vooral wanneer het kind dicht bij het afronden van zijn middelbare school is, 
in tegenstelling tot de tijd wanneer het kind net begint met de middelbare school. 
En er is sprake van sterke invloed als het kind hoge cognitieve capaciteiten wordt 
toegedicht op basis van testscores op de basisschool.  
Implicaties 
De belangrijkste conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat gezinnen in 
ontwikkelingslanden niet beschikken over een lagere voorkeur voor het onderwijs; 
maar zij worden geconfronteerd met beperkte middelen - het gebrek aan kwaliteit 
van een school; en inkomensbeperkingen. Omdat gezinnen tegen beperkingen 
aanlopen adviseren we beleidsmakers om naar andere manieren dan financiering 
van onderwijs en het formele onderwijssysteem te kijken om het menselijk 
potentieel te vergroten. Het is ons standpunt dat inzicht in de sociale en 
economische status van individuele gezinnen en de beperkingen waarmee zij 
worden geconfronteerd een belangrijke rol speelt in de beleidsvorming voor het 
onderwijs.  
Regeringen van ontwikkelingslanden hebben de neiging in te grijpen in het aanbod 
van onderwijs door het bouwen van meer scholen, uitbreiding van het aantal 
gekwalificeerde docenten en het verstrekken van studiebeurzen aan kansarme 
kinderen. Als we kijken naar de Indonesië, sinds 1997 en het begin van de 
Aziatische financiële crisis, blijkt dat het aantal kinderen dat de volledige 9 jaar van 
basisschool en drie jaar middelbare school afmaakt gestaag daalt van 75% in 1997 
tot 52,6% in 2001. Vanwege de belangrijkste belemmeringen voor investeringen op 
onderwijsgebied, stellen we dat verschillende families door de sociale en 
economische status een andere manier van besluitvorming hebben. Terwijl in 
normatieve termen de financiering van onderwijs door de ouders bedoeld is om de 
arbeidsmarktpositie van het kind op latere volwassen leeftijd te verbeteren, blijken 
gezinnen in ontwikkelingslanden veel meer factoren in ogenschouw te nemen. De 
manier van besluitvorming is waarschijnlijk niet gericht op de overgang naar de 
volgende klas, maar de factoren die een rol spelen zijn gericht op het behalen van 
het volgende niveau. De verstrekte gegevens in dit proefschrift bewijzen dat deze 
factoren zijn de regionale geografische beperkingen op de kwaliteit van een school; 
combinatie van werken en school vanaf de leeftijd van zes jaar tot aan het eind van 
drie jaar middelbare school wanneer de kinderen met de leeftijd van vijftien jaar 
legaal fulltime kunnen gaan werken; en of de kinderen voldoende cognitieve 
vaardigheden hebben om investeringen in onderwijs in de laatste drie jaar 
middelbare school en universiteit te verantwoorden. 156 
 
We stellen dat als bij het bijna voltooien van de basisschool er een duidelijk inzicht 
is in de factoren en beperkingen waarmee gezinnen te maken krijgen wanneer hun 
kinderen de overgang maken van basisschool naar middelbare school, er een 
hogere kans is dat de eerste drie jaar van de middelbare school worden afgemaakt. 
Het grootste knelpunt om negen jaar basisopleiding te verkrijgen ligt niet op de 
basisschool maar op de middelbare school. Gedurende de leeftijdsfase van twaalf 
tot vijftien zijn de beperkingen voor school en inkomen het grootst. Als een kind 
zes jaar basisschool heeft gehad in een dorp met beperkte infrastructuur in een 
achtergebleven gebied is de kans het grootst dat de familie zal besluiten om te 
stoppen met het onderwijs. Zowel de school als de leefomgeving is niet ideaal voor 
het voortzetten van het onderwijs op de middelbare school. Als een kind gewend is 
om te werken vanaf zijn zesde en met twaalf jaar zijn basisschool afmaakt, dan is 
het waarschijnlijker dat het kind meer gaat werken en minder naar school zal gaan. 
Dat komt omdat een kind, vooral een jongen, in een stadsomgeving een hogere 
relatieve waarde zal hechten aan tijd voor werk dan aan tijd voor een lagere 
kwaliteit school, waar hij niet veel zal leren. Er is echter bewijs te vinden voor de 
veronderstelling dat als een kind een paar jaar middelbare school heeft gevolgd tot 
de leeftijd van dertien of veertien jaar, het voor ouders steeds logischer is om de 
opleiding van hun kind te blijven financieren tot het afronden van het derde jaar 
middelbare school. Door te concentreren op de onderwijskeuzes die gezinnen 
moeten maken in deze risicovolle periode van de eerste drie jaar van de middelbare 
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